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     The concept of “ownership” has assumed some prominence in the recent 
anthropology of lowland South America (Fausto 2002; 2012; Bonilla 2005; Costa 
2017). “Ownership,” as it is typically defined, is a hierarchical relation that gradually 
develops between an “owner” and a person owned (whether human or non-human) 
through continued acts of care and feeding. In this dissertation, I explore the notion 
of ownership through the history of settlement of one group of South American 
hunter-gatherers, the Ache of eastern Paraguay. Attending to ownership relations 
between kin, between the living and dead, between Ache and Paraguayans, and 
between humanity and the Christian God, I argue that hierarchical relations of 
ownership contain important moral presuppositions. I describe how relations are 
evaluated in these domains to show that an essential aspect of ownership is the 
evaluation of it, and the risks inherent in the relation are integral to the continuous 








     One humid summer night in 2009, the grandmother Djakugi packed her carrying 
basket with a few possessions— an axe, a handleless knife with a worn blade, a 
woven-palm mat, and a plastic jug. She had heard the calls of her long-dead parents 
and brothers, and, moved by their siren-like pull, went to meet them. As her 
husband slept, Flora slipped the finely woven strap of her carrying basket over her 
forehead and shuffled across the clearing, and disappeared through the dark wall of 
vegetation.  
     In the dawn hours of the next morning, Djakugi’s absence caused some alarm in 
the community, and a group of hunters assembled to search for her as a group of 
women speculated about the reasons for her absence. There was only a small patch 
of forest outside of the community left for her to retreat to, and the hunters had no 
difficulty in finding her. After following her trail for a short time, they found her 
sitting alone in a small forest clearing less than a kilometer outside the village. She 
wanted to die, she told them. She would join her dead kin in the western skies. 
“Come back,” the hunters pleaded. “You still have your half-sister,” they reminded 
her, hoping that the care she felt for her living relative would be enough to coax her 
back to the community.  
     The excitement subsided upon her return, and satisfied at the resolution, people 
returned to their houses. Little more was said about her brief disappearance. As 
people returned to their routines, I wrestled with how to understand what had just 
	 2 
happened and what caused this episode. When I asked one young man why Djakugi 
had left the village, he lowered his eyes and laughed nervously. “She has lost her 
head,” he said. “She is crazy.”  
     His words were revealing. Although he spoke in Spanish (I was not yet proficient 
in Ache), he retained the Ache word tollã, which means, literally, “headless.” 
According to the young man, there could be no reason, no understanding, guiding 
her actions. It was little wonder that the young, who knew their grandparent’s life in 
the forest only from stories, couldn’t relate to the old woman’s anguish. But years 
later I would come to learn that what the young man had attributed to senility was 
not an uncommon affliction for old women and men. Djakugi had been overcome by 
some sort of fugue state, where she, instead of forgetting the past, had completely 
succumbed to it. The images of dead kin that had pulled Djakugi away were more 
than upsetting recollections. As I was later told, sad and despondent people were 
said to forget their living kin and feel a pull toward their dead kin. Djakugi, aged 
and childless, her husband Chinigi long dead from snakebite, could no longer see 
herself in the world that surrounded her. Her memories had roused her dead kin 
and brought lured her to them. 
     Her attempted “escape” was one of the early glimpses into the struggle with the 
past that that I encountered during the course of my fieldwork. Such struggles, as I 
would gradually learn, were intensely ethically laden, providing both the ground 
and the substance for everyday evaluations. Djakugi’s fugue state had put her at 
odds with the moral expectations of both the past and the present. She had failed to 
do what was expected of mourners: to forget the dead and move on, to avoid the 
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dangerous allure of past relatives. Djakugi’s dead kin, those who “owned” her 
during her life, wanted to “own” her again in death. Yet an essential part of “owning 
kin well” was to know when to let them go, to turn back to the care of one’s living 
relatives rather than be drawn over to the dead. Djakugi’s problem was a problem of 
ownership. How could the young people understand this? 
 
Ownership 
     The concept of “ownership” has assumed some prominence in the recent 
anthropology of lowland South America (see Fausto 2002; 2012; Bonilla 2005; Costa 
2017). “Ownership,” as it is typically defined, is a hierarchical relation that gradually 
develops between an “owner” and a person owned (whether human or non-human) 
through continued acts of care and feeding. The initial interest in ownership 
relations arose in response to two problems. Ownership was first theorized as a kind 
of relation unaccounted for by Viveiros de Castro’s  (1998; 2001) model of predation, 
in which predator-prey relations structure the cosmology of lowland societies. 
Noting a striking similarity in the way many lowland societies talk of relations 
between parents and children, pet-owners and pets, and warriors and their captives, 
these authors (primarily by Fausto 2002; 2012; Costa 2017) suggested that 
progressive acts of care and feeding create relations of authority in Amazonia more 
generally. 
     The hierarchical aspect of ownership has been subsequently invoked to dispute 
the often-repeated characterization of Amerindians as egalitarian and without 
property. Joanna Overing (1989; 2003), who has done the most to theorize the 
egalitarian ethos of Amerindians along ethical lines, attributed the egalitarianism of 
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the Piaroa to their renunciation of property: “In the Piaroa view, they have 
eradicated coercion as a social or political force within their society by refusing the 
possibility of the human ownership of material resources” (1986: 151). But, as 
Brightman (2016) has recently argued, the generality of such a condition may be 
quite limited, as asymmetry and difference are at the heart of sociality in many 
lowland South American societies, playing an essential role in an idiom where 
Amerindians claim to own material resources and human persons. In many cases 
across lowland South America, hierarchy and ownership appear intertwined with—
and not opposed to—the acts of care and giving that define relations among 
intimates.   
     These are, I think, essential points, and the growing study of ownership relations 
in lowland South America has provided a more nuanced way of thinking about 
hierarchy, care, and dependency. In moving away from Overing’s work, however, I 
fear that an attention to the everyday matters of ethical evaluation has been 
overlooked. The feeding and care that constitutes ownership is an integral part of 
domestic life, even if its boundaries are ultimately porous and elastic. In this 
dissertation, I want to suggest that hierarchical relations of ownership, given as they 
rely on actions rather than ideas, contain important moral presuppositions. 
Ownership concerns the owning particular entities, and as such, cannot be a fixed 
condition (Allard 2019). Its modalities are subject to risk. Ache ownership provides a 
privileged case to examine the role of ethics in ownership. As a relation, ownership 
is subject to evaluation, e.g. one can “own another well” (reko gatu) or “own them 
poorly” (reko buchã). One can “give well” (mẽ gatu) or be “badly stingy“(tã buchã). 
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Persons are capable of breaking with their relations and entering into new relations. 
One may become a “former-owner.” It follows that an essential aspect of ownership 
is the evaluation of it, and not merely the continuous feeding and care thought to 
create it. 
     A host of evaluative possibilities emerge from this point. It places ethical practice 
in the encompassing web of the kin and co-residents, precisely those with whom one 
regularly interacts. In this dissertation, I ask the following questions: In what contexts 
do people come to own others? How are these relations evaluated, and in what situations are 
the relations eclipsed or foreclosed? I show that the concept of “owning” others has been 
essential to Ache relations among living kin and with a host of distant others: the 
dead, enemy Ache, whites, and finally, their new relations to the Christian God. As I 
argue in the coming chapters, it is in the evaluating of these relations that the Ache 
have fashioned a history. 
 
The Ache 
     The Ache are a Tupi-Guarani speaking people who traditionally lived as hunter-
gatherers in Paraguay’s Atlantic coastal forests. Their historical territory, in its outer 
limits, is roughly demarcated by the long mountainous edge of the Paraná Plateau in 
the west, and the curvature of the Paraná River that forms Paraguay’s border with 
Brazil to the east and with Argentina to the south (see LaHitte 1897; Mayntzhusen 
2009 [1948]; Hill and Hurtado 1996). The cordilleras of the Paraná Plateau are part of 
a massive sheet of basaltic rock whose western edge winds its way down the entire 
length of eastern Paraguay. The cordilleras are (or were until the last decades of the 
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twentieth century) covered with thick forests, like most of the land to the east, 
though at various points along their chain, bare ridges of exposed basalt protrude 
from the forested cover. They aren’t particularly tall— in most places they only 
reached around 400 meters in height—but until the mid-twentieth century, the dense 
forests and rolling terrain were enough to channel most of the eastward travel into a 
few flat-bottomed fluvial valleys and the rivers that flowed through them.  
     The glimpses of Ache history available to anthropologists and historians come 
from the few institutions that defined Paraguay’s rural east. The area would become 
the backdrop for one of the most ambitious missionary projects in Christian 
history—the Jesuit missions of Rio de La Plata (1609-1767) that would inspire praise 
in Montesquieu and Rousseau and contempt in Voltaire. The first mention of the 
Ache in written sources comes from the writings of these Jesuit missionaries, which 
is perhaps unsurprising given that of all the frontier institutions, missions 
represented some of the most intense areas of interaction between Amerindians and 
Europeans. During the colonial period, the Province of Paraguay lay at the fault lines 
of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, a fact that made Paraguay, despite its lack of 
mineral wealth, strategically important for the rival monarchies for 300 years. 
Initially, at least, both empires seemed sympathetic to the order. In 1587, the first 
Jesuits arrived into the province of Guairá from Brazil, where they had already been 
proselytizing for nearly thirty years. Guairá was a fertile area on the eastern banks of 
the upper Paraná River that had been occupied by Spanish colonists from Asunción 
since the 1560s. The Jesuits established their first mission there in 1610 on the model 
of those they had already constructed in Brazil. The Jesuits called their mission 
	 7 
towns, reducciones, or reductions, places where the Indians were “reduced” into 
European civilization. The idea, as the provincial superior Manuel da Nóbrega 
explained, was “to concentrate the Indians from scattered villages into one large 
village. Whereas before many of us were needed to teach and indoctrinate them 
because they were so scattered about, now that they are concentrated together, fewer 
of us are needed. In this way it is easier to correct their errors and sins which they 
committed because so were so inconveniently located” (cit. Hemming 1978: 104).  
     The Jesuits organized expeditions called excursiónes for the purposes of bringing 
uncoverted Indians to the missions. These expeditions, which could last for months, 
initially involved pairs of Jesuit missionaries visiting larger villages to forge alliances 
with Guarani leaders. Once settled in the missions, the Indians would be subjected 
to strict disciplinary regime of liturgical devotion and collective work. Their lives 
habituated in the spiritual exercises of the Jesuits and disciplined through 
regimented labor (agriculture for subsistence and yerba mate gathering for market), 
the Jesuit missionaries hoped to bring the Indians to God.  
     The idea of concentrating the Indians of the Paraná plateau failed for several 
reasons. Waves of epidemics brought from Europe, the most deadly of which was 
smallpox, killed many tens of thousands of Indians. “Fearful of the contagion, many 
neophytes and catechumens fled to the jungles, postponing the salvation of their 
souls to that of their bodies,” as one Jesuit father described it (Techo [1673] 2005: 313). 
The mission Indians also became the targets of the Portuguese slavers, the infamous 
bandeirantes who captured Indians to work in the colony’s gold and diamond mines. 
In the 1628, bandeirantes completely overran the Spanish crown’s Indian towns 
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(pueblos de indios) and raided Jesuit mission settlements for indigenous slaves. 
Beleaguered by epidemics and bandeirante raids, the Jesuit missionaries and their 
Guarani charges withdrew from the thirteen Guaira mission towns in 1631 and 
retreated southwest to reestablish their missions away from the Portuguese threat.  
     Most of the missions were rebuilt between the Tebicuary and Uruguay Rivers in 
what was then called the Province of Paraná. Jesuit missionaries immediately set out 
to repopulate the missions by incorporating the nearby Guarani villages, just as they 
had done in Guaira, and in the missions above the Paraná River, this sweep included 
a small number of Ache bands. The Jesuits sent Guarani neophytes into the forest to 
capture Ache bands and bring them to the missions. The efforts of José de 
Insaurralde, the superior of the Reducción de Jesus, to make contact with Ache 
bands along the Monday River in the final years of the seventeenth century 
produced this account:  
...At daybreak, [Guarani neophytes from the missions] approach the camp 
silently and suddenly attack the [Ache] Guayaguis, who awake in the hands of 
those they imagine their enemies. In order that they don’t escape in the 
commotion, or perhaps to defend themselves, or they get carried away with 
excessive force, [the neophytes] tie them up with the rope they had brought. 
They search for the children who tend to hide in the forest, especially searching 
the highest trees where they climb. When these matters are taken care of, [the 
neophytes] sit with them quite lovingly, giving them food and dressing them 
in order that they can appear decently in front of others. With these 
demonstrations of affection, they slowly lose their fear, bury their false 
apprehension, and return to themselves. 
     It is proposed to them then to become sons of God and embrace the faith of 
Christ, and as they have few apprehensions, they easily surrender to the truth 
and come happily to the missions. They are baptized and leave as Christians, 
corrected by their religious obligations. If these raids would not occur, the 
devil would achieve the designs he endeavors: that by putting such a fear of 
strangers in their souls, he enriches his diabolical plots and misleads the sons 
of Adam (Lozano 1873: 420-1). 
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In their brief writings on the Ache, the Jesuits in the Reducción de Jesus wrote of the 
parallels they saw between the qualities that the Ache attributed to their dead and 
damnation by fire —parallels they interpreted as likely prefigurations of Christian 
doctrine. One Jesuit father described them this way: “In matters of religion, they 
hold no error or superstition, nor do they worship objects; they only have a simple 
understanding of a one true God, Creator of heaven and earth, and some careless 
vestiges of a belief that the wicked are punished with flames and fire, which gives 
them some fear” (Lozano 1873: 418-19).1  
     At their height of the missions in the 1730s, 30 missions would house almost 
150,000 (mostly) Guarani Indians, so the Ache presence of only a few bands in the 
Jesuit missions could never be considered anything more than miniscule. Moreover, 
given the high rates of mortality on the missions from smallpox and other diseases, 
we cannot be sure than any Ache left the missions once they entered them. Smaller 
groups were regularly decimated. The fate of one unnamed band of hunter-
gatherers incorporated into a mission along the Paraná River was typical: “The 
[Guarani] neophytes united 73 of these Indians in the mission, but accustomed to 
live in another climate and to eat different foods, all except 4 died that year, being 
baptized before” (Techo 2005 [1673]: 314). In any case, when the Jesuit project was 
consumed by the political machinations of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 
1767 and the missionaries were expelled, written information about the Ache would 
cease for another hundred years. 
																																																								
1 The original text reads: “En materia de religión, no tienen error, o superstición, ni adoran cosa alguna; 
sola si, tienen un simple conocimiento de un solo Dios verdadero, Criador del cielo y de la tierra, y algunos 
vestigios muy remisos de que son castigados los malos con llamas y fuego, de que conciben algún miedo.” 
	 10 
     After the expulsion of the Jesuits, mission towns became collection points for 
state-owned yerba mate production, and later, company towns for yerba mate 
conglomerates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From these 
former mission towns, groups of workers set off to harvest the yerba mate trees that 
grew in anthropogenic clusters throughout the eastern forests, and some of the 
country’s largest yerbales grew in the known territories of Ache subgroups (e.g. the 
Jejui River basin, the vicinity of Villarrica, the basin between the Monday and 
Ñacunday Rivers, and along the banks of the Paraná River.) Most teams numbered 
between 20 and 35 men, but in larger yerbales such as those in Caazapá, the number 
of workers might reach as many as 50. For months at a time, isolated parts of the 
forest would erupt in a flurry of activity. Workers spent several weeks clearing the 
forest and building what would amount to a small town in the forest. Thereafter, 
every day for several months, each worker cut and bagged hundreds of kilograms of 
tea leaves from the yerba stands in the area, before carrying the heavy bundles back 
to the yerba camps to be weighed, dried over slow burning fires, milled, packaged, 
and sent downriver to be warehoused in sizable towns. Hastily erected clapboard 
houses sprung up to store the provisions the workers consumed, and mules and 
oxen were corralled to work the mill and to transport the heavy bags of tealeaves to 
ports along the river.  
     The Ache would find new enemies in these strangers who moved into their lands 
to harvest yerba mate and to cut timber.2 Ache defended themselves by shooting 
																																																								
2 Mbya Guarani warriors attacked a band of Ache on the Tebicuary River in June of 1908 
(Mayntzhusen Nachscrift, July 27th, 1908). Fighting between Ache and Guarani continued 
intermittently into the latter half of the 20th century: In 1973, an Ache man and his wife were shot 
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them when they encountered them in their territory, and according to some authors, 
appear to have resorted to sabotage in an attempt to drive them out. The missionary 
Federico Vogt (1904) wrote that the Ache “sometimes cause great damage in local 
yerba camps by setting the yerba on fire. A few years ago, the Paraguayan Domingo 
Portillo lost about 400 arrobas [ca. 4,500 kilos]. One of his camps has thus been called 
‘Campamento Guayaki’ since that time” (1904: 215).3 Other accounts from the time 
noted that the Ache periodically destroyed bridges to disrupt the traffic of mules 
between the yerba mate stands and rivers or shot the mules outright for their meat 
(Bove 1885). But the yerba camps were only temporary, however, and the 
commotion would cease as suddenly as it began. Once the yerba stand had been 
emptied of its tealeaves and its firewood exhausted, the camp would be abandoned, 
and the yerbal left to regrow for 2-3 years. 
     These intruders were more than simply a source of irritation for the Ache, 
however. The yerbales and logging camps that gradually appeared in the Ache’s 
hunting grounds also became an irresistible source of tools and food. Whites were, 
however, dangerous. Yerba companies sometimes paid bounties to its workers for 
killing any Ache they encountered during their work (Miraglia 1941: 343). Still, 
raiding was the only means for the Ache to bring their powerful objects into the 
band. And given the volunteeristic nature of individual pursuits, nearly anyone 
could initiate a raid. (The decision to raid, in other words, was not made by 
consensus among all those in the band who might be affected by it.) It was initiated 
																																																																																																																																																																					
while digging manioc from the gardens outside an Ava Guarani village near the Jejui Guasu 
River (Kim Hill, personal communication). 
3 The continuous smoking of yerba mate leaves led to frequent fires in the yerba camps, so the 
accuracy of claims that Ache bands burned yerba mate camps in acts of sabotage is difficult to 
determine.  
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as any other collective hunting venture might be: one man might utter, “Nandje 
tãmberã apã djywõ mondo.” “For us to get an axe, we should shoot a Paraguayan,” and 
quietly wait for a few other men to join his initiative. 
     Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (and perhaps before), Ache 
raided outsiders for anything easily moveable, mostly metal tools, manioc and corn, 
and particularly meat taken from livestock. In advance of a raid, bands temporarily 
dispersed into smaller more defensible and mobile camps, as small groups of 
hunters were better equipped to take the long trek to a logging camp or the 
Paraguayans’ estancias to shoot the horses and cows corralled in the forest paddocks; 
women, children, and elder men remained behind in camp for the group to return 
with heavy quarters of beef or horse. With these precautions taken, Ache raids were 
often successful. Their trails were not so carelessly obvious, like the wide picadas cut 
by Paraguayans, and unless the Paraguayans employed skilled Guarani trackers, the 
Ache could usually evade their attempts at reprisal. 
     The Ache also occasionally raided the manioc gardens of Paraguayan and 
indigenous Guarani farmers during rainy periods. Rain was a substantial 
impediment to hunting, and after several days without food, the pangs of hunger 
might give way to talk of raiding a nearby manioc garden. The long roots were easy 
to pull from the softened ground, and the Paraguayans typically stayed in their 
houses during the inclement weather. A raid on manioc patch could bring a 
considerable yield, and women brought their carrying baskets to fill with starchy 
roots.  
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     Though taking manioc had less risk of retaliation than taking domestic animals, it 
too could lead to violent reprisals. Retaliatory raids against Ache bands were carried 
out by spontaneously organized groups, ominously referred to as comisiones, 
“commissions.” In some cases, estanceros and yerba mate bosses mobilized peons 
and local farmers—both Paraguayan and Guarani—into becoming the rank and file 
for the movements.4 In other cases, small farmers called on family, neighbors, and 
local police to avenge the loss of livestock or crops. These raids were local in both 
their organization and intent. The sheer brutality of their response, it was hoped, 
might deter the Ache from future raids on the farms and yerba mate stands in the 
area, or better yet, it might encourage the Ache to move out of the area altogether. 
One Paraguayan campesino explained, “The [Ache] Guayaki started with robbing 
the farms and stealing tools, and ultimately, if we didn’t take measures, they came to 
shoot someone with arrows. Thus, whenever we came across the footpaths of the 
[Ache] Guayaki, we would organize a group to find their camp and to kill a few of 
them. That way, they would stay in the forest and they wouldn’t bother us anymore” 
(cit. Renshaw & Reed 1990: 22). 
     One Ache man would recall a raid on a Paraguayan’s manioc garden outside of 
Villarrica in the early 1960s this way: 
																																																								
4 Several authors (Bertoni 1941 [1929]; Martens 1902) make reference to an incident in 1899 that 
occurred several kilometers inland from the mouth of the Monday River, in which local 
managers of the yerba mate company Industrial Paraguaya tasked Mbya Guarani to lead an 
attack on nearby Ache. The attack was evidently in retaliation for an Ache raid on the yerba camp 
for mules. Armed with rifles and bows, the Mbya killed six Ache and captured two. 
Contemporary reports also cite cases where Guarani sold their Ache captives to Paraguayans as 
slaves (Vogt 1904: 215). In other cases, such as after two Ache women were captured in the 1920s 
when raiding an Ava Guarani garden for manioc, the Ache apprehended by Guarani spent the 
rest of their lives among them (Richard Reed, personal communication). 
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Father went to the manioc garden. His wife went along with him. The 
children were left at camp beside grandfather. In the rain, the Ache pull 
manioc. In the rain, the Paraguayans don’t see the Ache pulling manioc. Then 
many Ache pull up manioc together, then bring it back to the forest in their 
carrying baskets. They bring it to camp. They bring it to the camp, and father 
hides the children. They hide them with their mothers. Grandfather also 
hides with his grandchildren. Then if the Paraguayans don’t come, our father 
calls to us. Then we move to a new camp.  
     We didn’t see the Paraguayans. We didn’t see the Paraguayans who 
wanted to kill us. The Paraguayans that came in the dark wanted to kill us. It 
was his manioc garden we had been in. He killed an Ache. The Ache died. 
We buried the Ache killed by the Paraguayans. Another Paraguayan took a 
child. The Paraguayans took two children. They took the two sons of the 
father they shot. 
 
The ability of Ache bands to avoid the dangers of both Paraguayan colonists and 
their horticulturalist Guarani neighbors rested on their mobility and their 
knowledge and use of terrain. The hunting and foraging practices of Ache bands 
were focused on the dense forests of the interior, and they avoided larger rivers, 
where extractive industries focused their efforts and indigenous Guarani had 
established their villages.5 Moreover, the principal extractive industries in the east—
yerba mate gathering and logging, whose workers made up the largest group of 
Paraguayans in the rural east until the turn of the century—were seasonal, and their 
operation was largely confined to a short distance from rivers they used for 
transportation. Though the harvesting of yerba mate occasionally brought the Ache 
and Paraguayans into close and violent contact, it does not appear that the 
																																																								
5 In most cases, natural barriers—mountains and wide rivers—prevented easy access between 
subgroups. It was a dangerous prospect to have no natural barriers between one’s territory and 
the enemies. My Ache informants from the Ñacunday area spoke of an “open path” between 
their territory and their Ache enemies to the west, making passage between the two areas 
worryingly easy. Though they were never attacked, their parents and grandparents regularly 
monitored those westward trails for signs of intruders in their youth. 
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incursions of yerba workers and loggers were not enough to displace Ache bands 
from their core areas. 
     Permanent settlement of the interior of eastern Paraguay came only in the late 
nineteenth century when modernizing governments turned to colonization to 
rebuild its economy. The Ache’s state of relative isolation would change rapidly in 
the ensuing years. Colonization would intensify with the collapse of yerba mate 
exports in the mid-twentieth century, when the government attempted to relocate 
campesinos in the area around Asunción to the vast eastern forests formerly owned 
by the yerba companies. The frontier towns that once served as yerba collection 
centers would become points of departure for the state’s haphazard settlement 
programs. Scores of settlers moved east. 
     There was no single moving line of settlement from the capital Asunción into the 
rural east. There were several different fronts for colonization in the 20th century 
beginning at different places and at different times. I list here the three largest and 
most consequential for the Ache:  
     1. Beginning in the 1890s, German-Brazilian settlers established agricultural 
colonies along the Paraná River in the country’s southeast. The effect on the Ache in 
the area began slowly. According to the prospector Friedrich Mayntzhusen (n.d.), in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Southern Ache still regularly foraged 
as close as 5 km north of the town of Encarnación. In the following decades, however, 
further waves of settlers would push the Ache roughly 30 km north past the Jakui 
River. The Ache subgroup to the immediate north, living at the confluence of the 
Ñacunday and Yñaro Rivers, would encounter intense pressure from this wave of 
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colonists in the 1940s (see Thompson [forthcoming] for a detailed history of 
Paraguay’s southeastern colonies and the Ache living in the area).  
     2. As settlement of southeastern Paraguay intensified, successive national 
governments sought to find more efficient lines of travel to the area. The 
construction of the rail line from Villarrica to Encarnación spurred settlement of the 
east-central Caaguazú region, with homesteads following along the rail line as it 
pushed further east. With the permanent presence of more outsiders, the Ache bands 
increasingly suffered from attacks. In the 1940s and 50s in the small frontier towns of 
San Juan Nepomuceno, Avaí, and Tavaí, crews of forest trackers called montaraces 
began raiding Ache camps for the particular purpose of capturing Ache to sell as 
slaves in local markets.  
     3. At least for a while, the Northern Ache were spared some of the worst abuses 
endured by their Southern enemies. The rural northeast remained the heart of the 
country’s yerba industry, throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, and 
seasonal yerba collection was less invasive for the Ache than the permanent 
settlement of colonists in their territory. Moreover, when incoming settlers did 
displace Ache bands from the foothills of the low-lying San Joaquin Mountains in 
the 1930s, they were able to relocate northward behind the higher sections of the 
cordillera around the headwaters of the Jejui River (Hill and Hurtado 1996).6 Yet 
such solutions would be short-lived. Seeking an efficient overland route from the 
central region with the northeast, the government began construction on a road to 
the city of Saltos de Guaira on the Paraná River. The road, begun in 1965 and 
																																																								
6 In 1943, Mayntzhusen reported Northern Ache living as far northeast as the Paraná River 
floodplain between Saltos de Guara and Delegación Pedro Juan Caballero (Mayntzhusen 
Nachscrift). 
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completed in 1968, would run directly through the middle of Northern Ache 
territory.  
     The Ache were badly out-armed and increasingly outnumbered by the settlers 
moving into their territories, a fact that even by those Ache who confidently 
proclaimed themselves “unafraid of Paraguayans” had to admit. The centuries of 
intermittent contact with missionaries, loggers, and yerba mate collectors—though 
hardly inconsequential in their effects—had not reached such an encompassing scale. 
The construction of roads and railways in the east brought scores of settlers into 
Ache territory, initiating a process that would see all Ache bands settled on 
government reservations or mission-owned communities by 1978.  
 
Leaving the Past Behind 
     The foregoing history, compiled from a smattering of available historical sources, 
is meant to provide some background for the reader. It is nevertheless not among 
the perspectives that Ache have of their own past. This is not merely because the 
Ache no longer remember the distance past of Jesuit missions. The “they” of 
historical narrative differs fundamentally in its assumption from the “we” of an 
Ache view on the past. The subject of that history is not the same. “The history 
narrated by native people is the history of kinship,” Peter Gow writes. “It is very far 
from being simply the victims’ accounts of colonialism and exploitation, and is quite 
different from our outsiders’ vision of the history…” (Gow 1991: 286). Much of the 
import of Gow’s statement will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow. But for 
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the meantime, we can gain an appreciation for that difference through the terms the 
Ache talk about themselves.  
     Most twentieth century anthropologists and lay observers referred to the Ache 
with the name given to them by their Guarani enemies: “Guayaki.” The meaning of 
the term “guayaki” has never been firmly established, though some anthropologists 
have fancifully translated it as “forest rats.” Whatever the term might have actually 
meant, we know that the Guarani freely applied the stem “guay-” to the names of 
their adjacent enemies: “Guaykuru” for their enemies in the Chaco and cerrado, 
“Guayana” for their Ge-speaking enemies to the east, and so on. The stem “guay-,” in 
other words, points to an otherness that the Guarani defined themselves against. The 
antagonistic connotations of “Guayaki” are not lost on the Ache, and they dislike the 
term. They are, as so many Amerindians refer to themselves, “people,” ache. For this 
reason, anthropologists have gradually abandoned the term “Guayaki” as an ethnic 
group on the grounds that it is a slur or a colonial invention. 
     But trading out “Guayaki” for “Ache” is not so straightforward a solution as one 
might hope, as “Ache” is not a natural label lying in wait to name some discrete 
group of people.7 The term presupposes particular notions of identity and a 
particular sociology, for every “name” includes a set of explicit or implicit 
assumptions about who or what is the same and who or what is different. This is 
best understood by appealing to the strongly performative quality of Ache identity 
and relatedness. Who and what a person is is a consequence of that person’s habits 
and the social relationships he or she develops. The Ache are not Ache because they 
																																																								
7 To say nothing of the cases in Amazonia where names bestowed by enemies have become self-
designations, such as the adoption of “Amondawa” by the Tupi-Kawahiva. 
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are born that way: they are Ache because they act that way, they practice certain 
activities or typified ways of living. To be Ache you must do “Ache things,” most of 
which revolve around the hunting and eating of certain animals, the embodiment of 
certain typified emotional states, and the maintenance of particular bodily habits. 
Being Ache is both mutable and material (and not, as in prevalent formulations of 
“indigeneity,” something based on lineage, self-identification, or bureaucratic 
definition—forms of indigenous identity defined in terms, if not recognized by, then 
at least recognizable to the state. 
     Identity is only as strong as the habits one keeps, so the Ache say that if one stops 
acting like an Ache, one stops being Ache: One may cease to be Ache through the 
failed display of valued skills, or by living among neighboring enemies and 
assuming their associated behaviors.8 Thus, a person who leaves the band to live 
with Paraguayans, after a time may ceases to be Ache and becomes Paraguayan. On 
several occasions, the berupuare—those born to Ache parents who were later raised 
by Paraguayans after their capture, who had become accustomed to their food and 
adopted their speech—were described to me as “not-Ache.” While I never 
encountered a reciprocal case where a Guarani or Paraguayan “became Ache,” 
examples of this transformation do appear in lowland ethnographies. In one such 
case, Wari’ women told Beth Conklin that her blood would become “truly Wari’” if 
she married a Wari’ man and bore his children (Conklin and Morgan 1996; see also 
																																																								
8 One Ache man I knew, after living with a different subgroup for decades, ceased to refer to the 
original subgroup of as ache gatu, “good Ache,” the customary self-designation for one’s kin and 
potential co-residents. The habits of his natal group, had become foreign to him, made them ache 
gatullã, “not good ache.” 
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Gow 1991).9 The relevant point here, it would seem, is that the essentialism of Ache 
identity (if it can still be called “essentialist”) adheres to individuals only insofar as 
they act out that essence.10  
     But even here a singular essence seems to simplify too much. “Ache” may refer to 
collectivities far larger and far smaller than an “ethnic group.” In its broadest sense, 
it means “people” or humans in general. In a narrower usage, it refers to the “Ache 
people.” In a still narrower usage, it may only to “initiated adults.” In still other 
cases, “ache” refers only to “initiated men.” In each sense, the constitution of a 
specific “we” depends on a corresponding other, which constitutes its exterior: 
animals, non-indigenous people, women, or children. As a result, an initiated man 
(for example) may refer without contradiction to the same woman as “ache” in one 
context and “not-ache” in another.11 Even in contexts where “ache” does refer to 
																																																								
9 Conklin and Morgan stress the symmetry of this process: “…In 1986, two Wari’ women were 
impregnated by Brazilian rubber-tappers and gave birth at a maternity ward in town. The 
mothers returned to their own village and raised their children in exemplary Wari’ fashion. 
However, villagers—especially their own family members—commented repeatedly and 
pointedly that the two mothers were no longer truly Wari’: they had lost their Wari’ blood and 
had become wijam, outsiders” (Conklin & Morgan 1996: 677). 
10 The construction of group identity emerges as a set of shared attributes, frequently in contrast 
to other groups. In this sense, Ache identity might be called essentialist, but it is virtual and 
anyone’s claim on it is tenuous. The sense of collective boundedness is more often permeated and 
expanded than maintained. 
11 The extension of autonyms in lowland South America can vary dramatically across multiple 
scales. As far as I know, the first instance of this was an observation by a mid-eighteenth century 
Jesuit proselytizing among the Guarani groups that surrounded the Ache. Frustrated by the lack 
of equivalences between Latin and Guarani and the supposed inability of the Guarani language 
to capture the transcendental properties of terms like “God,” “man,” “space,” and “time,” the 
Bohemian missionary Martin Dobrizhoffer remarked, “The Guarani use the word “ava”, which 
denotes “man” [virum] and “the Guarani nation,” as they lack a name for that which signifies 
“person” [hominem]. Ava che includes three senses, namely: “I am Guarani,” “I am a person 
[homo],” or “I am a man” [vir]; which of these is meant must be understood from the tenor of the 
conversation (Dobrizhoffer Historia de Abiponibus vol. 2: 184). The indexical quality of ava, long 
overlooked by Tupi-Guarani scholars, has become central to Viveiros de Castro’s (1998) notion of 
perspectivism, in which various entities of the cosmos—from living persons, to animals, to the 
dead—see themselves as humans. In such a view, terms like ava mark the human point of view as 
a condition: “Aba (awa, avá) means ―human being. (In certain Tupi languages, the term applies 
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what we might call “the Ache people,” people who held in common a similar 
language and religious life, the group constituted does not denote a self-reflexive 
identity to which all people could identify, belong, or find common cause. “Ache” 
was not a unit for achieving common goals.  
     At best, and in advance of much of the ethnography that would give the term 
clarity,  “Ache” is probably best described as a way of living. Those who called 
themselves “ache” lived in foraging bands led by influential men and married into 
other allied foraging bands led by other influential men. Few in number, they 
trekked and camped over a vast expanse of land that covered most of eastern 
Paraguay. To be Ache was to hunt and eat certain animals, to embody certain 
typified emotional states, to maintain particular bodily habits, and to hold certain 
experiences in common. Whether another Ache was kin, an ally, or an enemy, they 
might still be considered “ache” by the way they lived. And to the extent that they 
lived as one’s co-residents did, they were “good Ache” (ache gatu) and not “strange 
Ache” (ache purã) like the enemy bands around them. 
     It is only by understanding “Ache” as a way of life that we can understand the 
claims, made by some (whom I had assumed “were Ache”) that there are no longer 
any Ache at all. To be “not-Ache,” “no longer Ache,” or “once Ache” is to have 
abandoned a life in the forest and the kinds of social relationships that exemplified 
																																																																																																																																																																					
also, or especially, to humans of the masculine sex (no one is perfect)). Abaeté indicates, therefore, 
the real human being, legitimate people, veridical, that is, us. ―Us, that is, ―them, the Tupi. I am 
not speaking about us, who are here, but about an us identified with―real humanity. Abaeté is 
who says ―Abaeté” (Viveiros de Castro and Goldman 2012: 423). The ability for various entities 
to take up a human perspective in a variety of contexts thus accounts for the “equivocations” of 
the term.  
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it.12 Ore achebu ekõmbu ka-dji, “When we were Ache, we lived in the forest.” I heard 
references to “when we were Ache” in my conversations with older persons with 
some regularity, always followed by a record of the animals they had hunted and 
eaten, the kind of bodies they used to have, the ferocity they possessed as warriors, 
and the devotion they had as kin.13 It was simply impossible, an utter contradiction, 
to be Ache while living on a reservation where such possibilities were denied.14  
 
The Plan of This Dissertation 
     Roy Wagner (1986) once wrote, “Most good ethnographies are rather Calvinist,” 
in the sense that their intelligibility depends on ethnographers’ abilities to 
moderate—to “sanctify,” in Calvin’s words—the disorderly impulses of their inner 
dialogues. The ethnographer’s interactions in the field are numerous and the ways to 
interpret them unbounded for ethnographies to simply speak for themselves. 
Paradoxically, for anthropologists to communicate the “messiness” of the 
ethnographic and the historical realities they study, they must be more—not less—
attuned to some sort of organization that guides their work. I think this is true. The 
ways that ethnographers might present this order are fairly catholic, though, and the 
way I have presented this dissertation warrants some comment. 
																																																								
12 A conditional/temporal use of “ache” often appeared with the suffix –tywemi, “what we 
habitually did, but no longer do.” 
13 A body is a history, the sedimentation of a past. The effects of contact registered in bodily 
substance—what Vilac ̧a calls a “contact physiology” (2007: 183). “In a certain sense, tradition is 
internalized, though not as a belief or an attribute of spirit, but rather as food, as body liquids, and 
even clothes, when we consider it as also constituting a body. To change tradition […], for 
Amerindians is to change body” (Vilac ̧a 2007: 184). 
14 The criteria for remaining Ache had not changed. The horizon of the actions that members 
reciprocally attribute to “being Ache” had not changed. But their behavior had changed, and it 
had changed so quickly and so drastically, that they no longer recognized themselves in the 
habitual actions that made one “Ache.” They could no longer call themselves “Ache.”	
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     The following dissertation is a historical ethnography, though my concerns in this 
dissertation are primarily ethnographic rather than historical. It is to tell the story of 
a relation through history rather than to narrate a history about “the Ache,” which, 
as we have already seen, is an illusive category. I had originally intended this 
dissertation to include a discussion of the period following the departure of NTM 
missionaries from the Cerro Moroti community to the present day, though for 
unplanned reasons, this proved impossible for this project. If the current work 
resembles “salvage ethnography” in some respects, it is because the past remains 
somewhat untethered from the present. But perhaps the accident fits well with an 
“orphaned past.”    
     The first part of the dissertation deals with the decades before the arrival of 
Protestant missionaries (a period that spans roughly 1930-1970), and the second part 
addresses some of the changes that have issued from that arrival. Beyond that basic 
division, however, my interest lies in ownership as a source for action and an object 
of evaluation.  
     The first part of the dissertation examines Ache ownership in the context of 
everyday life among kin. In chapter 1, I describe how Ache oriented themselves 
towards specific persons or beings in order to effect material transformations in their 
bodies. In coming to experience the relation of acting and being acted upon, those 
who give food and grow the others create a hierarchical relation of ownership. In the 
first two chapters, I show that Ache mobility was not a matter of collective decision-
making. It was rather the outcome of following specific others. People have choices 
in residence, in whom they “follow,” but those choices were normatively limited to 
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those who “owned” them. “Following” (mudja), in other words, is a political act 
between a dependent to an owner, and persons were regularly instructed to follow 
those who give food to them when bands change. Ownership may be created 
through gifts of food that “grow others,” but it is not a static state. Ownership brings 
up the question of evaluation and moral criticism. In chapter 3, I describe that a 
specific verbal genre of scolding that happens within ownership relations. Yet, as I 
show, I risks involved in scolding show how tenuous the ownership relation can be. 
An owner’s scolding of a dependent could easily lead to accusations that he or she 
“owned badly.” Chapter 4 examines the implications of ownership for death. Kin 
relations—particularly ownership relations—are decomposed in funerary rites. For 
the dead to own the living is to make them co-residents in the land of the dead. Here 
I discuss a ritualized form of scolding meant to break the ownership relation 
between the living mourners and dead kin. 
     In the second part of the dissertation, I turn to the changes to Ache conceptions of 
relationality and autonomy resulting during the settlement period (1959-1978), with 
particularly emphasis on their conversion to evangelical Christianity. As I show in 
Chapter 5, ownership relations with enemy Ache and whites became central to the 
settlement process, and, as I describe, Ache converts found a new owner in a new 
Christian God. In chapter 6, I note some of the changes resulting from conversion. 
Though God had changed their bodies, he did not give them gifts of food in the 
literal sense, as “owners” did. Instead God became a new kind of owner, and his 
commandments redefined what ownership meant more broadly.  
     In this dissertation, I seek to capture neither timeless essence of “Ache-ness” 
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(whose limited value, giving the previous discussion, I hope is clear) nor do I want 
to describe a particular “point” in time. Instead I wish to describe but some of the 
patterns in relatedness and autonomy in “ownership” that would undergo a rapid 
but intelligible transformation in social practice over a few decades. The aim of the 
dissertation then is to make accessible some of the terms in which Ache have 
understood their actions since their settlement, a span of some sixty to seventy years, 
and how they have made sense of themselves over that time. It therefore describes a 
small section of the many changes the Ache have faced and is not a comprehensive 
history of that period. I have for the most part left aside consideration of the role of 
Catholic missionaries in the Ache communities of Chupa Pou and Ypetimi. I will 













The Give and Take of Ownership 
 
     Giving food creates an asymmetric relation between the giver who grows and the 
receiver who is grown. That relationship is defined by the verb reko, “to have or 
possess,” which corresponds to the widespread mode of relationship that 
Amazonianists have termed “ownership” or “mastery” (Fausto 2012; Bonilla 2005; 
Costa 2017). “Ownership,” as Luiz Costa (2017: 5) has defined it in his 
comprehensive study of ownership in lowland South America, is “an asymmetrical 
bond involving control, protection, dependency, and care,” and it is one of the 
principal idioms in which kinship is interpreted and conveyed, made and unmade 
for the Ache.  
     In many lowland societies, there exists a specific term to denote an “owner.” 
There is a term in Ache for “owner,” dja or djara, which is cognate with the same role 
in other Tupi-Guarani languages, but this term was rarely applied. I only ever heard 
it used to describe the jaguar as the “owner” or “master” of a covert class of game 
animals (tapir, capybara, paca, etc.) When talking about “ownership,” they referred 
to use the verb reko (“to own or possess”) or its nominalized form, rekotygi “Those 
who habitually own/take care of others”). 
     The subject of the verb reko (i.e. the “owner”) is necessarily animate, although not 
necessarily human, as some non-human persons—primarily spirits—may “own” or 
“possess” other persons and things (see also Oakdale 2008; Kohn 2017). The things 
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that people can “own” may be both inanimate and animate.15 People “owned” the 
artifacts they make (such as bows, baskets, necklaces, and utensils); they owned the 
knowledge they have (particularly dreams); and they owned the parts of their body.  
They “owned” certain kin relations, and for those who treat animals as proper 
persons (Descola 2012; Viveiros de Castro 1998), it should not be surprising that 
notions of “ownership” should include non-humans. Women “own” the pet 
monkeys and coatis orphaned after hunts. The relation (or lack thereof) between the 
ownership of persons and the ownership of artifacts in other lowland groups has 
provoked some debate. McCallum (2001: 92), for example, has argued that the idiom 
of Cashinauha ownership pertaining to persons is “in no way comparable” with the 
ownership of things, while Brightman (2016) has argued in favor of a relation 
between the ownership of persons and artifacts for the Trio.16 I will return to subject 
of non-human owners and the relation between owning people and owning objects 
in chapter 4 when I discuss the intentional destruction of ownership relations in 
Ache funerals. For now, I am essentially concerned here with animate possession 
resulting from transfers of food and other acts of care.  
     In this sense, ownership is built around the contrasts between “giver” and “one 
who is given.” Feeding establishes the giver’s relationship with the one fed, so that 
the “giver” comes to own the “one who is given” through unreciprocated transfers 
																																																								
15	In Guarani, possessive relations marked by pronominal possessive markers and those coded by 
the verb of possession (reko) can refer to differences in alienable and inalienable possession. The 
system is somewhat different in Ache, as it lacks the pronominal system (Roessler 2019), yet the 
Ache reko is similar to the Guarani possessive verb reko in the following respect: “The possessive 
relation expressed by the verb (reko) is more of a contingency than an inherent and durable 
relation. Verbal possession is more event-like than non-verbal possession, and the PSR and the 
PSM are closer to being encoded as participants” (Velázquez-Castillo 1996: 75). 
16 This likely depends on which class of objects is considered. Indeed, the difference between 
persons and artifacts appears thinnest with bodily ornaments, which for many groups are 
considered both heritable property and components of people’s actual bodies (Miller 2009). 
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of food and other acts of care. There is the sense that the owner’s agency directs 
what it possesses, supported by the fact that the verb reko also means, “to physically 
hold something.” Despite such asymmetry, ownership is not a despotic partnership, 
as the word might suggest in English. This is for at least two reasons. First, 
ownership is a potentially defeasible relation. It is sustained by constant gifts of food 
and is susceptible to degeneration when those gifts diminish and termination when 
they cease. Its defeasibility is due in part to the actions of the “owned” to refuse gifts, 
for one party to switch residence, and so on. Secondly, ownership is not a right 
directly transferrable between persons but the outcome of repeatedly feeding and 
caring for another (Brightman 2016). While it is true that husbands “own” their 
wives and fathers “own” their daughters, the father’s ownership does not transfer to 
his son-in-law after his daughter’s marriage. Ownership results from the actual gifts 
one gives another, not abstract rights that may be traded away, so the father’s 
ownership of his daughter and the husband’s ownership of his wife result from a 
series of independent actions.  
 
1.1 Kinship Preliminaries 
     From the earliest accounts of them by Jesuit chroniclers up until the late 20th 
century, the Ache trekked year-round in residentially mobile hunting bands.17 The 
days began and ended in forest camps, which they cleared, occupied, and then 
abandoned on an almost daily basis, with no semi-permanent base village to which 
they would return for a portion of each year. Each camp typically accommodated 
																																																								
17 In this, they were not only different from the Guarani but decidedly unlike the thousands of 
other peoples in lowland South America who lived as swidden horticulturalists. 
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between 20 and 40 persons (though might be twice that size at ritual gatherings of 
multiple bands), with the size and composition of the band varying as persons came 
from and went to other allied bands.  
     Hunting bands were contingent entities whose size and composition were 
influenced by a number of political and economic factors. Bands often coalesced 
around a group of brothers, their wives, children, unmarried sisters, and a few sons-
in-law. Band residence did not differentiate one’s affines from one’s consanguines. 
Individuals often had close kin in distant bands, and their resident band was mostly 
composed of non-relatives (Hill et al. 2011).  
     If life in a band meant living in close proximity with non-relatives, it also meant 
that one could find kin among a number of allied bands that traveled nearby. These 
extra-band allies were referred to as irõndy, “habitual companions.” As the universe 
of kin relations, one’s irõndy encompassed kin, affines, and potential affines. Irõndy 
referred not to common ancestry but to the habit of living together, so that one’s 
irõndy consisted of those one resided with or could reside with, but not forbearers 
who one had never personally encountered. Relations with irõndy implied some 
degree of friendliness and a regularity of contact, with cooperation in ritual activities 
and food sharing. Marriage partners might be drawn from any of the irõndy who 
hunted and camped in the peripheral reaches of their territory.  
     The largest grouping of consanguines was pawe, a “classificatory sibling” which 
included full siblings, half siblings, and both parallel and cross cousins, and in its 
broadest sense, simply meant “relative” as opposed to “stranger” (picha). Picha refers 
to an unrelated peer from an allied band, typically of the same generation with 
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whom one did or could reside, but not kin or an actual affine. The opposition 
between the boundaries of pawe (siblings, kin) and picha, (strangers), was one 
explicitly made by the Ache: Pawellãrõ picha, “Those who aren’t siblings are picha.” 
Like pawe, picha is a reciprocal term, in that someone who is picha to me is someone 
to whom I am picha. Yet pawe and picha are not symmetrical opposites: not everyone 
who is picha to my pawe is pawe to each other, so the distinction made between pawe 
and picha was not an objective designation dividing Ache society into two marriage 
classes or sections. Men and women were forbidden to marry anyone classified as 
pawe. The Ache did not make use of descriptive terminology or modifiers to specify 
marriageable collateral kin (e.g. cross cousins) that a classificatory term like pawe 
would obscure (cf. Basso 1984). One should instead seek potential marriage partners 
among those considered picha.  
     The notion of siblingship is an important waya in which Ache created and 
bounded fields of relations. The bilateral range of kin had a theoretical limit of 
second cousins, beyond which lie picha, “strangers.” But in actuality, few people’s 
knowledge of kin extended this far. Most people might identify some second cousins 
though they may not be able to trace all of the intermediate links that would define 
them as pawe. It is in the more distant regions of cousinship where the boundaries 
between pawe and picha become more performative than classificatory, and pawe was 
often used as an idiom for solidarity and the appropriateness of mutual affection.  
     Ownership differs from both affinal relations and sibling relations in essential 
respects. While a man’s ownership of his son and a new husband’s relation to his 
father-in-law are both hierarchical, food was not given as an act of care. The 
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hierarchy among affines preceded the gift of game and occasioned it. Sibling 
relations, by contrast did involve acts of mutual care and affection. But they did not 
involve the sort of hierarchy and dependency intrinsic to ownership. I did hear of 
cases where older brothers “owned” their unmarried co-resident younger sisters.18 
But as far as I could tell in such cases, older brothers stood in for (absent or dead) 
fathers, who otherwise would have nurtured their daughters until their marriage. 
     There is no word in the Ache language that would easily translate to “marriage.” 
Nor was their any formal ceremony to mark a discrete transformation between a 
ritual before and after. Marriage was identified with close and prolonged co-
residence. Husbands and wives were those who djapety wapy (“sit alongside”) or 
djapety djeno (“lie alongside”) the other. Spouses were said to “own each other” as a 
result of close co-residence and the sharing of food, though some of my informants 
insisted that only men “really owned” their wives. Still, theirs was relationship of 
mutual demand, in which either spouse could leave the other. And indeed, 
marriages were dissolved when one party left the other to reside elsewhere, 
something that happened quite regularly. Hill and Hurtado (1996: 219, 237) report a 
mean of thirteen husbands for Northern Ache women over their lifetimes.19 
 
1.2 How Ownership is Created  
     The foods hunted and gathered during the day were transferred to and from 
persons in the late afternoon camp. If he had taken several animals, the hunter 
																																																								
18 Like many lowland peoples, the Ache had specific terms that point to the gender and age 
differences between siblings. Younger siblings call older siblings key’y, and older siblings call 
their younger siblings tywy. Cross-sex sibling terms do not distinguish relative age. A man calls 
his sister nwy. A woman calls her brother kywã. 
19 This figure is slightly lower for men, because some men did not marry during their lives. 
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would cut a length of vine to lash to the hind legs of the animals, slinging the load 
over his shoulder, and with his bow and arrows in the other hand, he walked to the 
evening camp that has been established during the time he hunted. Those in the 
camp could spot a successful hunter by the blood on the points of his arrows or on 
his body from carrying the animal. Even before the hunters return, those in camp 
often knew which hunters have killed which animals from the hunters’ shouts to 
each other during the day, which they can hear from some distance away.  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Minõngi carrying a tapir head, 1982. Photo by Bjarne Fostervold (used with 
permission). 
 
The hunter immediately gave up his kill upon arrival to another who would butcher, 
cook, and distribute it. With deliberate indifference to the camp’s inquiring 
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excitement, he retired to the fire, lying down on a woven palm mat beside his wife. 
After this, he played no further role in handling the game: He was not only 
prohibited from eating from his kill; he was prohibited from butchering it and 
distributing it.20 To butcher, cook, or consume one’s own game—to take part in any 
aspect of its distribution or consumption at all— would inflict him with a 
debilitating impotency called pane that would thoroughly diminish his hunting 
ability in the future. 
     Small game animals, like armadillos and coatis, were carried inside the camp by 
the hunter and given directly to a woman sitting around one of the camp’s hearths. 
Women usually butchered small animals.21 Animals with hair were first singed 
whole in the fire. As the hair burns, it was scraped off of the game with a stick or 
bamboo splinter until the animal is hairless. The animal was then eviscerated after 
the animal’s hair was singed and placed separately in the coals to roast. The heart, 
intestines, liver, and kidneys were eaten while the men wait for the animal to finish 
cooking, and these too were shared. 
     This technique was not a practical solution for larger animals, such as the 
capybara, agouti, tapir, and peccary. These animals, unlike small game animals, 
were said to be “owned by the jaguar,” who protected them and avenged their 
mistreatment. Women were matter-of-factly prohibited from butchering these larger 
game animals; the butchery and initial distribution of large game animals were 
instead reserved for a few senior men. Their authority to butcher and distribute the 
																																																								
20 Djywõndygi kai djuellã pane, The shooter doesn’t want to roast the game, it brings pane (Susnik 
1974: 173). 
21 Women also sometimes took part in the capture and killing of small animals, but they were 
prohibited from hunting larger animals. 
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meat of other hunters was justified in both negative and positive terms: first, as 
already mentioned, they must do it because the hunter who killed the animal cannot. 
Someone else had to do it. Yet it must be them—and not women or young hunters—
because of the dangers that derive from butchering certain large game animals. They 
were “those who had repeatedly seen it done,” and because of this experience, they 
were obliged to perform this ritual task not just for the successful hunter’s benefit 
but also for all those in the camp. 
     Butchery could be dangerous work, and large game animals had to be 
disarticulated in very precise ways. It took the knowledge and practiced hands of a 
senior man to (for example) disarticulate a capybara’s mandible or to remove a 
tapir’s tongue—procedures that had no direct bearing on the portioning of food. 
Any errant cuts made by the butcher could have dangerous consequences, and one 
could never be sure the deleterious effects caused by a butcher’s mistakes would be 
limited to the butcher himself: the butcher might grow sick and frail; a jaguar (the 
“owner” of large game animals) might attack the camp; or the butcher’s hunting 
prowess might dry up through a debilitating condition known as pane. 
     Given that the hunter was often the inferior of the butcher in some social sense, it 
might appear fitting to describe the transfer of large game animals from the hunters 
who killed them to the seniors who butchered them as an act of “appropriation” (cf. 
Rivière 1984). One could see in the hunter’s giving up of his game to a butcher the 
loss of the benefits of giving: that the butcher, in giving away what he did not 
himself kill, would make the hunter’s kill his own. (After all, as Machiavelli 
cautioned, it was only politically wise to be generous when giving away other 
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people’s property.) This may be the case. But the notion of “appropriation” depends 
on some preexisting relation between the hunter and the game he killed, and 
empirically, I have found no evidence to support that relation.  
     The butchery of large game animals falls to senior men because of the dangers 
these game animals pose, and the butcher’s precautions represented only part of 
those play in the butchery and consumption. From the time the animal has been 
butchered to the time it has been eaten, the camp’s residents shared a common 
stance toward game animal. Even though everyone in the band was typically quite 
hungry by the end of the day, those in the camp exhibited muted interactions among 
themselves and with their food. When eating, one should neither stand up nor lie 
down but sit with folded legs. Speech was similarly muted. One should not speak 
loudly or laugh, but eat calmly with requisite restraint. There was, moreover, great 
emphasis on disposing of the bones of some game animals properly. The bones of 
capybara and monkey should be broken apart, burned, or buried and not tossed 
carelessly outside the camp. If these precautions were not taken, a jaguar—the 
master of these animals—would follow and attack them. The precautions that 
motivate the hunter’s giving up his kill therefore seem less a cynical strategy for 
seniors to appropriate the food of younger hunters than a general concern with the 
dangers of killing and eating animals with whom they share a basic subjectivity 
(Fausto 2007). 
     Furthermore, even if the hunter could eat his own kill, he was not effaced from it 
entirely. The hunter’s affines and/or ritual kin received the jowls or some other 
coveted piece of meat. It is only after these relations have made claims on their 
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portions that the butcher distributes whatever remains, and as we will see, he has 
little discretion in directing specific transfers outside of his hearth. Given the relative 
positions of killer and butcher, the term “appropriation” seems inappropriate in the 
first place. 
     The terms that describe food transfers in the anthropological literature (e.g. 
sharing, distribution, exchange, etc.) do not find ready equivalents in the Ache 
language. The Ache terms that refer to the transfer of food derive from mẽ’ẽ, “to 
give.” Syntax may lay stress on the giver or the recipient in a variety of ways, as the 
following examples show: 
1. De mẽwe go chope, “You gave it to me.” 
2. Chope de mẽwe go, “You gave it to me.” 
3. De chope mẽwe go, “You gave it to me.” 
 
Nevertheless, even in cases where the recipient was stressed, there was not 
(linguistically, at least) a sense of the recipient’s activity involved in the transfer, and 
there is no word in the Ache language that would imply the receipt of something 
from someone. The closest equivalent is the passive form of mẽ’ẽ (mẽmby), “to be 
given” something. To be given something is to be the object of another’s action; 
because of another’s gift, (something) has entered one’s grasp or the immediate 
space of his/her body.22  
     Of course the linguistic focus in Ache on acts of giving over receiving does not 
diminish the practical importance of receiving food. While the terms themselves 
																																																								
22 Exchange, by contrast, involves the going out of something and the coming back of something 
else. The first gift obliges the one who receives it to reciprocate. But sharing involves not a 
contract or an exchange but an expression of sentimental friendship. Sharing is one-directional, 
which means that it does not require a promise in return. As Bourdieu has argued, the difference 
between the two is largely an effect of time (and the interests behind it), which makes one-way 
and two-way transfers analytically difficult to separate. The difference between exchange and 
sharing may then be purely evaluative. 
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focus on the actions of the giver, the recipient of food is not practically effaced. 
Persons might solicit gifts of food, and people might refuse what was offered them. 
For example, in the aftermath of a quarrel, angry wives might refuse meat offered to 
them by their husbands, only accepting the same meat when it was passed through 
one or several intermediaries.  
     Division involves thinking about a whole in terms of its parts. In sharing, a whole 
entity is divided into equal parts. And this is often how anthropologists have viewed 
sharing. For Service (1966), the “sharing out” of food is an expression of hunter-
gatherer egalitarianism and the alleged density and strength of their social relations. 
The person one shares with will share in turn when he gets meat, and this web of 
mutual obligation sustains the life of the group. Abundance and hunger are shared 
alike. For cultural ecologists, this qualitative equality is reckoned quantitatively: 
Distribution is understood to be a function of the weight of the animal and the 
number of the claimants, and because everyone supposedly gets a share of the game, 
the identity of the recipient is irrelevant.23 In each of these perspectives, neither the 
identity of the recipient nor the identity of the thing given appears to matter much in 
distribution.  
     Yet the identity of the giver, recipient, and the kind of food given did seem to 
matter in the particulars of Ache distribution: During the first phase of division, the 
butcher divided the animal into a fixed number of pieces. In butchering large game 
animals, such as a peccary or deer, the following portions were cut: tõ (head and 
neck), pekã (front shoulders), pyte (the back, in two halves, each with a rib section), 
																																																								
23 The size of the share given to a hearth is proportional to the number of people sitting there 
(Kaplan and Hill 1985: 233). 
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kymaka akã (thigh), and tayro (a large piece of rump meat, cut into two halves). These 
animals were cut into nine pieces. Smaller animals, such as armadillos and coati, 
were typically quartered, with their fatty skin cut into a small number of strips for 
distribution, amounting to no more than six or seven pieces. In any case, it is the 
kind of animal and not the available number of persons or hearths that dictates the 
number of initial portions. 
     There is no specific term in the Ache language for “sharing” or “distribution.” 
There is mẽreko, “to give repeatedly.” The postposition reko24 here signifies the 
repetition or continuation of the verb it modifies, signifying in this case that multiple 
acts of giving take place in some span of time.25 The verbs that describe the butcher’s 
actions—to “cut” (mondo or kychi) or “cut into strips” (bowo)—imply the distribution 
that follows them.  
     For heuristic purposes, we may distinguish between two forms of distribution 
based on their relation to residential units. Each Ache band occupied a single camp 
within which were found individual family clusters. A prominent feature of every 
family group is its fire (tata), which is maintained a fire burning constantly. Hearths 
were a sort of residential atom of Ache kinship: clustered together around each fire 
were parents, unmarried children, and perhaps for a short period of bride service, a 
newly married daughter and her husband. 
     The initial gift moves from the butcher (or the butcher’s spouse) to someone from 
a different hearth: The first distribution of the animal is made in large uncooked 
																																																								
24 This term is a homonym to the verb reko signifying ownership. 
25 But that span is indeterminate. Mẽreko may refer to a person’s repeated gifts to another over a 
year or more; or it may refer to a butcher’s distribution of portions of game gifts to multiple 
people in a period of minutes. 
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portions to each hearth in the camp. Frequently, children act as intermediaries to 
deliver portions of meat to others. This initial portioning by the butcher to each 
hearth initiates a series of further transfers. Once the meat reached another hearth, it 
would be completely cooked and then further divided among those sitting around 
the fire. Here, close kinship was the factor that sets the pattern of the giving.  
     Hearths are only a few meters away from each other, and the butcher’s initial 
transfers of meat to each hearth are visible to everyone. The distributer’s portioning 
is carefully watched, and his or her omissions may come under stinging rebuke. 
Those in the camp attempted to direct the portioning of game through a variety of 
linguistic means. Onlookers are quick to remind the distributors who has yet to 
receive a share.  
 
Dja kymino ymaba rõnde kyminorõ 




Rayperõ mẽ’ẽ. Raype mellãdjipa? 
 
[A woman to her husband]: “Your 
grandchild might not fully grow if 
you never feed him. Are you the one 
who never feeds his grandchild?”  
 
[Mother to her son]: “Give to your 
son. Are you one who doesn’t give to 
your son?” 
 
     Adults might also direct food away from certain people by invoking restrictions 
on particular foods: “The white-lipped peccary was never eaten by the female 
initiate (daregi). That’s what the fathers said.” Others offered their confirmation. “It 
was like that.” “Yes, that was how they said it.”26  
																																																								
26 Some considerations were general: Older people with poor teeth “did not know how to eat” 
tougher cuts of meat, so they would be given soft parts, such as heart, lungs, etc. Brains were 
given to women, as men would become pane if they ate them. Other recipients stood in some 
particular relation to the hunter who killed the game animal: The hunter’s mother-in-law would 
receive the head of the animal. 
	 41 
     Portions were occasionally solicited. A child might call out, “I want the thigh,” as 
a parent was portioning the meat, but my informants were equivocal about whether 
this was considered behavior appropriate for an adult. Only children openly 
complained about the portions they received or the stinginess of the one distributing 
meat. Adults, some of my informants told me, would not stoop to such behavior, 
though parents typically indulged their child’s impatience on the understanding that 
children are ignorant of right ways of conduct. Adults regularly commented on the 
shares given, but in sharp contrast to children, they did so to direct food for others 
and not for themselves.27 
     Food was generally given to anyone present in the camp, reflecting the 
importance of commensality in maintaining a sense of shared of satisfaction among 
co-residents.28 But out of this common pool of sharing, gifts were carved to satisfy 
the more pressing needs of providing food for more immediate dependents, and 
here the identity of the recipient mattered.29 I heard the following rebuff as reported 
																																																																																																																																																																					
     Distributers might withhold shares to children they deem “lazy”—girls who do not carry 
water when setting up camp or teenage boys who do not hunt.  
27 It was (and still is) considered improper for the recipient to complain about what he or she is 
given in front of others. In private, however, people express their resentment with the share they 
received. When I asked informants to name the best hunters and the “best givers” in the village, 
they readily complemented their answers by pointing out the stingiest of their neighbors as well. 
The complaints cited particular events in the past as evidence of their neighbors’ self-less 
generous or unpardonable greed. It was difficult for me to determine whether one person’s 
alleged faults were actually greater than anyone else’s, but accusations such as these seemed to 
fall along kin lines with some frequency. Most people I interviewed tended to extol the 
generosity of their close kin, while stressing the stinginess of non-kin. In some respects, this may 
be a truism: They were stingy because they were non-kin; what seemed like a particularly flagrant 
transgression was actually how everyone else would act with respect to those outside his 
immediate kin. 
28 There were exceptions of course, such as when distributers might temporarily withhold food to 
adolescents they considered “lazy,” or when orphans, who were effectively non-persons, might 
be refused a share entirely. 
29 This may have something to do with the kind of food shared. The fruits and vegetables 
gathered during the day were also shared along with the meat, but as Hill and Kaplan (1983) 
have noted, the breadth of their distribution was more restricted than game. 
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speech in an account of manioc raid in the 1950s, and it resembles the (admittedly) 
rare cases during my fieldwork where I heard someone refuse to give food to 
another who asked for it:  
Mẽmba cho achepe. Ache rapama.  
 
 
Cho rekollã chipolla. Rekollãma cho 
nakõpe.  
 
Mẽmba achepe. Cho mẽmby apo cho 








Cho rekollã chipolla. 
 
I gave all [the manioc] to the Ache. 
The Ache took it.  
 
I don’t have any manioc. I don’t 
have any in my carrying basket.  
 
I gave all [the manioc] to the Ache. I 
have only one piece of manioc for 
my child: it’s for when my child 
cries from hunger.  
 
There are others with a lot of 
manioc in their baskets. You should 
ask them.  
 
I don’t have any manioc.  
 
One could expect shares from others but could only truly count on gifts of food from 
close kin. Because of this, when Ache couples left the band for a day or two to forage 
alone, they left their children with grandparents or close consanguines who were 
obliged to care for them. It was considered an imposition for parents to leave their 
children in camp with non-kin when going off alone to gather honey or larvae, and 
parents would be roundly chastised for their negligence, as it was their fault when 
their children went unfed and unsupervised in the presence of others. It was the 
same rationale that justified the withholding of shares to “ownerless” orphans 
altogether.30  
																																																								
30 Lacking relations, orphans lived at the edges of human relations. In the situation described 
above, living apart from (living) kin relations does not reflect the person’s independence, because 
no one can live alone in the forest. The role of orphans for Ache served very different dramatic 
ends in the West—from Oliver to Harry Potter—where orphanhood becomes a test of one’s will or 
destiny. As a result of their diminished status, orphans were commonly given “dangerous” jobs. 
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1.3 Orphans and Other Pets 
 
     The adoption or orphans has been is important to theories of ownership, as it 
suggests ownership is created through the feeding of others rather than the acting 
out of existing obligations (Costa 2017; Brightman 2014). Attitudes regarding 
orphans were decidedly negative. Without the regular sharing of food and ethics of 
commensality that define kinship’s “mutuality of being,” orphans risk 
transformation into a state of quasi-animality. There are numerous instances of this 
pattern across the South American lowlands, and it connects well with other 
explanations across Amazonia regarding why orphans are prone to refashion their 
kin relations with animals, killers, predators, and various others (Vilaça 2002; Fausto 
2008; 2012). The violence of the contact period made orphans of many Ache, and 
mortality rates for orphans were considerably higher than they were for those with 
parents (Hill and Hurtado 1996: 434-436). Nevertheless, I did come across cases 
where orphans were adopted. In the few cases with which I am familiar, boys whose 
parents were killed by Paraguayans were “cared for” (kuwẽ) by adult women 
without family of their own. The adopting mothers did not appear to be related to 
the children. Rather, despite generally negative attitudes toward orphans and the 
burdens they put on others, these women felt moved by the pity they felt to raise 
them. 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Take this example from Sammons (1978) of a mother warning her son against picking fruit that 
would attract arboreal snakes: “Don’t touch the unripe ceriman or a snake will bite you. Let an 
orphan touch it. Climb the tree to find ceriman for grandfather to eat” (Sammons 1978: 7). 
(Unripe philodendron fruit—called ceriman—is long and green, its rind covered in hexagonal 
tiles that resemble the skin of a particular green arboreal snake. Moreover, the painful swelling 
caused by ingesting the oxalic acid found in unripe philodendron fruit was likened to that of a 
snakebite. This iconism between unripe ceriman and the snake is also indexical in that touching 
unripe ceriman is thought to cause bites from that snake.) 
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     Non-human intimates might also be adopted. Pet-keeping derived from feeding 
orphaned animals whose parents have been killed while hunting. Thus, the same 
types of animals that are hunted for food were nurtured as pets: foxes, rabbits, coati, 
and especially monkeys. When a hunter returned with orphaned animals, a 
woman—often the wife of the hunter—claimed the animal by saying: “Don’t kill my 
future pet (mymbarã).” Owners and pets lived in close proximity. Women tied their 
pets to their carrying baskets during the daily treks, and in evening camps, pets 
were tied to a tree close to the owner’s hearth. 
     As with the adoption of other children, the new owner of the animal nurtured 
(kuwẽ) in order to “familiarize” it. Women feed their pets pre-masticated foods in the 
same way they do their children, and in the case of monkeys, they may breast-fed 
them. And it is because of this feeding that pets were often likened to surrogate 
children.  
     The owner’s acts of care and feeding constituted a social relation that linked 
particular animals with particular persons. But monkeys, unlike humans, cannot 
become independent children. Most do not survive into adulthood. Older monkeys 
begin to display destructive and aggressive behaviors. Many escape their captivity. 
While the Ache are relatively tolerant of the monkeys proclivities for theft and 
mischief, and the habit of coati of biting. If they are a nuisance, they are eventually 
killed by a non-owner. While an owner never eats her own pet, if the owner dies, the 
animal might be eaten by others. 
 
1.4 Giving to Grow 
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     Intrinsic to the notion of “owning” another is the idea of “growth” (yma). Yma is 
both a verb and a noun, and thus may refer to both “the act of growing [something]” 
and “something fully grown.” As a verb, yma most often appears in transitive 
constructions that emphasize the relation the growth expresses and engenders.  
     In a general sense, we might imagine growth as a movement across a sequence of 
ascriptive roles and statuses that anthropologists commonly call “age grades.”31 Age 
grades have typically been understood as the cultural classification of natural (i.e. 
biological) growth. That is, humans develop, and that development is classified into 
a series of culturally significant terms. 
 
 
Table 1.1 Age Grades 
 
 
Male Term Female Term English Gloss Approximate Age 
Krumi Krumi Child 0-8 
Kybuchu Kudjabuku Pre-initiate 9-12 
Beta Dare Post-Initiate 13-15 
Kybei Kudja Adult, Reproductive 16-60 




31 A number of finer distinctions can be made within these general categories, whether looking 
forward to a status just realized or looking back to a status just left behind. For example, pou 
(“new”) is affixed to signify newly achieved statuses (e.g. a krumipou is an “infant”), and the past 
tense (-we) may be added to some terms to emphasize the just completed status of a person (e.g. a 
kybuchuwe is an “already initiated male.”) Likewise, the modifier –ete (“true” or “real”) may be 
added to these terms to stress the final stages of the status, the time when the person is thought to 
most fully embody the qualities of that status. These modifiers focus on the boundaries of each 
status, where one gives over into another.  
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Yet the idea of development implied by these terms in Ache is neither a purely social 
condition nor is it mere biological condition, at least as anthropologists have 
traditionally understood the “social” or “natural.” This development was not purely 
a social condition because the terms applied well beyond Ache social organization. 
The term for male pre-initiate (kybuchu) and the term for female initiate (dare) shared 
their names with two kinds of larvae; these terms spoke of a more general sense of 
developmental immaturity than that of Ache adolescents alone. Moreover, the terms 
listed above could specify the age and sex of two monkey species (hooded capuchin 
monkey, Sapajus cay; black howler, Alouatta caraya), the lowland paca (Cuniculus 
paca), the capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris), and the lowland tapir (Tapirus 
terrestris).32 These terms went well beyond the development of humans, and were 
general stages of growth for a variety of life forms.33  
     Yet neither is development “natural,” in the strict sense of the term. People did 
not grow “by themselves” according to some internal blueprint. They grew through 
the intentional and deliberate transmission of food given by others around them, an 
act reflected in the causative constriction “to cause to grow” (ymawã) (see Costa 2017: 
129).34 And the specific persons who caused others to grow were identified as such. 
It was common refrain, when describing their childhoods, for my informants to say, 
																																																								
32 There is one exception, however. The term beta, which refers to the labret that boys receive in 
male initiation, is not applied to adolescent male animals, because as I was told, these animals do 
not undergo initiation as the Ache themselves did. Interestingly, however, adolescent female 
animals are referred to as dare (the term that describes the female initiate), though obviously, 
these animals do not menstruate. 
33 These are, incidentally, the animals considered to have once been human in a mythic past. 
34 The idea that gifts of food contain a part of the giver (essential to Mauss’ argument in The Gift) 
has a tendency to erode the familiar Aristotelian distinction between natural things, which grow 
themselves (by their own design), and artifacts, which are produced (by the design of others). As 
Mauss would argue in the essay, “Conceptions qui ont précédé la notion de matière” (1939), the 
relationship between “given” nature and “constructed” artifacts depends on historically and 
culturally variable conceptions of agency, technology, and gender.  
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Cho ãpãrõ cho ymare, “My father grew me,” or Cho pawerõ bretete cho ymare, “My 
brother, a great hunter, grew me,” and they readily identified the particular foods 
that grew their bodies. As one man told me, 
Buchu ãpã djuapa ka-dji dja ray pycherã. 





Gobu tay purã buchu pycheaty kyrama. 
Ymama gobu.  
 
 
Kuyra o-dji ãpã yma reko dja ray. Karẽ 
pire-dji. Kua kymakadji yma dja ray ãpã. 
Kua kymakadji yma reko ãpã. Tadjy 
purã ymabama gobu.	
Father cut down trees in the forest 
so his sons could suck palm weevil 
larvae. All the palm larvae. Father 
cut down trees so his sons could 
suck palm weevil larvae.  
 
Then his sons, by sucking palm 
weevil larvae, became fat. They 
grew then.  
 
With bird meat, father gradually 
grew his sons. With coati skin too. 
With monkey leg, father grew his 
sons. With monkey leg, father 
gradually grew them. He grew all 




This example makes clear that yma does not refer to “raising” a child through moral 
instruction or socialization. Yma is a fundamentally material notion, and it implies 
the central role of food in the development of right and proper persons. Age grades 
are distinguished in terms of bodily properties. Marilyn Strathern has made a similar 
point when describing development in Hagen: “The child grows into social maturity 
rather than being trained into it” (1980: 196).35 And this implies someone who grows 
of that child and a relationship presupposed and entailed by that growth.  
																																																								
35 Elsewhere, Strathern (1993) has compared Melanesian transformation of social statuses to the 
Western ones in the following terms: “Melanesian children are ‘already’ social beings, and do not 
have to be made into such. Rather, their immanent sociality is made visible in the course of 
[initiation] rites” (1993: 46). By contrast, “What Westerners take serious is education as an 
essential component of the whole socialization process. Education is supposed to make a 
difference to the person: it instills knowledge, alters attitides, is evidence of its own effects. […] 
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     One older man, Kuategi, described to me the way in which he came to possess his 
wife: 
Go ãwe-rõ cho budjarõ cho breko wewe 
go. Dare ãme putẽma cho yma mondo. 
Gogi go-djiwa cho reko. Go cho weiri 
matãma. Cho wei yma mondo. Gogi cho 
pirã upuwe. Gogi wyche koe cho 




Wei rupi ore yma eira, tangy. Cho 
rembia wei cho budja ymawã cho baku. 
Cho wei djywãma, kande djywãma. Cho 




Go wei wei ore wei rupiabu cho budja 
ymawã. 
She was my wife, my first wife. I 
“grew her” from the time she was an 
initiate. That one [she] was the one I 
“owned.” I carried animals to her, I 
“grew her” her with the animals I 
hunted. That one stayed by my side. 
She didn’t leave me behind, my wife 
Tatugi.  
 
We grew her with meat, honey, and 
palm heart. I cooked my prey to 
grow my wife. I shot animals, 
collared peccary. I cooked the coati 
that I shot. When she was an initiate, 
I didn’t give her liver.  
 
We killed animals in order to grow 
my wife.  
 
Kuategi, interview 04/18/2017 
 
The last sentence of Kuategi’s recollection warrants further explanation. The 
causative construction (ymawã, “in order to grow”) is joined with the roles of 
husband (ime) and wife (budja). Kuategi gave her meat in order to grow her as his wife. 
Growing another relied on the discretion and knowledge needed to give different 
recipients the foods they needed to grow—and withholding the foods that would 
stunt their growth. 
 
1.5 Food that Grows, Food that Withers 
     Growing another is not a matter of giving just any food but the right foods to 
																																																																																																																																																																					
As part of a real process, it is essential to equipping a person with the skills necessary to conduct 
him or herself as a member of society” (1993: 43). 
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others. Bodies do not grow by themselves; nor are persons spontaneously afflicted 
by disease. Rather, some particular person (a token of an gendered age grade type) 
becomes sick because he or she consumed a particular food, most commonly meat. 
And a poisoned gift often pointed to the person who gave it. 
     Specific foods are thought to have specific effects on the body. Food might cause 
the recipient’s body “to grow or increase in size, strength, and vitality” (chidjama) or 
it might cause the recipient’s body to become praru, that is, “weak, tender, stunted, 
withered, diminished in strength and health.” The Ache did not have general 
proscriptions that would prohibit the consumption of a particular food for everyone 
at all times. The consumption of certain animals was encouraged or prohibited in 
order to achieve the desired adoption or exclusion of these properties these effects at 
specific times along the life course. Though nothing was outright prohibited, many 
foods were to be situationally avoided, and the force of that avoidance appeared as a 
consequence of a larger set of qualisigns, both prized and feared, that certain objects 
passed on those who incorporate them. Thus, for example, if the claws of coati, 
armadillo, and tegu lizards were not removed before a pregnant woman consumes 
the leg meat of one of these animals, her child would be born with long claws 
resembling those of that animal. Likewise, children are prohibited snake meat so 
that their skin would not turn scaly.  
     Humans and animals shared a similar subjectivity, and the dangers to which 
humans are exposed when eating meat were related to the fact that the subjectivity 
of game animals resembled that of the humans who consume them. Thus, game 
animals did not merely pass on their qualities as contagion; they did so out of a 
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desire to avenge themselves against those who killed them. “A subject conceived as 
feeding on its objects, as principally endowed with a corporeal existence like theirs, 
runs the risk of losing itself in them: they invade it and undermine its identity” 
(Valeri 1998: 101; see also Fausto 2007).  
     Eating meat involved the incorporation of an animal with an intention resembling 
that of the person who consumes it. Meat, particularly fatty meat, was highly valued, 
and game made up the bulk of the Ache diet (Hill and Hawkes 1983; Hill and 
Kaplan 1998; Hill and Hurtado 1996). Nevertheless, the meat of game animals was 
also considered to be a powerful substance and could be dangerous for those who 
consume it. The danger of red meat was found to be particularly acute in specific 
parts of the game animal: its head, its fat, and above all, its blood. Consuming blood 
or eating undercooked meat (or simply too much meat) risked the incorporation of 
the game animal’s soul (adjawe), allowing it to avenge itself for having been killed 
and eaten through dangerous diseases (called djuwy or baiwã36 depending on the 
dialect). The outward signs of djuwy were an intense fever with coughing and 
labored breathing. Yet concealed inside the body was a frantic activity, an attack by 
what was consumed on the body that consumed it.37  
																																																								
36 These terms are difficult to gloss. It is possible that baiwã is composed of bai (animal, thing) and 
wã (causative), meaning “to cause one to become an animal.” This would fit with Fausto’s (2007) 
perspectival argument regarding food and disease, but I am not confident enough in the gloss to 
suggest a definitive interpretation here. 
37 These afflictations were caused by either, in the case of meat, a cannibal agent that claws or eats 
the victim’s insides, or in the case of honey, the introduction into the body of tiny arrows 
(modeled on the bee’s stinger). This image is repeated in a myth where honey-producing bees 
and wasps take revenge on a gluttonous tapir by entering the tapir’s body through the anus and 
killing him with arrows, i.e. stinging him to death. After stealing fire from a hapless old man, the 
bees and wasps later fly the tapir carcass to the sky, where it becomes the Hyades and the bees 
and wasps become the Pleiades. 
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     To rid meat of the smell or the sight of blood, it must be boiled for a long time or 
roasted until it was thoroughly cooked through. Even when well-cooked, red meat is 
often thought to need further moderation. The potency of meat had to be attenuated 
by pairing it with a mild food, such as a bland-tasting gruel made from boiled palm-
fiber or philodendron fruit (membe). Spears of palm heart and gruel made from 
boiled palm fiber are characterized by a mildness of taste and smell. Combining the 
meat with boiled palm fiber was considered something people ought to do, and was 
among the things said to the persons cooking the meat. “‘You should put the 
armadillo meat in with the palm porridge. It tastes good in the palm porridge. You 
should put it in the palm porridge.’ That’s what the Ache say” (Sammons 1978: 15-
16; see also Clastres 1998: 151).38 
     Honey, which was also considered dangerous when unmixed, was also “defused” 
in a similar way. Honey from aggressive bee species—particularly the mrỹnga, 
kiwicha, chu’a, and irõ bees—was thought to cause djuwy/baiwã, and it had to be 
diluted with water before consuming it. The tame jaty bee (Tetragonisca angustula) 
was harmless, however; its vinegary honey could be eaten freely, and the smoke 
from burning its wax could cure those affected by djuwy/baiwã.  
     Potent foods and mild foods like palm were complementary: Strong powerful 
foods were necessary for growth; but their volatile and dangerous potential had to 
be moderated through an operation to neutralize or reduce the actions of the 
animal’s soul with the addition of some inert substance (Menget 1973: 200; see 
																																																								
38 It is interesting here that what one ought to eat also tastes good. 
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Rivière 1989).39 But bland foods by themselves were insufficient for growth; to eat 
only “weak” foods would make one wither, dry up, and may lead to a death 
analogous to dying of old age. The inseparable opposites of potency and moderation 
were not confined to food alone. Indeed, what made striking the proper balance 
between the soft, slow-growing, cool qualities associated with “white” vegetables 
and the fast-growing, hot qualities associated with meat such a variable and 
capricious matter was that the bodily state of the person eating—particularly the 
quality of that person’s blood—affected the sort of food needed to properly grow 
that person. Thus, those in exceptional states (the sick, new initiates of both sexes, 
killers throughout the period of their ritual seclusion, and pregnant women in the 
last weeks of their pregnancy), whose blood was described as “hot” (aku), “abnormal” 
(purã), and “bad” (buchã) reduced their diet to the mildest of Ache foods, a fare of 
palm porridge, spears of palm heart, and the white kernels of philodendron fruit. 
The surface of their bodies was washed with a foamy white solution of timbo 
shavings in water. Following this, they would be able to gradually reintroduce the 
“stronger” and more dangerous foods befitting their age grade. Conversely, the 
elderly, whose bodies are weak, were invigorated by eating strong foods. They 
might eat the parts of game animals that harbor the strongest connection with the 
animal’s subjectivity, such as the head and fat, and if they are withheld specific parts, 
it is usually because their loss of teeth made eating them difficult, and less out of a 
need to balance the heat or coolness of foods against their own bodily condition. 
																																																								
39 The anthropophagous Ache Ua subgroup treated enemy humans as game animals. They 
observed the same proprieties described above (e.g. not laughing during butchery or 
consumption, etc.) Moreover, the flesh itself contained the same dangers. Like the meat of the 
aforementioned game animals, human flesh was also thought to be too “potent” to consume 
without dilution (see Clastres 1998: 330). 
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1.6 Responsibility for Growth and the Dialectics of Ownership 
     The grower stimulates growth in the recipient by giving them fast-growing 
substances at certain crucial points in their lives and weak inert substances at other 
times. The food given to another contributes to the bodily growth of the recipient. 
Yet the effects of that food are, more often than not, taken to be indexical of the 
feeding relationship and are not the focus of interest in their own right (see Taylor 
2000: 319, Vilaca 2002: 352).40 To say that one grew another is not simply a statement 
about causality; it is a statement about responsibility. It is, in other words, an 
evaluative claim about whether the person who is “owned” is “owned well” (reko 
gatu) or “owned badly” (reko buchã). In his narrative above, Kuategi stresses the 
transitive effects of his actions on his wife. It was he who fed her and grew her body 
into that of a woman’s. In the time after her initiation, he gave her meat, honey, and 
palm heart. These were foods that would strengthen her body after the ordeals of 
initiation: the honey would heal the tattoos she received during initiation; the palm 
heart would restrict her menstrual flow; and the meat, which she was prohibited 
from eating during the initiation, would gradually give her body the strength of an 
adult woman. Yet he did not give her coati liver, a strong food that her body, still in 
a liminal state, could not yet manage without risk of disease. The pride Kuategi 
expresses in how he “grew” his wife stems not simply from some generalized spirit 
of generosity but from the knowledge required to give her what she needed when 
she needed it.  
																																																								
40 Or in Strathern’s phrasing, “It is not the food as such that needs to be analyzed, but the feeding 
relationship” (Strathern 1988: 251). 
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     The shadowy possibility implied by Kuategi’s evaluation of his ownership is that 
someone can own another badly and be owned badly (reko buchã). Kuategi knew that 
giving his wife-to-be liver when she had just left seclusion would adversely affect 
her. But the fact that this was worth mentioning at all implied that others did not 
know this, as just as his wife’s health was a sign of his care, one’s bodily weakness 
could be taken as a sign of negligence on behalf of his or her owner. This was 
particularly true of sicknesses. As previously mentioned, sicknesses were often 
attributed to an animal spirit, which might be the immediate source of the attack 
that brought on the sickness—or the animal spirit might be simply the intermediary 
of a discontented dead person. Animals might be subjects, but some animals were 
subjects more than others, and here the animal served less as an agent in its own 
right than a bearer of messages about the relationships between the giver and the 
receiver of the food. Sicknesses might be blamed on the eater’s eating too much and 
sharing too little: “Why did you eat so much of the meat that made you sick?” Or 
they might be attributed to the person who gave the eater the food: “Why did you 
give your son bloody meat?” Blame did not, however, rest on the animal, whose 
desire for revenge was taken as a matter of course.41 
     Ownership entails responsibility and evaluation. It is, in other words, a matter for 




41 Here, as elsewhere in lowland South America, animal revenge is subordinated to human 
designs. Oakdale writes, “When one of the Masters of the Game causes death, Kayabi people 
tend to take revenge on other ethnic groups. After death, people blame the shamans of other 
peoples: they have either led the Masters of the Game to a Kayabi victim or weakened a person 







Other Places, Other Times 
 
     The Jesuit chroniclers of the eighteenth century described Ache bands as 
“wandering aimlessly [discurrir vagos] through the jungles, looking for wild honey, 
fruits, and animals for sustenance” (Lozano 1875 [1789]: 415). Their movement, to 
the extent that the chroniclers would describe it as purposeful, concerned itself with 
the satisfaction of immediate vital needs, yet beyond that, it had no sense of order 
that Jesuits could envision from the vantage of their missions. The Ache took what 
they needed from nature without transforming it. “They do not work to procure 
food, and in this they are equal to wild beasts; they are unfamiliar with agriculture 
and commerce” (Techo 2005 [1673]: 483). The Jesuit’s understanding of Ache 
navigation as aimless movement over an expansive space was of course defined 
negatively with respect to the geometrically regular space inside the missions, and in 
that respect, the prejudices of the Jesuits tell us about the Jesuits and nearly nothing 
about Ache navigation. Yet the blinkered views of the chroniclers were right on one 
account: if Ache territory appears as a limitless expanse, it could not have a single 
center.  
     Ache bands were identified with one or more senior men who were said to “own 
the band.” The leader or leaders of the band became the exemplar or representative 
of his co-residents in the band, and his co-residents were known by his name. They 
might be referred to, for example, as Djamo Chachugi rekoatygi, “those who follow 
Djamo Chachugi” or Djamo Chachugi rekotygi, “those owned by Djamo Chachugi.” 
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Co-residents might also be referred to metonymically by their usual foraging 
grounds (Djamo Chachugi ekoãndy, “where Djamo Chachugi customarily lives”) or 
Djamo Chachugi djoawe, “where Djamo Chachugi passes.”) The names suggest a 
relationship among one or more band leaders, a band of co-residents, and the places 
they regularly inhabit. My aim in this chapter is to outline those relationships. I 
show that Ache movement and co-residence as a function of the notion of 
“ownership” developed in the previous chapter. Ownership, in other words, has an 
essential spatial component in that dependents were expected to “follow” the 
persons who owned them. Here, as elsewhere, evaluation that underlies the notion 
of “following an owner.”  
 
2.1 The Daily Rounds 
     The camp began to stir before daylight. Groups of men sat together beside the fires 
repairing their arrows before the day’s hunt. They looked down the length of the arrow 
like a pool cue, rotating the bamboo in their fingers to spot any bends, working and 
straightening the pliant bamboo, before repeating the procedure to check its straightness 
again. After repeating the process several times, they heated the shafts in the fire to fix 
their shape. Others softened the band of beeswax at the end of the arrows so they could 
rebind the fletching. The men spoke softly among themselves or not at all. 
     Shortly after sunrise, the hunters left camp in small groups, carrying with them only 
their bow and arrows to pursue unencumbered any game they might come across as they 
walked. One child calls out to his father as he leaves the camp, “Bring me back peccary 
meat!”  
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     As they leave the camp, hunters moved at a quick, shuffling pace, faster than a walk 
but not quite a trot. They walked nearly a kilometer from camp before spreading out to 
search for game. Gradually, the hunters slowed their pace, one-by-one adopting a 
distinctive gait, a kind of walking that affords a certain kind of looking. Hunters must 
see the ground immediately in front of them. Even the thickly calloused soles of hunter’s 
feet could be cut by the debris on the forest floor; cuts on the feet could be incapacitating, 
forcing hunters to remain in camp with the women and aged for days. And a bite from a 
venomous snake could be fatal.42 A hunter had to choose his steps carefully. The hunter 
waited on one foot while looking at the ground for the place to land the other.  
     When they walk, hunters do not step parallel to the marching line. They pick their 
feet high up from the ground. Each step crosses the body slightly, so that hips rotate 
from side to side. It was a distinct style of walking that whites, unaccustomed to 
traveling in the forest, found strange. One nineteenth century Swiss naturalist 
described an Ache captive’s style of walking in the following unflattering terms: “From 
the first moment, his gait struck me, for it was exceedingly peculiar, I will say, even 
grotesque. He seemed to be walking in a straight line, sometimes deviating abruptly like 
a drunken man, and setting foot on the ground in a hesitant and uncertain manner, his 
torso leaning forward slightly, his legs wide apart, and [walking] with a sort of waddle” 
(LaHitte 1897: 15). Despite such an ungenerous characterization, an Ache hunter’s 
style of walking allowed him to move silently through the forest, protecting himself 
against its dangers, while looking carefully for such minute signs on the ground as the 
																																																								
42 On walking and hunter-gatherers, see Amato 2006; Lee and Ingold 2006; Widlok 2008. 
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tracks of a passing animal, broken branches, fruits left half-eaten, or the smell of feces 
pointing to a troop of capuchin monkeys in the treetops above.  
     When a hunting party left the camp, there were always people—women, some 
children, uninitiated boys, and men too old to hunt—who stayed behind and waited to 
leave some time after the hunters. After the hunters left, women packed the household’s 
belonging in their carrying baskets: their woven mats, containers of various sizes and 
manufactures, and their husbands’ possessions—wallets of feathers used to fletch arrows, 
cabybara teeth or knoves used to cut notches in the arrowheads, etc. Along with their 
baskets, they carried their infant children, their axes, and perhaps several coals from the 
morning’s fire. When the group left camp, it moved in a direction parallel to the 
hunters—along the way, collecting fruits and larvae.43 Women’s style of walking was 
quite different from men. Ache women took short steps and walked at a shuffle. They 
carried their heavy palm baskets with a tumpline, a headband fitted over the top of the 
woman’s forehead that distributed the basket’s weight to her spine, which kept her back 
straight. For her neck to support the weight of the carrying basket, her head and torso 
pitched slightly forward at the hips, pushing her gaze downward as she walked.  
     Though men and women spent most of the day apart from one another, the groups 
remained close enough so that they could remain regular communication with each other. 
Routes might be adjusted from the sketch offered in the morning, and many tasks 
required cooperation. This improvisation required communication. If a hunter finds a 
																																																								
43 Fruit is bountiful in the early summer months. Women gather fruit from Myrciaria cauliflora 
(jabuticaba, pretylla); Camponesia guaviroba (guabiroba, virella); Philodenron sp. (philodendron, 
membe); and Eugenia sp. (Brazilian cherry, buoilla). In the late summer, Jacaratia sp. (wild papaya, 
challa) is popular; the fruit attracts coati, and the trees may be cut down so that guchu larvae will 
grow in them. During the winter months (May-August), Syagrus romanzoffiana (palm fruit, pytãlla) 
and wild volunteer oranges (browilla) are popular.  
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cluster of palms or a tree with honey, he calls to his wife to bring her axe and basket (see 
Hill and Hawkes 1983).44 Some might use an axe to chop out honey from a standing tree 
or larvae from a rotten trunk. They call out to each other. The message and importance 
of the call is perceived by the cry, by the request with which it is carried out. Other short 
calls follow in response. When a hunter kills a game animal early in the day, he might 
leave it along a trail so that he can continue hunting unencumbered. He calls out to his 
wife for her to pick up the game. “There are two monkeys on the ground. I killed them. 
Put them in the basket.” Or he calls out, “Chupape cho djache ra!” (“I will take [the 
monkeys] on my shoulders to camp!). Those who find a good fruit tree call to others 
nearby to collect fruit with them. Usually a teenage boy or older man will accompany 
the women and children to climb fruit trees and shake down fruits that the women 
collect on the ground below. These quantities of fruit are brought back to share with 
others. 
     Pregnant women did play a significant role in hunters’ movements and the 
positioning of the band, as the movements of the unborn child in the mother’s belly 
pointed to specific concentrations of game animals. To hear Ache tell it, pregnant 
women walked together through the forest, and they spoke about where they suspected 
the game animals where concentrated and the direction they traveled. A man 
accompanying them would call out to the hunters, indicating the likely path the animals 
would take. Later in the afternoon, the two groups would call back and forth to each 
other in deciding where to camp for the night—somewhere close to where they planed to 
hunt the next morning. 
																																																								
44 About 60% of game (by weight or by animal?) is taken in cooperative pursuit (Hill and Kaplan). 
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     The Ache word ekõandy literally means “living-space” or “existence-place.” Each 
being in the forest had its ekõandy, described in terms of its habitat. Animals had 
their ekõandy. Enemies also had their living-space, with Paraguayans living in the 
treeless meadows (prana) and the Guarani who lived at the edge of forest clearings. 
Even the dead and forest spirits had their ekõandy; the ekõandy of ancestral sprits 
called krei was in the clouds, that of the specters of the recent dead was in the 
impenetrable parts of the forest, and a long-haired spirit called bykapukugi (“the 
long-crested one”) lived between the rocks beside waterfalls.  
     The ekõandy of individual Ache bands was most often identified by the resources 
found there, the typical game animals, fish, palms, and fruits (e.g. the peccaries that 
lived there, the honey that one could extract, and so on) as well as the 
“improvements” made to it (e.g. pit traps dug for tapirs, the palms felled for 
growing larvae, etc.) The relation between the ekõandy of particular Ache bands and 
its relevant features was not imagined along the lines of a relation between container 
and content. An ekõandy was not imagined as a continuous area of land but a series 
of concentrations of forest resources.45 As Eduardo Kohn (2013) has argued, life is 
distributed unevenly across a tropical forest landscape. Long stretches of relative 
emptiness are punctuated by localized concentrations of useful stores. Take for 
example, the palm fruit that matures during the winter months. Palm fruit (Syagrus 
romanzoffiana) is not only eaten by humans; places favorable for gathering fruit also 
make for favorable hunting grounds. Palm fruit is also eaten by capuchin monkeys, 
																																																								
45 The Ache word ekõandy is etymologically related to the Guarani territorial concept tekoa. On the 
latter, see Melia 1989; Pissolato 2002; and Mura 2006. 
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black howlers, agouti, ring-tailed coati, and squirrels. Tapirs too are rapacious eaters 
of palm fruit, so Ache hunters dig their pit traps beside the trails that lead in and out 
of palm groves. These concentrations of plants and animals became the names of 
places. In the Ache language, the suffix –ty (or –dy when it follows nasal vowels) 
modifies a noun to mean “a profusion of” or “a collection of” that thing. Thus, a 
single stalk of bamboo was called takua, while a bamboo stand was called takuaty, 
and these stands were locatable places where Ache bands can expect to find bamboo 
larvae during a particular time of the year. The same limited number of names was 
repeated over the immense stretch of a band’s ekõandy.  
     Though the living space of a band was typically identified with the band’s owner, 
the “ownership” of foraging bands did not entail any sort of control over access to 
space. Neither the ekõandy identified with the band nor the locatable places stretched 
across it were the property of the band leader. Specific persons might own the 
individual palms they felled to grow beetle larvae or the pit traps they dug to 
capture tapir, but the ownership of a felled palm was a claim for the larvae grown in 
it and not a claim upon who is allowed to access what type of space, and when.46  
Even if an individual “owned” a felled palm, this could not extend to a palm stand 
or any other of the particular concentrations of resources that dotted the forest. 
These were not “ownable” features of the landscape. 
     The identification of a band leader with an ekõandy was based on the ownership of 
the band rather than his ownership of land. The group’s mobility was a means of 
“positioning” itself in relation to these discontinuous concentrations. The band 
																																																								
46 Animal masters appear to work the same way. The small white-haired “master of honey” 
named Djakarendy owns the trees where honeybees build their nests but has no broader 
territorial claim beyond this. 
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moved camp near one concentration of resources, and by means of small 
collaborative groups, killed or collected that resource and moved it to camp. At any 
given time, hunters might be near one resource but far from another. And the 
satisfaction of one resource provoked a move to another resource within a distance 
coverable by foot. These concentrations were often talked about in terms of 
destinations, but they may also be singled out as places to avoid as one moves along 
a trail. For example, bands tried to avoid walking through spiny thickets called 
kwãnty; bands generally avoided the meadows (prana) where Paraguayans built their 
houses; and menstruating women were specifically prohibited from passing through 
cedar thickets (chingyty), whose pleasing smell had some connection to ancestral 
spirits. 
     An ekõandy was not merely a punctual landscape but also one of lines, edges, and 
familiar trails (see Ingold 2007). Rivers were also basic orienting geographic features 
for Ache. Places along the rivers could indicate concentrations of resources in the 
same way that a forest might (e.g. “the river where the fish are”), but more 
importantly, the sinuous rivulets that spread throughout their ekõandy were invoked 
as lateral lines to coordinate the band’s movement. A river has a “base” (y apo) and a 
“head” (y ãkã), and these features are, not coincidentally, the names for the parts of a 
tree, so that the network of waterways is analogous to tree branches that flow into an 
ever-wider trunk. The “base” and the “head” imply a direction, so that walking 
along the banks of a river or stream, one walked in the direction of its flow or 
against it.  
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     The ekõandy was a seasonal space. The Ache language refer to stretches of time by 
adding the temporal suffix (–bu) to some seasonal forest resource (kymata pirãmbu, 
“when kymata fruit turns red”; biadjubu, “when there is philodendron fruit,” etc.) As 
we can see from these examples, much of Ache time reckoning was connected to the 
relation between seasonal changes in the forest and food gathering. Ache time 
intervals were best thought of as events in the world, with which other undertakings 
or happenings might coincide, or to which other events were indexed. These 
occurrences are not, however, used as quantifiable measures. Unlike the Ecuadoran 
Huaorani, who use the appearance of chonta palm fruit as a regularly increasing 
temporal unit to locate other events in the past (e.g. referring to an event that 
happened three palm seasons ago) (Rival 2002: 47), Ache time-reckoning does not 
measure time as one would some physical object (in terms of length, etc.). The event-
based time intervals used by the Ache were related to other events by relationships 
of sequence and simultaneity—and not by metaphoric containment of some 
calendric unit. More particularly, because time-reckoning was figured with respect 
to the qualities of physically located objects, talk about time could motivate 
inferences with a strong spatial component (e.g. that at a particular time, say, “the 
time palm fruit ripens,” a band should move to palm groves to fill their baskets). 
 
2.2 A Kind of Movement 
     Residence was based on social relationships. Movement was less a matter of 
following a plan or route than it was following a person. “Following” was, in other 
words, a political act. In Ache, as in English, the verb “to follow” (mudja) has 
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polysemous spatial and political valences: those who “move behind another person 
in the same direction” may stand in some subordinate political relation to that 
person. Following someone was therefore an icon of the other’s influence. But of what 
sort? 
     The decisions regarding where to travel were typically made in the afternoon 
camp, at the culmination of the day’s hunt and the collective meal. What might 
appear as merely innocuous talk about the day’s hunt was in fact of essential 
importance to where and how the band moves, for in recounting the particulars of 
the day’s events and what they had seen and done, individual men made 
announcements about what they will do for the following hunt. The hunter would 
say that he would go toward some specific concentration of resources or to follow 
specific game animal, through a phrase such as “I will go toward [a known place in 
the forest, such as a peccary trail, an orange grove, or a salt lick].” Or such a 
response might be inferred from his mentioning the fresh tracks of an anteater that 
he saw on his way to camp.47  
     Reasons for walking to a specific place were not given in terms that all those who 
will be affected by a decision would reasonably accept; the statement was made 
neither as an order nor as position to be debated by equals (Brightman 2016). A 
hunter simply made a claim about the future. He vocalized a project, and whether 
others in the band either followed him or went their own way, they did so without 
going against him, without discussion or protest.  
																																																								
47 In some cases, these destinations took them away from the band for a day or two, such as when 
a man decided to return to rotten palms he felled months before to collect the larvae that have 
grown in them. 
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     There is no verb in Ache “to lead” that would correspond to mudja, “to follow.” 
One simply described the route he had taken, announces that he will do something, 
and waited to see if people would follow. There is a real sense that persons, because 
they cannot easily compel another to act, cannot lead others at all. Obviously, some 
men were more influential than others. There were those who had shown 
themselves proficient in finding game and generous by sharing his food to feed 
others, and these outstanding personalities were more likely than others to provoke 
the movement of camp by their individual decisions. This sort of limited influence 
that leaders enjoyed is well captured by Sahlins’s description of a petty chieftain: 
“One word from him and everyone does as he pleases” (1968: 21).  
     Once they have heard a hunter’s intentions, others will communicate that they 
will “follow” him.48 Reference to the first hunter’s announcement might be more or 
less explicit. In his reply, a second hunter might signal his willingness to hunt with 
the first hunter by asking, “Where are you going to go?” or by telling the hunter, 
“When you see peccaries, call out to me.” Or the second hunter might simply 
announce that he will travel to the same destination without directly responding to 
the first hunter at all. There was a considerable degree of spontaneity in this. Other 
men will often deferred a decision about whether to stay, whether to accompany the 
man who was moving, or whether to move elsewhere, until the move begins. The 
band’s movement resulted from this series of ad hoc individual decisions.  
																																																								
48 Parallels exist with other Amazonian groups. It is common for Arawete to call their leaders, “he 
who begins” and whom others follow (Viveiros de Castro 1992: 110). Rivière (1984: 72-73) writes 
that Trio leaders are “expected to lead from in front, by example and by initiating activities, and 
not by issuing orders from behind.” 
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     There were obvious limitations to such spontaneity, however. Living alone was 
an existence reserved for lone spirits and solitary hunters like jaguars. For humans, 
one could leave the cooperation and companionship of the band only for the 
cooperation and companionship of another band.49 To be “left behind” (wedja) by the 
band, as happened when one became too ill to keep pace with the band’s 
movements, was a frightful possibility.  
     Certain relations were expected to follow others as part of the expectations 
involved in “ownership.” People were explicitly instructed to follow their older 
consanguineal kin: young spouses (of either sex) may be advised to follow their 
affines, adult wives to follow their husbands, and children to follow their fathers or 
mother’s brothers. The general idea in following “owners” was that people should 
follow kin who were obliged to take care of them, and that people should be aware 
of those relations should sudden changes in residence occur.  
     Bands moved through these lines of multiple followings, with a few lines brought 
together through siblinghood or the ties of sons-in-law to their father-in-law. Bands 
were the composite point of the relationships that produced them, a grouping of 
persons continuously composed and decomposed through various “followings.” It 
was only as a fetish (in Lévi-Strauss’ sense of the term) that the band appears as a 
relationship between a leader and followers, as an objectification of the multiple 
relations of leading and following that produced them. It is only from the outside, 
that is to say from a particular point of view, that a leader is said to “own” the band. 
																																																								
49 No one would choose loneliness; to leave the band voluntarily was an act tantamount to 
suicide, undertaken by elderly men who had become ashamed of the burden put on others. 
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It is as if “the group owes its form, size and even origin to the potential chief who 
was there before it came into being” (Lévi-Strauss 1974: 347).  
 
2.3 Where to Go, Whom to Follow 
     Shortly after the birth of her child, Chedjugi’s husband had left their resident 
band and visited another. This was, by itself, quite common. The parturient blood of 
their wives contaminates new fathers; Animals are attracted by the clinging odor of 
a woman’s blood on those who come in contact with it. Just as it might draw a band 
of capuchin monkeys within range of the hunter’s bow, so might the smell stimulate 
the sensitive olfaction of dangerous jaguars and venomous snakes. The new father’s 
liminal state was spent away from the band. Yet Chedjugi’s husband had stayed 
away for several weeks, far longer than new husbands typically did, and she became 
increasingly concerned about her relationship upon hearing rumors that he had 
fathered another child in his absence. As she described it, 
Cho ichywe k’bae rekollãndy cho. Cho 
memby cho etakra watawe. Cho ime 
Djapegi baydja kudja pedja pukuwe cho 
ime Djapegi. Cho ichywe wedja kua’allã. 
Cho ãpã Kradjagirõ cho ichywe rekoaty. 




Ai Chãkrãmagi ga cho tarã djawu. 
“K’bae rekoeme dje ichywe wedja 
kua’allãwerã.” “Cho kowebu k’bae 
rekollawerã,” na’ã. “Cho rekollãwerã 
Djapegi. Cho wedja kua’allãre cho 
rekollawerã.” Cho myrõ uryrawe cho 
kuyrõechebu. Cho pradjallã cho ime cho 
wedja kuallãwe.  
 
I was a new mother, and I did not 
own a man. My child and I walked 
alone (i.e. did not follow a man). My 
husband, Djapegi, went far away. I 
was a new mother he left me. I was a 
new mother, so I followed my father 
Kradjagi. Then I no longer cried 
because he left me. 
 
Mother Chãkrãmagi often said to me, 
“Don’t own the man who leaves a 
new mother.” I said, “Now, I will not 
own a man. I will not own Djapegi. 
He left me, so I won’t own him.” I 
was going to run away when I was 




Ymaeche wachubuma cho ime Djapegi 
reko. Gobu Chewugi brawowachu 
djapomami. Gope chope kiuma Chewugi 
“Brawodjiwa emi Djapegi miwe.” Cho 
djawullã. Cho ollãwe.  
 
 
Gobu Djapegi rekoma idja brekotydji, 
Chewugidji. Brawo wachu mimbyre oma 
amaty. Prandjã buchã Chewugi. 
Prãndjabu kuirõma Djapegi mondo. Eru 
erurawe ore endape. Go erubu cho 
rekollãrawe Djapegi. Ore rekoaty erubu 





Djary Baetapagi chope inama, “Kbae 
rekoeme.” Cho kbae rekollãrawe cho 
pawe Bywãngi djawullãbu. Cho pawe 
Bywãgirõ chope djawuare. “Myrõeme 
kbae mechãbu. Gorõ dja memby kyra 
wẽwãdji. Bue myrõdjipa?”  
I was grown, and my husband 
Djapegi owned me. Then he made 
Chewugi pregnant. There, Chewugi 
told me, “Djapegi made me 
pregnant.” I didn’t say anything. I 
didn’t leave. 
 
Then Djapegi owned his wife, 
Chewugi. After she became pregnant, 
they went somewhere. Chewugi was 
very mean. When he was mean, 
Djapegi left her. He was going to 
bring her to our camp. If he brought 
her, I would have not owned Djapegi. 
When they followed us, she was 
mean. There I would have left behind 
Chewugi. 
 
Grandmother Baetapagi said to me, 
“Don’t own a man.” I was not going 
to have a man if my sibling Bywãngi 
hadn’t spoken to me. My sibling 
Bywãngi said to me, “Don’t run away 
when a man looks at you.” He will 
fatten your child. Why are you one 
who runs away?” 
 
Chedjugi in Sammons (1987: 33-34) 
 
As Chedjugi’s case shows, the interruption of residing to considerable uncertainty 
about the status of relationships. There was considerable latitude regarding where 
that hierarchical relationship might apply, as one could follow any number of people. 
And even professedly short visits to neighboring bands might lead to the dissolution 
of existing relationships and the creation of new ones. The composition of one’s 
residential band was therefore not something that could be taken for granted. This 
created choices for who one should follow and where ownership relations should 
apply, choices that could be deliberated among one’s familiars, as Chedjugi’s story 
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describes. No longer living together, Chedjugi no longer “owned” her husband, and 
her husband no longer “owned” her. Yet the relation still provoked instruction by 
Chedjugi’s co-residents about whether it was better to follow a man who “owns 
















Scolding, the Agonism of Ache Ethics 
 
     Part of the way ownership became consequential in the lives of Ache lay in the 
ways it came under evaluation. Owners might be evaluated on the basis of their 
ownership, as “owning well” (reko gatu) or “owning badly” (reko buchã). And 
although dependents—as persons owned—were not evaluated on that basis, owners 
evaluated those they owned in ways they could did not do with other kinds of 
relations. One of the most explicit ways ownership relations were evaluated was 
through a genre of scolding called kura, and kura-scolding was mostly (though 
hardly exclusively) confined to ownership relations. This was for good reason. Cases 
of scolding tended to cluster in places where social relations were well-defined, 
intimate, and hierarchical—precisely those relations characterized as “ownership.”  
     The Ache language features a specific postposition construction—used 
exclusively in a speech genre called kura—which transforms verbs into questions of 
the sort: “Are you one who does (some undesirable) act?” (e.g. “Are you one who 
hits your husband?”) Essential to the meaning of the utterance—what it is and what 
it does—is the sort of semiotic relations people make between “action” and 
“character.” The kind of ethical critique implied in Ache kura is immersed in the 
thoughts and ideas that it opposes. By this I mean that kura criticizes some person’s 
actions, but because speech is also an action, kura itself frequently falls under 
scrutiny. So the notion of kura (and its cross-cultural counterparts like “scolding”) 
	 71 
encourages us to reframe critique in a broader horizon of action. And it implies that 
differing shades of critique—from corrective training, to moral critique, to outright 
scolding—are distinguished from one another, with important social effects. Critique 
can backfire. This is precisely what a notion of “scolding”—as opposed to “mere 
criticism”—is thought to capture. How can moral critique fail and with what 
consequences? What are the risks involved? 
     These are, I think, pretty fundamental questions, but my sense is that they don’t 
always get the attention they deserve from anthropologists. This may be because an 
important part of what many anthropologists do is critique. And we have certain 
taken-for-granted assumptions about what we do when we critique something. As 
critics, we tend—Foucault’s genealogy of the particularity of “truth-telling” not 
withstanding—to treat critique as an act of individual freedom directed at some 
injustice that we correctly pick something out about a person or situation. We are 
“speaking the truth,” if not “to power” (as the Quaker activist mantra goes), then at 
least to someone able to do something about the problem. Still, there is the 
possibility that one’s critique can be “truthful” or normatively grounded and still be 
wrong.50 Critique is not simply a matter of “telling the truth,” fault-finding, and 
correcting; its success or failure depends on a number of pragmatic conditions—the 
localized situation, the identity of the actors, indexicality and implicature, and so 
on—through which the evaluative stance of the critic is—or is not—shared by others. 
And, as in the case here, the pragmatic considerations may overwhelm the content of 
the criticism, to the extent these things may be separated at all. 
																																																								
50 A prospect evoked in a famous line from the Cohen brother’s film The Big Lebowski: “You’re not 
wrong, Walter, you’re just an asshole.” 
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     In this chapter, I want to explore how a certain anxiety around moral critique 
might be rendered as integral to the imagination of an ethical life. At the root of this 
anxiety is an inherent risk found in Ache scolding: The anger that one experiences in 
a given situation is experienced in relation to something, such that scolding has an 
object. One is angry about something or with someone. Yet scolding is itself an act 
and others may treat it as a sign of the enduring character of the scold (specifically, 
the scold’s angry temperament). Just as a quality of an action (its slow pace, for 
example) may point to some enduring character trait (e.g. laziness) in the actor, so 
can an act of scolding indicate something about the person expressing it. One can 
simply be angry. 
     The idea that critique can fail is exactly what is captured in a number of readily 
characterological tropes easily recognizable to the reader: the scold, the Puritan, the 
nag, the paranoid, the finger-wagging moralist, whose critiques are dismissed as 
nothing more than the cries of rootless curmudgeons, sullen and cut off from the 
commonality or kinship with those around them. What these figures suggest is that 
moral critique may be taken to reveal as much about the critics as those they criticize. 
In what follows, I show how Ache scolding constructs characterological types to 
evaluate relations and sanction behavior. 
 
3.1 Happiness and Anger 
     What order and cooperation there was in these dispersed groups—how individuals 
got along and affected each other’s actions—depended on the ties of recognized 
relatedness, and the satisfaction of these relations was often discussed in emotional 
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terms. Interpersonally, emotions provided them with a way of making sense of other 
people’s motives. Anger, jealousy, and love served as dispositions that motivated 
actions, reasons for why people do what they do. Collectively, emotions provided a 
measure for contented sociality, and considerable ethical work is devoted to showing 
others just how contended one is. Laughter, for example, accompanied the daily 
activities of gathering, food preparation, and other convivial activities, and served as 
a sign that people are “living happily” among their kin and affines.  
     Happiness (ury) is a moral ideal, an emotion the Ache say that people should have. 
The central themes of the Ache moral order revolve around the ideal of closely 
cooperating kin, and it is in terms of this understanding that Ache attempt to define 
when and how one should be “happy.” Being among kin, to be shown affection and 
concern, and to show it, should make one “happy.” Like acts of giving and laughter, 
certain ways of speaking serve as signs of the contentedness of relations. Happiness 
also implies a way of talking so that “good speech” (djawu gatu)—softly-spoken, 
carefully worded, loving speech—is directed toward one’s kin and intimates. But it 
is also recognized that “happiness” may be achieved in illegitimate and gratuitous 
ways, that some individuals are made “happy” by doing the wrong sorts of things.51 
There are those who, to cite the most prominent examples I encountered, are “happy 
to joke around” (djudja ury), “happy to talk too much” (djawu ury), “happy in their 
excessive grief” (chẽnga ury), “happy to fight” (djuka ury), and even “happy to shoot 
others with arrows” (djywõ ury). Happiness, real happiness, was a fragile 
accomplishment.  
																																																								
51	These constructions are somewhat similar to the English adverb “happily,” as in, “I’ll happily 
share my food with you,” though ury is generally applied to more durable dispositions.	
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     The Ache considered the feeling prãndjã—a term associated with “wrath,” “fury,” 
or “rage”— to be the cause of and the effect of the degeneration of happiness. 
Prãndjã, as with other emotions, had both corporeal and social correlates. On the one 
hand, the sensible signs of anger were thought to index certain physical states of the 
body. Anger was often described as a hotness in the blood—something feverish. On 
the other hand, prãndjã was an undesirable emotion whose effects were registered in 
the lives of one’s co-residents. By inspiring fear, anxiety, or anger in others, prãndjã 
hindered the performance of contented harmonious relations. In both its corporeal 
and social senses, the “heat” of prãndjã was explicitly contrasted with “coolness,” (ruy), 
whose bearer possesses health, contentment, and thoughtful restraint. The 
association with emotion and bodily temperature is meant in a more literal and 
physical sense than the expressions “hot-blooded” or “cool-headed” do in English, a 
difference which becomes apparent in the techniques through which violently angry 
people might be subdued: the body of the “hot” angry person is rubbed with palm 
heart or fibrous palm pith—foods associated with “coolness”—to soothe it and 
return the person to a normal state. 
     Scolding was considered to be one such expression of anger. Even though it 
purportedly responds to the moral failure of another, the act of scolding itself was 
open to further critique in a potentially infinite regression. As Judith Irvine has 
written, “The act of making an evaluative statement about someone is itself a social 
act subject to evaluation” (1992: 113). One was, in other words, responsible for what 
one says when scolding another, and consequently, was open to the same 
characterological questioning. One could scold another for being a scold, something 
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that (if the reported speech of my informants is any indication) happened with some 
regularity. Djakaetedjipa? “Are you the one who scolds so much?” 
     This appears to be quite different from what is reported in other parts of the 
South American lowlands, where harsh criticism was often given indirectly through 
ritual or heavily formalized verse, effectively excluding the speaker as the source of 
critique. Charles Briggs (1992; 1993) has described how in Warao funerary laments 
women assiduously note the lapses in care and generosity thought to have led to the 
death. In Bakairí initiation rituals, unsuspecting spectators may be scolded for 
stinginess and adultery by masked dancers who appear in the guise of animal 
masters, the origin of the critique seemingly lying outside of humanity itself (Barros 
2003). In each of these examples, the speakers are not held individually responsible 
for their speech even as the addressee’s behavior is called into question (cf. Irvine 
1992). 
     But for the Ache, the agonism of critique is neither masked nor projected outside 
of society but considered part of the cost of interaction. Of course anger may render 
people unable to control themselves, growing out of proportion to its causes. Yet it 
does not seem that people can do without it; anger can and ought to be felt in some 
cases, and people should act upon in response to certain injuries inflicted on them or 
on those they care about. Whether anger is appropriate or not is not something 
determinable in advance but depends on the particulars of a context. This was 
precisely Aristotle’s position in the Nicomachean Ethics, “There is praise for someone 
who gets angry at the right things and with the right people, as well as in the right 
way, at the right time, and for the right length of time ” (2014: 72). The problem for 
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Aristotle, as it is for the Ache, is how and to what degree anger is a sensible solution 
to the intolerable actions of others, and it is necessarily a practical one whose answer 
cannot be given in advance.  
      Whatever kura is, it is something far more than simply a disagreeable act from 
which the Ache can’t seem to rid themselves. It plays prominent roles in some of the 
most elaborate rituals in Ache life. These highly formalized uses of kura, featured 
most prominently in funerary rites and male initiation, not only dramatize the 
everyday experience of interpersonal conflict, they play fundamental roles in 
making the right sorts of people. I will save discussion of funerary scolding for the 
next chapter. For now, it is sufficient to point out that, whatever the differences 
between these isolated cases of ritual scolding and their more everyday forms, they 
share the ambivalent sense that scolding is (in the abstract) both unavoidable and 
unacceptable. The trouble it brings is a general condition of social life: part of “the 
costs we pay in order to live,” as Veena Das (2013: 19) has so expressively described 
sacrifice.  
 
3.2 The Accusation 
     The Ache word that I translate here as “scolding” is kura. The term itself refers to 
the characteristic intonation and emotional expression of the scolder. Kura is also used 
to refer to the deep guttural growl of a jaguar, and like this other sense, it points to the 
sensible signs of something’s being angry. To do kura is by definition a forceful and 
angry act, so much so that the emotional expression of the speaker is a constructive 
feature that distinguishes kura from other kinds of discourse. In other words, the 
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speaker’s expression of anger is a necessary condition of a man or woman’s utterance 
counting as kura.  
     If the expression of anger is not a separate feature of the criticism “added” at the 
discretion of the speaker, neither is it the case that speaker’s emotional stance 
excludes a consideration of linguistic form. Kura is defined by a particular 
grammatical construction not found in other speech genres:  
 
 [action+dji+pa] 
[verb + nominalizer + “strong” question marker] 
 
The various components of the utterance are as follows: 
A. Verb-dji 
The –dji attaches to a verb, and effectively nominalizes it, so that the specific 
act criticized is turned into “one who does the act” thus criticized. 
 
B. “Strong” question marker –pa  
Like other Tupi-Guarani languages, Ache encodes speaker attitudes in its 
questions. The question marker –pa indicates a direct question, while the “soft” 
question marker (-ko) indicates perplexity or astonishment. The use of the 
question marker –pa in kura constructions is not softening an assertion. The –
pa suffix is forceful and always directed at an addressee, whereas –ko is often 
used in the presence of unaddressed bystanders. While it is grammatically 
permissible to use a “soft” question (–ko) in scolding, it would be attitudinally 
improper to use –ko with a kind of speech described as angry.  
 
We can get a vague sense of how the utterance comes off through some examples: 
 
1. Pichu uechedjipa? 
	




2. Dja kyminoperõ karadja krypy 













5. Piãmbyre rupi djarawã ekõwã 
beru. Picha krumi reko buchãdjipa? 
	
 
The tough howler monkey thigh 
meat is for your grandchild. Are you 
the one who doesn’t know how to 
eat? 
 
You didn’t give to the child. Are you 
the one who picks up [becomes a 
ritual godmother to] so many 
children [that you don’t care for]? 
 
Your child is lost. Are you the one 
who looks so much for manioc 
[instead of watching your children]? 
 
Do you want the Paraguayans to 
come to take you? Are you one who 
is so bad to other children? 
	
 
We can see that in its most basic form, kura involves, first, a statement of fact about 
the action a person committed (or its implication by the speaker) that specifies the 
actions as deficient in some way. In example 2, the speaker points out in front of 
others that an older man has kept a cut of meat that was intended for that man’s 
grandchild—with the added offense that the man should have known the tough cut 
of meat was for someone with better teeth. In examples 3 and 4, the speaker begins 
by pointing out that the addressee has neglected an essential obligation to a child. 
Even in cases where the opening statement is omitted, such as in examples 1 and 5, 
the speaker still implies that an offense has been committed (e.g. that the addressee 
is eating or has recently eaten palm larvae or the address has ill-treated a playmate.) 
This offense forms the basis for the question that follows it. 
     Secondly, kura involves a question about whether the doer of the action is the 
kind of person who performs acts like these. At stake is the difference between “a 
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person who cried” and a “crying person.” Sometimes the form is accompanied by a 
specific sanction in the form of an external threat (as it is in example 5). Thus, unruly 
children or those who struggled to keep pace with the band might be reminded that 
a jaguar or a Paraguayan might attack them. But there is a strong sense that kura is 
its own punishment, and the formalized language of scolding contains its own kind 
of threat. Specifically, Ache kura threatens to define the character of individuals 
through the undesirable actions they perform, and it does so by means of a question: 
“Are you one who commits x, y, or z act?”  
 
3.4 Actions and ethical types 
     In these and other examples, the focus is not on the act per se but on the kind of 
person who would regularly perform that act. Scolding therefore involves a 
particular relationship between action and character, a behavioral token and an 
ethical type. But what kind of relationship is this? Moral philosophers have formulated 
various ways in which action and personhood might be—or should be—connected. 
For the sake of simplicity, I cite the two prevalent options.   
     The first option argues that being blameworthy is “really” about being 
responsible for a defined action. This is the position of a number of moral 
philosophers (mostly Kantians, but also neo-Aristotelians like Nussbaum [2016]: 
233), who make a strong distinction between critiques directed at persons and 
critiques directed at acts. By strictly separating the person and the person’s act, they 
argue, we may identify and correct abhorrent behavior while still respecting the 
dignity of the person. Put otherwise: the dignity we grant to all persons requires that 
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we judge acts singularly and not as a direct reflection of the person who commits 
them. (This attitude is also commonly found in Christianity, where judging persons 
is reserved for God. Or the saying popular with evangelicals “Hate the sin, love the 
sinner.”52) 
     The second option directs criticism at the person who has originated the action. 
Action is still important here, but it is important for what it communicates about the 
person who performed it. Or to put it in more semiotic terms, it posits a certain 
relationship between character and action, where a person’s actions index some 
enduring aspect of that person’s character, personality, soul, disposition, etc. Central 
to this option is an essentialization about a person who committed an act, an answer 
to the question, “what must one be like to have committed this action?” 
     We might treat the sort of ethics implied in Ache kura as a third option. It shares 
with character-centered critiques a concern with action and personhood. For both, 
the idea of character is thought to explain a particular action. There is, in other 
words, some basic sense in which we are what we do. But in Ache kura, the 
relationship between an action and the person—the “the one who does things like 
that action”—is always posed as a question: “Are you the one who eats so many 
palm larvae while your children go hungry?”53 
     Just what is at stake in posing character as a question? We might grant that 
“action” and “character” have the same paradoxical character as the “grain of sand” 
																																																								
52 I thank Carla Jones for bringing this example to my attention. 
53 I am not concerned whether such an account of character is philosophically defensible. In other 
words, I am not concerned, as those working in meta-ethics are, with whether character is or isn’t 
real, whether character actually picks out an existing disposition in a person or whether it is a 
case of fundamental attribution error. My interest in these aspects of ethical life is 
anthropological: given that people do, in practice, treat others’ actions as an index of their 
character, how are persons imbued with character?	
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and the “heap” from Eubulides’ famous “sorites paradox.” Character is not 
something immediately perceptible to others: it is a habitual or otherwise 
naturalized component of the person, whether it accumulates primarily from the 
fulfillment of generous acts, or whether generous acts index a character that was 
there all along. A single act is never enough by itself to make the difference between 
one particular kind of character and another. After all, how many “bad acts” must 
one do to be considered a “bad person?” At what point does “a man who lied” 
become “a liar?” Perhaps this is why character is so often attributed to something 
indefinite about a person’s essence: something “internal to the person” (Aristotle), 
the “operations of the soul” (Aquinas), “personality,” or some other vague predicate 
like “soul” (see Severi 1993).54 
     The scolder’s address to the offending party derives its force from this very 
ambiguity between act and character. The act is named in the accusation. But from 
this Ache scolders not directly conclude, “You are lazy” or “You are malhumored.” 
The ethical type can only be suggested by the accuser. Kura is therefore not an act of 
naming another; it is rather a threat to characterize another as a moral failure. Just as 
it is impossible to determine how many “bad acts” makes one a “bad person,” the 
form of Ache scolding invokes the frightening possibility that one’s next “bad act” 
might be the defining one in the eyes of others. In other words, Ache kura acquires 
its force from its open-endedness as a question. 
 
3.5 The Recipient 
																																																								
54 Character (type) and action (token) can and often do act as evidence of each other. Henry James 
noted the circularity of the terms in The Art of Fiction: “What is character but the determination of 
incident? What is incident but the illustration of character?” (cit. MacIntyre 1981: 125). 
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     One way to see why kura’s particular qualities might matter is to compare them 
with the way anthropologists have often treated moral education since Durkheim—
that is, discourses on acceptable practices, their purpose, how individual behavior 
should be adapted to it, and how breaches to morality might be resolved. For moral 
education to work, in such a view, critique must achieve a particular goal. It is the 
violation of a collectively sanctioned idea—and only this—that entitles us to lecture 
them and punish them. The offender experiences not just the feeling of social 
discomfort or a fear of the scolder’s wrath, but an admission that they did what they 
knew to be wrong at the time. In feeling shame, a person feels not just the other’s 
view of what that person is, but a collective sense of failure from that view. And this 
affects the person’s view of him or herself. The admission of the offense, where 
through symbolic acts like atonement, expiation, or apology, actors demonstrate 
their adherence to moral and ethical values of the group to others, and in so doing, 
repairs the damage his/her actions have done.  
     But something very different happens in Ache scolding. The moral force is not 
external to the kura utterance but is the internal possibility of the expression itself. 
The social life of ethical claims is mediated by discursive interactions (Keane 2016). 
Though critique is packaged in a strongly formalized accusation, the interaction is 
not closed by a similar degree of formality. In fact, in most of the cases of scolding I 
witnessed or heard described, the question often elicits no immediate response in the 
accused at all. The question asked in kura—“Are you one who does such a thing?”—
is not a straightforward question, to be answered truly or falsely. There is no 
acknowledgement of the utterance or the offense nor is there a resolution to it. The 
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accused avoided direct eye contact with his accuser. Staring downward or sidelong, 
stooping slightly, the accused typically suffers the sting of the accusation in silence.  
     Everyday scolding mostly occurs between cross-generational consanguineal kin 
or between spouses. In the former case, the person scolded is already dependent and 
indebted to his or her accuser. And that hierarchy gives force to the accusation 
made. Parents may scold their children; grandparents may scold their 
grandchildren; elder siblings may scold their younger siblings without escalation, 
though as we will see, not without resentment. 
     The outward signs of the accused’s passivity often conceal an inner rage. When 
recalling past incidents when they had been scolded, my informants described the 
rage they struggled to hide in response to being exposed by their accuser. Here is 
one such example: 
The midday camp was cold. Mothers nursed their babies, and the older children 
stoked and added wood to the fires, as they warmed themselves before the hunters 
returned to camp in the late afternoon. 
     Suddenly, a hunter’s call rang out from a distance outside the camp. “Aaaa. Aaaa. 
Aaaa. There is honey here. Bring your baskets.” Two older children sprang up from 
their seats, and reached into their mother’s woven palm leaf carrying baskets to find 
the baked clay cylinders they would use to collect the honey that had just been 
discovered. 
     One girl remained by the fire, trying to steal a few more moments of comfort by 
the fire before leaving with the other girls. Just as her older sister left the cleared space 
of the camp in the direction of the hunter’s voice, she noticed her sister remained by 
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the fire with their mother. Within earshot of the others, she shouted at her younger 
sister, “Paraguayans are going to come get you! Are you a lazy person? Why would 
anyone save you from being abandoned to the Paraguayans?”  
 
The younger sister, who told this story to me, was furious at her older sister’s 
scolding. The suggestion that because of her laziness, she was unwanted by any of 
her co-residents in the band left her humiliated. “I would have liked to have hit my 
sister with a firebrand,” she confessed as she recounted the event to me decades later. 
But the girl did as her sister said, and left the warmth of the fire to go bring back 
honey with the others. 
     Being singled out in this way not only embarrasses the accused. The scolder’s 
deliberate disregard for the other’s autonomy or integrity induces anger. In the 
particular case just mentioned, the younger’s sister swallowed her bitterness in 
silence. But the potential for direct confrontations to immediately escalate hung over 
these interactions. Likewise, as a verbal confrontation, some degree of risk – or 
danger – of failure is inherent in every performance of Ache kura. 
 
3.6 Too Much Kura Makes One Prãndjã: The Scold as an Ethical Type 
     Threating to define others with ethical types comes at a cost. The general 
sensitivity for people who scold too much places clear limits on criticizing others. If 
scolding was common, it was also commonly resented, so that criticism was often a 
dangerous action in its own right. Here we encounter the doubled-sided nature of 
criticism: The resources a person has to form a critique are also the terms in which 
others will interpret his or her behavior. The threat of ethical typification extends 
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meta-pragmatically to scolding itself: “those who scold” may find themselves 
accused of being common scolds: “You are so angry with your children. Are you a 
real scolder?” 
     Perhaps this was why it was so common to talk about being scolded. In the 
character evaluations of their peers, Ache regularly identified the habitual emotional 
states of others—as angry people, as kind and caring, or as scolds. And as evidence, 
they carefully cited the way particular “angry people” had scolded them, 
reproducing the same blistering critique in other settings so that others might also 
hear how aggressive the scolder was. In reporting the scolder’s critique of their 
action, speakers made no effort to hide the accusations leveled against them or to 
defend their actions. They seemed unconcerned whether their person listening to the 
story might agree with the scolder’s account—that they might in fact, actually be a 
“stingy person,” a “lazy person,” or a “someone who eats too much palm larvae.” 
The final framing of the event was enough to suggest the fault of the critic. 
     Moreover, the ethical type “scold” is more durable over time than other, less 
ambivalent, ethical types like “lazy person” or “stingy person.” At death, scolds and 
violent people (both of which are ultimately motivated by anger) may become 
voracious jaguars or ghostly specters called adjawe that prey on living kin.55 Or, 
better put, a jaguar is the particular body the dead person inhabits for purposes of 
revenge and carnage. While someone’s laziness or stinginess does not carry on after 
one’s death, one’s anger does. Dead scolds—in the form of jaguars or ghostly 
adjawe—were responsible for a variety of ailments and misfortunes (in addition to 
																																																								
55 As I was told, Prãndjã ekõwerã adjawe. “The angry ones will become adjawe.” 
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jaguar attacks). They might enter the stomachs of living persons and sicken them. 
They might cause cramps in people during their daily treks through the forest. Or 
they might, as jaguars, maul those they encountered. 
     Dead scolds also preserved some connection with their biographical past, so that 
any misfortune suffered by a living person could potentially be attributed to some 
deceased person who had once scolded the victim. These injuries seemed personal to 
the living persons who suffered them, perhaps not in the same way as the original 
scolding, but at least as different manifestations of an angry character.  
     Critique is, in one way or another, a negative act. To engage in critique is to 
grapple with omissions, insufficiencies, or evasions in the person one is critiquing. It 
is to formulate a limit, to perceive a deficiency, to heave a sigh of disapproval or 
disappointment. And because that disapproval is directed at a person, it implies an 
assertion of authority over the person being scolded. Its possibility and risk comes 
from violating the recipient’s autonomy. Scolding comes from resentment and 
circulates it. To borrow James Siegel’s depiction of witchcraft, we might say that 
scolding “is a violence that inheres in the social and that turns against it” (2006). It 
involves a violence that does not serve to restore existing social forms but at least 
makes visible the breakdown of relations and their obligations. And in that regard, it 










The Dangerous Remainder 
 
     Relations have lifespans. They are built up over a time and subject to dissolution 
through neglect. In other cases, relations must be purposefully and deliberately 
ended. It is the purpose of this chapter to describe the content of that detachment. I 
show that not only was the stance of detachment that funerary rites cultivated in 
relation to dead kin not necessarily a gesture of moral disregard; it was a moral 
imperative. Funerary rites provide the content of detaching ownership relations, 
where relations of ownership are systematically taken apart. As I argue, the content 
of those relations affects how they are ended, and again evaluation, plays a role in 
decoupling the relations between the living and the dead. 
 
4.1 The Body After Death 
     Death, as an event, was marked by the soul’s departure from the body. The Ache 
term for “soul” (owe) encodes this central point. Ache, like many Tupi-Guarani 
languages, uses the nominal past (-we) to refer to a part separated from a whole. The 
owe then is what has separated from flesh (o’o) at a person’s death. Exactly what it is 
that left the flesh at death is somewhat uncertain, though it did have a definite 
itinerary: Once separated from the body, the owe traveled skyward to the land of the 
dead, where it became a krei, a shadow. It left behind a body, its flesh, an unwanted 
and dangerous remainder.  
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     Both these aspects of the deceased—its ephemeral and fleshy aspects—were dealt 
with in funerary rites, but they did not receive the same degree of attention and 
concern. Ensuring that the owe found its way to the land of the dead was fairly 
straightforward and little concern was given to it in Ache funerals. The dead were 
buried along the path of the sun with their feet toward the east and head to the west 
to direct the owe to the land of the dead, and a trail was cut westward from the place 
of burial to guide the departing owe in its intended direction to the western skies. 
The owe was sometimes aided in its upward journey by necrophagous animals, 
hitching a ride on the back of an armadillo as it crawled to the treetops or lifted on 
the back of a king vulture to fly through the forest canopy. If the deceased was a 
child, it would be carried to the sky in the arms of an already deceased relative who 
descends to earth to retrieve them. But in no case did I ever hear of the owe ever 
becoming lost on its way to the sky. This journey took place as a matter of course (cf. 
Clastres and Sebag 1963). 
     The physical body of the deceased was not so easily moved, however. It required 
careful attention to stave off its dangers, and from its beginning to end, the focus of 
the Ache funerary rite was devoted to this task.56 The Ache funeral therefore was not 
an act of remembrance, a cathartic turning back to reflect on the entirety of a life lost. 
The actions performed in an Ache funeral did not, at least overtly, concern 
																																																								
56 It is not the case, as Clastres argued, that living bodies have no soul, that “only at the death of 
the body do souls begin to exist” (1974: 317). One can speak of an owe or krei whenever one’s 
consciousness has separated from one’s body—not just when one has died, but also when one 
dreams. The owe can leave the body as it sleeps, and the dreams remembered in the morning is 
evidence of the activity of owe. The information revealed in dreams is useful primarily as a 
forewarning of unfortunate events. When I asked about this, I received was the same answer as 
Susnik (1974: 140): ukẽmbu cho owe kãndjare o, “when sleeping, my soul escapes.” Clastres is 
nevertheless correct that the soul only becomes an object of concern for the Ache when it 
separates from the body. It is by nature a “de-carnated” entity.  
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themselves with the past at all. Instead the Ache funeral concerned itself with the 
practical effects of forestalling the future dangers that the dead body posed, either 
by impeding its capacity for movement or destroying its presence altogether. 
 
4.1.1 Adjawe 
     The contrast between the ephemeral and fleshy aspects of the dead was 
categorical and made explicit by the Ache: “Owe are not adjawe.” Their paths 
diverged at death, and from then on, their encounters with living Ache were 
decidedly different, never to encounter each other, each ensconced in different 
interactional settings. The owe moved on; the adjawe remained. (For this reason, I will 
discuss the ephemeral, “celestial” soul in a later chapter.) 
     Adjawe, the Ache name for the specter a body produced at death, was not a well-
defined discrete class of beings. What distinguished them from the other spirits of 
the forest, however, is that they were dead, or more accurately, “not quite living.” 
My informants were unsure—and untroubled—by my question if animals had owe; 
but it was apparent that both dead humans and dead animals had (or produced) 
adjawe. The form of adjawe was susceptible to transformation, and they might appear 
to humans in both embodied (etegi) and disembodied (etellãngi) states. In the cases 
with which I am most familiar, human adjawe tended to appear in embodied form, 
and animal adjawe tended to appear in disembodied form.57 But since part of what 
defined adjawe was their capacity for metamorphosis, it would make little sense to 
insist on a rigorous distinction here. Both human and animal adjawe were said to 
																																																								
57 People saw the adjawe of their parents. People do not see the adjawe of animals; that an animal 
adjawe has entered the body of someone is inferred from symptoms. 
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cause disease, and their capacity to do so could be causally intertwined: human 
adjawe were sometimes considered to be the ultimate cause of diseases immediately 
attributable to animal adjawe. There appears to be a hierarchy of agency here. The 
human dead might employ the adjawe of animals, but animal adjawe were not the 
ultimate cause of the actions of human adjawe. 
     Within the context of an Ache funeral, however, human adjawe did take a 
relatively consistent visible form. They were described to me as a hideous specter 
that retains the generic image of Ache enemies. A few Ache I spoke to had actually 
gotten a glimpse of them. Their appearance was grotesque and dirty. Their bodies 
were painted black, as the Ache did themselves when raiding the bands of their 
enemies, and they gave off a foul, musty-smelling air. These “night-walkers” would 
typically attack the Ache in nighttime raids, sprinting into the camps to shoot 
invisible arrows into the stomachs and legs of sleeping Ache and split their heads 
with long warclubs of piry wood (Lonchocarpus sp.). As quickly as they appeared, the 
adjawe would dash off into the night with a woman (often a former wife of the 
deceased) thrown over its shoulders to make them their wives far away from where 
they came.58  
     Virtually every adult I met who had grown up in the forest had a collection of 
stories describing the abduction of some missing relative by adjawe. Their aim is to 
provide a close description of what happens during an encounter with these deathly 
monstrosities. Testaments to the continued efficacy of the dead, these tales of 
																																																								
58 Raiding enemies for marriage capture was not something the Ache did in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Nevertheless, the Ache did attribute that practice to fearsome distant enemies (whom 
they called bakadju and bwara), and, if Jesuit sources from the 17th century are to be believed, it 
was something the Ache did regularly in the distant past (Thompson 2019). 
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deathly encounters detailed the myriad ways adjawe spirits affected the living. Many 
of the stories I heard included a reckoning of responsibility, where one’s abduction 
by adjawe was due to bad behavior or carelessness, as indicated by the disastrous 
consequences that had resulted (e.g. an abduction as the result of an unsupervised 
child, a hunter who wanders out of shouting distance from his peers, or a woman 
who strays from her friends while picking fruit on the trail.) In such cases, adjawe 
struck persons out of place.  
     The “dwelling space” (ekõandy) of the adjawe was earthbound. Generally speaking, 
their territory was the reverse of that of the living, so that the adjawe inhabited one or 
a number of forest types that the Ache avoided. They skulked in the depths of the 
forest (ka wachu), in bristly thickets (kywainty), or around the grassy cerrado where the 
Paraguayans live. In this sense, the ekõandy of the adjawe was an inversion of the 
social space of the living. Still, though the living and the dead dwelled in different 
parts of the forest, encounters between them were inevitable. Adjawe could travel 
rapidly to inflict vengeance on the living from such a range as could not be covered 
in the time by a normal human being. They were elsewhere, but could be here at any 
moment. Though generically, the “dwelling space” of the adjawe was imagined in 
opposition to the places that living Ache regularly inhabited, individual adjawe did 
retain some spatial connections to their individual historical selves. They might 
return to the place of burial, the place where the placenta was buried, or other places 
where exuviate was deposited during its life.  
     The ailments caused by human adjawe were conceived as invisible arrows shot 
into the stomach or the legs of their victims, or in the case of animal adjawe, claws or 
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teeth that lodge themselves in victim’s bodies. These object intrusions would cause 
one’s legs to become emaciated, to cramp, or throb with pain. More frightening than 
this, adjawe were responsible for a class of illnesses called djuwy (or in another Ache 
subgroup, baiwã). Associated with eating undercooked meat, the adjawe would enter 
one’s stomach and cause cramps and “heaviness.” The image invoked here is the 
eater being eaten by the animal he or she has consumed. The sick person would 
become immobilized and would be left behind by the others as they continued on. 
The adjawe were also held causally responsible for a variety of infirmities that 
encumbered a person’s mobility. These maladies were not merely playful tricks or 
minor pains to endure in silence. As with djuwy, these were injuries that, if even for a 
short time, slowed one’s pace or kept them from walking altogether, which could 
easily leave one behind the band in its continual push forward.  
     Straying far from their regular routes placed the Ache in the most danger of 
encountering an adjawe, as attacks by adjawe spirits nearly always happened when 
the victim was alone. As one Ache told the anthropologist Leon Cadogan, Kudjã 
etakrãmbu kybai ymarõ adjawe ra’a. Kudjã tãrãmbu yma adjawe rallã, “When the woman 
is alone, the llãwe of the man [her husband] takes her. When the woman is with 
many people, the adjawe of the man will not take her” (Cadogan 1968: 194). Adjawe 
attacks are both the cause and the effect of isolation from one’s living familiars. 
Being alone left one vulnerable to adjawe attack and the sicknesses that resulted from 
those attacks. Conversely, the sicknesses brought by adjawe often limited one’s 
movement, debilitating a person so that he or she would be unable to keep pace with 
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the rest of the band, so that they would be left behind by the band. Adjawe would 
follow the band, occasionally overtaking the laggards or an isolated person.  
 
4.2 The Funerary Rite(s) 
     Ache funerals were a means to dispose of the dead. In actuality, however, there 
were a variety of means to achieve this goal. Funerals were “weakly ritualized” in 
that their ritual formulas did not derive from a fixed, preordained text. What took 
place in any one funeral was always one of several of possibilities. The variations 
upon Ache funerals the Ache considered the biographical details of the deceased or 
by the deceased’s status when disposing of the body. Death was not a “great 
equalizer.” People lived different lives and died different deaths, and this affected 
how dangerous they could be for the living. Why then shouldn’t they be given 
different funerals? 
     People were buried a short distance from the place where they died, usually only 
a few meters. If the person died in the camp, hunters would be called back from 
their hunt to begin preparations for the burial. If the person died outside of camp, as 
typically happened to hunters who died suddenly from snakebites or some other 
unexpected accident, the band traveled to the body it to bury it and a makeshift 
camp would be cleared beside the body.  
     One or two men prepared the grave. Several hundred meters outside the camp, 
they cut a small clearing in the forest, and in the middle of it, they dug a cylindrical 
hole of about a meter and a half. This work was not delegated to any specific class of 
people, and there was no discussion about who would do it. Meanwhile, close kin 
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(of either sex) prepared the body for burial, washing the bodies with water. If the 
deceased were a man, his male kin would shave his beard with a bamboo knife, and 
the female kin of the dead cut their hair short in mourning.59  
     Dead bodies were lifeless but not inert. Even the bodies of those who led amiable, 
peaceable lives required rope to encumber limbs that still contained within them an 
impulse to move. The women tied the body’s calves to their respective thighs, the 
forearms to their respective arms with stands of nettle fiber and hair, which the 
women kept in their baskets for their husbands to use as spare bowstrings. They 
bound the legs together as well with a thick bupi vine, which was knotted and then 
passed along the body and around the neck. The vine was then tightened, drawing 
the folded arms and legs into the body, forcing the body into a fetal position. Once 
the bound body was pulled together, it was wrapped in two woven sleeping mats 
and is carried to the grave. Sleeping mats were made by women and considered 
their personal property, but the wrapping of dead bodies in woven sleeping mats 
cannot simply be explained by a need to dispose of the deceased’s property, as men 
must also be wrapped in palm mats as well. If the deceased was a woman, she was 
wrapped in her own palm mats, but if the deceased was a man, a spouse or close 
relative volunteered their own mats.60 The two men who carry the body touch only 
the edges of the mats, careful not to touch the body. 
     The men passed the body to a man standing on the floor of the grave, and he 
positioned the body. A stake was fixed to the floor of the grave, and the body was 
																																																								
59 Its regrowth, as Lima has described for the Juruna, will be a “calendar of mourning” that 
measures the time until the woman resumes her everyday activities after seclusion (Lima 1995: 
224). Techo (2005 [1673]) describes something similar for the seventeenth century Guarani.  
60 It is interesting here that when so much concern is placed on violence inflicted on the body, it is 
important that the body must be protected from dirt and from rain. 
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leaned upright against it, so that the deceased’s body sat almost vertically. The face 
was positioned toward the sun, the destination of the dead’s celestial-bound spirit. 
The deceased’s possessions might be tossed into the grave at this time. After the 
corpse was positioned, the men who dug the grave immediately begin to cover the 
body with earth. As the dirt began to cover the body, the deceased’s close kin were 
given stern warnings to avoiding looking at the body as it was buried. At this point, 
the mood of restrained sadness that had been so far maintained gave way to 
eruptions of uncontrolled grief. And it is here that the differences between the 
mourners and the others became pronounced. The mourners became distraught that 
they would be separated from their dead kin forever. And the distant kin of the 
deceased feared that the mourner’s attachment had become too close. As the dirt is 
first poured over the body, it was common for kin of the deceased to attempt suicide 
by throwing themselves into the grave. Overcome with grief, close kin begged others 
to bury them with their kin, so that they might accompany them to the land of the 
dead. And as the grief of the mourners intensifies, so did the efforts of affines to 
restrain them. The non-kin pulled them out and attempted to console the mourners. 
     The men tamped the earth flat with their feet. On top of the grave, they 
constructed a small shelter. It does not resemble the shelters that Ache built to 
shelter themselves from the rain, though they are called by the same name, tapy. 
Their way of construction is utterly different. The shelter’s foundation was a fence of 
palm staves fixed into the ground around into the perimeter of the grave; this barrier 
would keep away animals, and the raised earth around it would keep rainwater 
from pooling on top of the grave. Several long palm fronds were draped over the 
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side of the wall. Once the shelter was complete, a fire was built on top of the 
flattened grave with logs of some slow-burning wood, such as the Brazilian maple 
tree (Balfourodendron reidelianum). In this way, these nomadic people could evade the 
ghosts of the dead by fixing the dead body to a place.  
     The kind of funeral one receives is the result of certain characterological 
assumptions about the deceased, whether based on that person’s biographical past 
or the stereotypical qualities of the age grade to which he or she belonged. The 
funeral as just described was the most common one, and it was given for those who 
were considered “not-angry” (prãndjãllã). The procedure was defined negatively; 
binding was provided for those were not quarrelsome and aggressive during their 
lives, who had not died violent unexpected deaths, and who would not be expected 
to cause vengeance after they died. Of course the binding of the body was still a 
necessary precaution, and even “not angry” people were capable of horrific acts of 
vengeance on their living kin, this was exceptional. After all, “not-angry” people 
were not like children, whose death inspired no such fear at all, who could be buried 
with little preparation in shallow graves, who could be mourned intensely without 
dangerous consequence, and who did not stir the band to travel great distances from 
the gravesite to avoid their ghosts.   
     The bodies of “angry persons” were singled out for special treatment. Binding 
was insufficient to thwart their vengeful projects, so they were given different 
funerals, though in a general sense, their funerals were clear transformations of the 
ones just described. The mourning of “angry persons” was more sharply curtailed, 
and the violence inflicted on the dead body was intensified. (Or, to put it formally, 
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we could say that the permissible expression of sympathy was inversely 
proportional to the violence inflicted on the deceased’s body.)  
     If the deceased was an adult man, he might be buried with one of the children he 
“owned,” typically his young daughter or the daughter of an unmarried sister. She 
was “dropped on his chest” (chape ity) along with his other possessions and is buried 
with him. Despite past ethnographers’ characterization of chape ity as a “sacrifice” 
(Clastres 1998; Hill and Hurtado 1996), the killing of children at funerals does not 
warrant that label in the classic Maussean sense of the term. The characteristic 
feature of a sacrifice, according to Hubert and Mauss (1964 [1898]), is that it 
establishes a connection between two disjunctive terms. The thing sacrificed is 
ritually made sacred so that it might cross an ontological boundary. But in this case, 
a connection between the living and dead was precisely what chape ity was intended 
to avoid. The child was not “offered” to the dead in exchanged for the security of the 
band; as close kin “owned” by the deceased, she already belonged to the dead 
person, and this was the stated reason that the child must be killed: The children 
were buried with their male kin in a similar way that a person was buried with his 
possessions—destroying these links to the world of the living would help to create a 
firm boundary between the living and the dead. 
     In other cases, the bodies of the dead were destroyed outright. Rather than being 
buried, bodies of killers and particularly belligerent persons were placed on a rough 
wooden bier and burned. The body was placed on a wooden scaffold, similar to 
those the Ache use to roast game, but larger, approximately 1.5 meters tall. A mound 
of dry firewood was placed under the rack, and the body was burned until it was 
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reduced to ashes. The remaining bones were crushed with a bow stave or buried. 
This appears to have been performed by men for their male kin, and women were 
not allowed to see or take part in the body’s cremation (Mayntzhusen 2009 [1948]).  
     How can these fearful images be attributed to the bodies of individual dead 
persons, who just a short time ago, were so familiar? At issue here is the kind of 
transformation that death effects in a person. The violence directed at the dead body 
can only appear incomprehensible if we consider dead bodies to be inert—and if 
inert, then harmless, and if harmless, then pitiable. However, should we consider the 
inertness of death not as given but something that must be effected through ritual 
action, as the Ache do, then such familiar sympathies given to the dead cannot be 
taken for granted. Those who dropped children in the graves of the dead or burned 
the bodies of their kin feared their own deaths and turned to these acts to prevent 
the dead’s revenge from happening. They saw the violence they inflicted as a means 
to restart a normal life, the temporary suffering of someone as a way to provide a 
worthwhile life for others. 
 
4.3 Leaving the Past Behind 
     Co-residence was a prerequisite for ownership. And destroying the relationships 
that connected the dead to its former intimates required the living to rapid distance 
themselves from the dead and their former places of habitation. 
     After all funerals, the site of burial had to be abandoned, though here too the 
Ache stress that the distance the band traveled from the grave to the new camp 
depended on who the dead was. Ache manobu pe puku llãwepurãmbu. Kromi manobu pe 
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pukullã, “When an adult man dies, they cut a long trail so the adjawe won’t take them; 
when a child dies, the trail is not long.”61 
     It is a commonly reported by lowland ethnographies that death requires a 
reconfiguration of residential arrangements. The living had to avoid the spaces 
where the deceased had cooked, eaten, and slept. This does not mean that an entire 
village was definitively abandoned and rebuilt elsewhere every time an adult 
member of the village died, though in some rare cases, villages do seem to have been 
definitively abandoned at the death of important people. But it does require the 
living to distance themselves from the spaces of commensality and its routines. More 
often, as Viveiros de Castro (1992) has stressed for the Arawete, this abandonment 
involved and the group’s dispersal into forest until the specter of the dead was no 
longer considered particularly dangerous, a period typically lasting several months, 
after which they would return to inhabit the village. Piro typically dismantled the 
houses of the dead, the most desirable parts reused in the construction of new 
houses (Gow 1995). The Kawaiwete dead were buried in the houses in which they 
																																																								
61 Viveiros de Castro (1992) also finds this correlation in Arawete funerals between distance 
maintained between living and dead and the deceased’s age grade: “Deceased children who did 
not yet have a name are buried inside or nearby the house; those who were a little older are 
buried in the nearby brush. Adults are interred at least five hundred meters from the village 
along a hunting path that henceforth will be abandoned” (Viveiros de Castro 1992: 197). 
     One of León Cadogan’s Ache informants connects the spatial distance that the living must 
maintain with the emotional distance they must maintain. While Ache mourners sharply 
curtailed expressions of grief for their adult consanguines during and after funerals, the same 
expectations were not applied to the deaths of related children, where parents’ grief was given 
greater license. The child did not pose the same dangers as a deceased adult: Krumi manobu 
chengaete. Wedja djuellã. Ãpã chengaete, ai chengaete. Adjawe purãllã. Ywyri kybape, “When a child 
dies, they cry a lot. They don’t want to abandon [the gravesite]. The father cries a lot, the mother 
cries a lot. [The child’s] adjawe is not purã. [The child] is curled up in the earth” (Cadogan 1960: 3). 
Interestingly, in Viveiros de Castro’s account of the Arawete, the age grade of the deceased 
affects the size of the funeral’s cortege, but not their permissible emotional display: “Although 
the death of a small baby arouses little emotion, its burial may draw many people; by contrast, 
the retinue for the funeral of an adult is small” (Viveiros de Castro 1992: 197). 
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lived, which were later burned and a new house built over the site (Oakdale 2005). 
Whether the ties of co-residence are uncoupled through a temporary avoidance of 
the deceased person’s house, the house’s disassembly, or its physical destruction 
altogether, the destruction of the house is meant to aid in the dead spirit’s 
dispersion; no longer enclosed by the confines of domestic space, the dead was free 
to drift away. 
     The Ache appreciated the need to redefine co-residence, but as hunter-gatherers, 
their avoidance of the dead involved a somewhat different spatial orientation to the 
dead. When the burial was completed, the band left the camp, lighting small fires 
along the footpaths that led out from the gravesite to impede the adjawe’s pursuit. 
Further precautions were taken after the band had established a new camp: For 
several nights following the burial, the Ache burned freshly cut bamboo close to the 
relatives of the deceased. The wet stems would swell from the heat and explode with 
a loud dull thump. The vengeful spirit of the deceased, they hoped, would be 
frightened away by this unwelcoming sound and left behind as the band hurried on 
to a distant camp.  
     The centerpiece of many women’s laments describe the place of burial and the 
band’s distancing relation to it: 
 
Dja paparõ dja paparõ wedja puku 
pachawe 
 
Dja papa kwarewerõ wedja puku 
pachawe 
 
Dja irõndyrõ dja irõndyrõ matã buku 
pachawe 
My father, my father, we left his 
bound body far behind.  
	
My father’s grave, we left his bound 
body far behind.  
	
My habitual friends, my habitual 




Dja mamarõ ywy wachurõ peche 
pachawe 
 
Djamo kudja baechedjima lluãndywety 
myrõ wachuma baydja purã tupa 
djamino 
 
Djamo kudja baechedjima lluãndywety 
myrõ wachugima myryrõ puku pachawe 
 
 
Djamo kudja baechedjima lluãndywety 
myrõ wachuma bytã ẽmbeterõ wyra 
puku pachawe 
 
Dja paparõ dja paparõ wedja puku 
pachawe 
 
Djamo chue baechedjima bytaty pyte o 
wachuwe krã puchĩ djamino 
 
 
Dja ãpã kwarewerõ dja ãpã kwarewerõ 
tõnkapewerõ wedja puku pachawe 
 
Dja djamorõ dja djamorõ wedja puku 
pachawe 
 
Dja djaryrõ budjarõ matã buku pachawe 
bodies far away.  
	
My mother, they covered her bound 
body with a heap of dirt.  
	
She became a female jaguar, we ran a 
great distance to the camp for the 
baydja.62 
 
She became a female jaguar, we ran a 
great distance, ran a long way from 
her bound body.  
	
She became a female jaguar, we ran a 
great distance along the edge of the 
tall trees away from her bound body. 
 
My father, my father left his bound 
body far behind.  
 
He became an old male jaguar, we 
went from where the corpse expelled 
excrement.  
 
My father’s grave, my father’s grave, 
his skull, we left them far behind.  
 
My grandfather, my grandfather, we 
left his bound body far behind.  
 
My grandmother, we fled far away 
from her bound body.  
	
 
Laments like this one (called chenga ruwara, “sung crying” or simply chẽnga, 
“crying”) were gradually created through the mourning process and then sung 
whenever the woman remembers the dead, such as when one encountered animal 
that bore the same name as the dead relative. (People are named after game animals). 
																																																								
62 As has been mentioned, a baydja is someone who attracts jaguars, usually on account of his 
(baydja are almost always men) being exposed to blood. 
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Chenga laments often describe the person’s death or funeral and biographical details 
are effaced: what is remembered about the dead is precisely the leaving of him/her. 
This particular example of women’s lament progressively describes the actions taken 
by the band to dissociate themselves from the dead—the binding and burial of the 
dead bodies, as well as the band’s departure from the site of the burial—precautions 
taken to avoid the dead’s vengeance (as jaguars, as sickness, etc.) The enumeration 
of relationship terms that begin each line, laying out the plentitude of senior kin 
(father, mother, grandfather, grandmothers, and habitual friends), demonstrates that 
such precautions would be needed for all of one’s close relations. Everyone—one’s 
father, mother, grandparents, co-residents, and allies—must eventually be left 
behind.  
 
4.4 The Dead’s Possessions 
     The deceased’s personhood is difficult to destroy. This is because personhood, as 
Alfred Gell reminds us, lies “not just in our singular bodies, but in everything in our 
surroundings which bears witness to our existence, our attributes, and our agency” 
(Gell 1998: 103; see also Laidlaw 2015). Of those objects that index the dead, personal 
possessions and names are particularly important for the Ache in the time after 
someone dies. Possessions and names63 have different temporalities than the human 
																																																								
63 Ache received their name from the game animals cooked and eaten by their mother during her 
pregnancy. During a woman’s last term, the expectant mother receives gifts of game animals 
from various hunters, usually male affines. Though the stock of names is fairly limited in this 
regard, it is nevertheless rare for two persons to have the exact same personal name. This is 
because the name includes distinguishing features of the game animal in question—its color, its 
size, or the fact that it had a piece of its ear missing. Moreover, preferred names often come from 
uncommon species, so that no correlation exists between names and the most frequently hunted 
species (capuchin monkey, armadillo). 
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bodies to which they refer, and they stubbornly exist even after the person from 
whom they originated ceased to exist.64 They may circulate widely and yet still 
remain intimately linked to the personhood of the dead. It is exactly this fact that 
makes possessions and names a problem for the living.   
     As Gabriel Marcel (1965) has eloquently described it, “In the fact of thinking of 
someone, there is already an active denying of space, that simultaneously material 
and abstract character of proximity. Thought about a dead person is the active denial of 
his extinction (consider the metaphysical value of memory, or even, in a sense, of 
history). The denial of space denies death, death being in a sense the deepest 
expression of a separation as can be realized in space” (Marcel 1965: 31-32, emphasis 
added). The efforts made to put distance between the living and the dead were 
subject to continued risk, and even after the body had been immobilized or 
destroyed and the band had distanced itself from the place of burial, that risk 
remained. Remembering one’s dead relatives threatened to collapse the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
     It is these animals that bykwa the child. Though bykwa literally means, “to put the by’y into,” 
the term by’y has no well-defined meaning. In fact, it is never used alone, and Ache typically 
express some mix of amusement or bewilderment when some impetuous ethnographer asks for 
its gloss. Still, its use in several constructions points to a common meaning. Affable and light-
hearted persons are said to have a bygatu, a “good by’y.” One can also lose one’s by’y. The 
negative form, byllã, describes a state of passionate anger; when one is byllã, he is filled with an 
inconsolable rage, and he must commit revenge. Thus, from its use, we might gather that it 
means “temperament,” or something to that effect. After the birth, the mother chooses one or 
several names from the animals that bykwa’d the child, with preference usually given to the 
largest or most frequently eaten animal. For the most part, these names are simply the words for 
animal plus a person-marking suffix (-gi). Adults tend address each other by name and not by 
kinship terms. (Though the person marker -gi is usually dropped in such cases.) Most persons 
have more than one name. Nearly everyone shares a name with someone else. There are no sex 
distinctions in names. 
     In choosing a name for her child, the mother establishes relations between herself, her 
husband, and her child on the one hand, and the bykwatygi—the hunter who gave her the meat—
on the other. The name-giver enters into a relation of gift exchange with the father, and normally 
the relationship between them is, at least on the surface, friendly. 
64 It would therefore be an exaggeration to suggest for the Ache, as Nimuendaju (1978: 52) said of 
the Guarani, that the name is the person, just as it would be to say that a man’s bow is the man 
that made it. 
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spatiotemporal distance that had to be carefully maintained between the living and 
the dead, such that the dead that had been made then-and-there might return to 
become the dead here-and-now.  
     The name did not disappear when its owner died. An essential connection still 
remained between it and the person, much like a dead person retained some 
connection to the arrows he made or the bow he carved. But they could be disposed 
of in the same way. Possessions could be burned; names could not. The name of the 
deceased was avoided in conversation for months after the burial, and when the 
name was reintroduced, it did not return as it was.65 Ache speakers (in the past and 
now) affixed the term marĩ (or maĩ) to the personal names, kin vocatives, and 
nominalized descriptors of anyone who is deceased at the time of the utterance.66 
Speakers did this even when these names or kin vocatives appear in direct quoted 
speech reported from the past. For example, in reporting a decades-old conversion 
between two siblings, both long dead, one speaker recounted a man’s purportedly 
																																																								
65 This is frequently mentioned in other ethnographies of lowland South America. The 
Yanomamo (Albert 1985), Mundurucu (Murphy and Murphy 1974), Bororo (Crocker 1985), and 
many other groups prohibit speaking the name of the deceased so that its specter will not return 
to the living. In such cases, ethnographers’ inquiries into the genealogies their informants have 
sometimes been met with stinging rebuke: “Told in graduate school that we should take down 
genealogies and thus build up an outline of the more extended kinship units, we queried our 
informants unmercifully about the names of their grandfathers, their grandfathers’ brothers, and 
so on, only to be told by some that they could not even remember the name of their father. One 
middle-aged man finally became impatient with us and exclaimed: “Do you think we bandy the 
names of our dead around as if they were children, like you white people do?” (Murphy and 
Murphy 1974: 97). Moreover, some societies refrain from uttering the real names of living 
persons—as opposed to nicknames that connote a physical characteristic or general 
characterological trait. As reported for Yanomami (Albert 1985), Warao, Jivaro, Nambikwara 
(Lévi-Strauss 1948), and others, persons conceal their real names in fear that an enemy’s 
knowledge of it would leave him vulnerable to sorcery. Whether as a vehicle to destroy that 
person or a means to invite its specter, both practices share the idea that personal names are 
essential part of the persons, so that the sound of uttering the name can exercise a causal effect 
over that person. 
66 Those familiar with the ethnographies of Tupian groups will recognize the term maĩ, which in 
those cases refers to the souls of the dead after the have become gods (Viveiros de Castro 1992). 
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direct address to his sister as, “nypurãngi marĩ,” “my late sister.” The sister 
(nypurãngi) of the narrated event becomes “the late sister” (nypurãngi marĩ) because 
the speaker is alive and the people whose conversation he has reported are dead. It 
is important to note that the anxieties of citation specifically concerned the 
deceased’s name: reported speech from the dead person does not invoke that 
person’s presence in the same way; nor does the speaker’s performing the gestures 
or tone of the dead person from the reported event. But for the names of the dead, at 
least, the past is an inseparable part of the present utterance. Even when the 
speaker’s point of view on the past is otherwise masked, there remains an unwanted 
concrete relation to the dead persons he invokes which the term marĩ is meant to 
neutralize. 
 
4.5 Kura in Ache Funerals 
     In his recent book, The Subject of Virtue (2014), James Laidlaw appeals to Beth 
Conklin’s (2001) historical work on Wari’ mortuary cannibalism to argues that the 
Wari’ practice of eating their dead affines was fundamentally an ethical act. The 
Wari’ ate their dead affines because they “felt sorry” for them and for the bereaved 
relatives, and they reviewed funerary cannibalism as a way to save the corpse from 
decay and to help lessen the sorrow of mourners. When asked, the Wari’ emphasize 
that affines ate because the dead person’s close consanguines asked them to do so. 
They bore a responsibility to perform emotionally difficult tasks that kin could not 
or did not wish to do themselves, and it was a responsibility that affines owed one 
another. One ate the corpse out of a sense of compassion and duty to their affines, 
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not out of desire for the flesh itself. Human flesh was not ordinary meat. Wari’ reject 
the idea that anyone wanted to eat the corpse; to treat the corpse like animal meat 
and eat voraciously was insulting to mourners (Vilac ̧a 2000).67 That eating human 
flesh was allegedly considered repulsive to the Wari’ becomes, in Laidlaw’s account, 
a test of the duty owed to non-kin during their period of mourning.68 
     Laidlaw’s point leaves out what ethnographers of the Wari’ have deemed crucial 
points. First, by placing sympathy as the principal “cause” of ritual action (a 
controversial point given that most sentiment tends to be the effect of ritual rather 
than its cause), he ignores a central point: at decisive points in the ritual, the 
deceased’s kin (i.e. the mourners) and the non-kin do not share a common 
understanding—either of the immediate situation or of reality more generally. As 
described by Vilaça (2000; 2014), Wari’ funerals involve a conflict between rival 
perspectives: between the dead person’s kin, who still see a relative in the dead body 
of their kin, and the dead person’s non-kin, who see the dead body for what it really 
is. Kin and non-kin are equated with social stances, or different positions in relation 
to the dead. Non-kin were aware of this difference in understanding and set out 
purposefully to change the views of the mourners.  
     Though Wari’ funerals were concerned with the relation between the perspectives 
of mourners and non-kin, these social stances were themselves evaluated in ethical 
																																																								
67 Yet as Vilaça (2000: 101) and Conklin (2001: 182) have written, in some contexts of the ritual, the 
Wari’ corpse was treated “like meat” to differentiate them from living people. 
68 Given that the Wari’ practiced exocannibalism during the same period as they practiced 
funerary cannibalism, one could reasonably doubt Laidlaw’s claim that the revulsion to eating 
human flesh that “we” share with the Wari’ is what allows us to appreciate just how committed 
the Wari’ were to the responsibilities owed their grieving affines. Though Wari’ were expected to 
show restraint in eating, their disgust came as a result of the body’s often putrid state and not out 
of any general abhorrence for human flesh. 
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terms (see Londoño Sulkin 2012). Essential to the ritual was that mourning kin did 
not see the body of their relative as it really was. The compassion that affines felt for 
mourners was not born of a merging in point of view or emotional state, and here 
invoking the English term “sympathy” is misleading. Indeed, the compassion affines 
felt toward the mourners was not born of an identity between kin and non-kin. The 
moral significance of the living and dead existing in different worlds is this: one 
cannot remain in both worlds at once. For the living to share in the perspective of 
their recently dead relatives is to invite death, not just for themselves but for others 
in the band as well. The issue, I suggest, involves the ethics of detachment.  
     Elsewhere, Laidlaw (2015) has been a sensitive observer of this particular 
problem:  
The attenuation or even the cutting of relations may have positive aspects: 
positive both in the sense that detachment is not merely an absence of 
connection—there may be various kinds of definite content to detachment, 
and these different forms need describing—and positive also in the sense that 
these various forms of detachment might be sought as desirable states of 
affairs (Laidlaw 2015: 130-131). 
 
     This, perhaps even more than in Wari’ funerals, is the central dilemma in Ache 
funerals. I received two explanations for the steps taken in the funeral. Each act 
performed in the ritual—the binding, the quick burial, the suppression of the 
mourners’ grief, the swift retreat, etc.—was done either with the purpose of 
preventing vengeance (djepy) by the dead’s specter, or done so that the mourners 
would “no longer feel affection” (prawollã) for their lost kin. These explanations 
appear as different sides of the same coin when we remember that the mourner’s 
longing allows for that vengeance.  
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     The problem that Ache funerary rituals was meant to solve involved both the 
mourners and their dead kin. Those who expressed deep anguish at the death of a 
loved one were “stingy.” The dead, still possessing something of their living selves, 
were also “stingy” with their relations and sought to return to their familiar relations. 
Both mourners and their dead kin had to be cured of their stinginess.  
     Elizabeth Ewart has perceptively observed that Panará notions of “generosity” 
and “stinginess” refer not only to a focus on relationships but also to a lack of 
attachment to things: 
…the concept of generosity in Panará refers not exactly to the principle of 
altruism, but rather describes the quality of not “desiring things.” A person 
should be seen to be passing material goods on, rather than retaining and 
accumulating them. […] A central feature of Panará “generosity” concerns 
the absence of attachment between people and their objects, rather than 
relations among people mediated by “meaningful” objects. That people give 
others their things is as much a sign of their lack of attachment to their own things as 
it is an expression of close social relations (Ewart 2013: 40). 
 
     We can observe a similar dynamic at work here with both the living and the dead. 
Ideally, death was the relinquishing of life, a willed leaving behind of the body, a 
transformation that mourners could bear with stoic resignation. That resignation, to 
paraphrase Ewart, is as much a sign of their lack of attachment to the dead as it is an 
expression of close social relations among the living. Yet the dead, bereft of their kin, 
were lonely. Those who, when they died, jealously clung to their spouses and kin 
imperiled them with their desire. Likewise, the mourner’s loneliness was described 
as a kind of rapaciousness, a stinginess that leads them to kill their living relatives in 
an effort to reunite with them. Just as game and other foodstuffs had to be “given up” 
to enter circulation, so too did the newly deceased have to be “given up” to a new 
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form of existence away from its former surroundings. The “stinginess” of the living 
and the dead had to be broken, and kura was meant to force this break.  
     Scolding, as a means to prepare for the separation of the living and dead, took 
place in two specific contexts. The first context dealt with the soon-to-be dead, those 
who, because of an illness or an augury that foretold of death (from dream signs to 
the material signs of cutting down a palm with rotten pith), were suspected of dying 
soon. These signs often led to a consideration of whether the person thus marked 
was ready for death. Would that person’s grudges carry on after death by their own 
inertia?69 Would that person’s lingering resentment turn to a desire for vengeance 
after death? The fear that the soon-to-be dead might exact posthumous vengeance 
																																																								
69 If living persons could willingly allay the possibility of taking post-mortem vengeance after 
their deaths, then the perspectives between living and dead could not entirely exclusive, as 
formal accounts of perspectivalism would assume (Viveiros de Castro 1998).  
     Manuela Carneiro da Cunha (1978; 1981) was the first, to my knowledge, to call attention to 
what would become known as the perspectival quality of living-dead relations in lowland South 
America (see Viveiros de Castro 1998). She begins by saying that living Krahó and the mekarõ, the 
“double” that endures after a person’s death, appear to be opposite in character. The places they 
live appear as inversions of each other: “The spatial framework of the dead is the reverse and the 
complement of that of the living. The Krahó have often said to me, “The moon is the sun of the 
mekarõ.” The mekarõ like the shadiness of the forest and detest the plain or the cleared zone of 
vegetation at the foothills which for the Krahó is the ideal form of landscape. […] The mekarõ, on 
the contrary, like dark and hidden places and winter days (i.e. days of rain) and fear the hot sun; 
during the daytime, I have been told, they stay in their village, but during the night they wander 
in the forest” (Carneiro da Cunha 1981: 164; see also Carneiro da Cunha 1977). Not only this, but 
their norms of conduct appear to be inversions of each other as well. As the Krahó describe them, 
the dead are like animals; they know nothing of the restraint required in the norms of proper 
interaction, shamelessly flouting the deference, modesty, and generosity expected in affinal 
relations (1978: 123). Yet, as Carneiro da Cunha demonstrates, for the Krahó the difference 
between the living space, morality, etc. of the living and the dead cannot be understood in terms 
of a simple opposition or negation. The living are not the simple opposite of the dead, because 
the living and the dead both see themselves as the living. As she was told, “The mekarõ call us 
mekarõ, they don’t call themselves mekarõ; they are afraid of us” (Carneiro da Cunha 1978: 
120/1981: 165). The Krahó dead, in other words, see themselves as living humans, and they see 
living Krahó as dead. The living and the dead see different worlds in the same way. 
     The reader may notice some similarities between my account of Ache living-dead relations 
and Carneiro da Cunha’s, particularly with respect to the living-spaces and moral habits of the 
dead. Future work should attend to these similarities and whatever tensions exist between the 
perspectival aspects of the living and dead with the biographical residue that attaches to dead 
individuals as krei and adjawe. 
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prompted others to shore up existing grudges with them and plead with—or scold—
the soon-to-be dead into accepting their fate.   
 
Djawu ore mano putabu. Mano putabu 
djawu. Go nonga djuwy ra; dja djakaty 
djuwy rawerã. Go nonga djawullãmbu. 
 
We talk when we want to die [i.e. are 
about to die.] When one wants to die, 
they talk. The dead take them with 
sickness like that. The one who 
scolds will take them with sickness. 
It is like that if they don’t talk.  
 
Baipurãngi in Sammons (1978: 41) 
 
 
Picha manobu duwe djakama. Picha 
imeperõ djawu, “De manobu, djepyeme. 
Djambueme.” Nawe, “Manorõ kua. 
Djambupaka.” Go nonga na’ã wãiwipurã 
duwe chuepurã. “Djepyeme de manobu, 
Krombegi.” 
When someone is about to die, another 
scolds him. The old women talk to her 
husband. “When you die, don’t take 
vengeance. Don’t be angry.” She said, 
“Just die. You mustn’t be angry.” 
That’s what the old woman said to the 
old man. “Don’t take vengeance when 
you die, Krombegi!”  
 
Achĩpurãngi, interview (9/13/10). 
 
 
I did not encounter any of these discussions during my fieldwork, though they often 
appeared in reported speech in the narratives I heard about death auguries. The kin 
of those persons considered “about to die” looked to the latter’s future state as 
deceased spirits, as a particularized, experiencing thing with direct connections to its 
former self and the lives of the living persons it left behind. Speakers addressed their 
“about to die” kin to urge them not to return to take them, to not be “stingy” in the 
holding on of their relationship. Manorõ kua. Djãmbueme. Tãeme. “You know how to 
die. Don’t be angry. Don’t be stingy.”  
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     The second context of funerary scolding took place in the period following the 
burial, and it was directed at mourners. The period of mourning after an Ache 
funeral did not end through a formal period of closure, but rather in a gradual 
extinguishing of sadness. Grief has a duration: a beginning and, if not a formalized 
end, at least point where grief ceases to become acceptable to others. In the weeks 
after the burial, it was expected that mourners return to the daily rhythms of life and 
to show their contentment in performing the everyday routines of contented 
commensuality. And accompanying that expectation was an increasing worry that 
the mourners’ anguish might color their whole character, that they might become 
like the dead they had left behind, and that their feelings of grief spread to others. At 
the level of interaction, this concern involved metapragmatic claims about the kinds 
of emotions one should display after a person has died. The longing that mourners 
display for their dead kin has expected effects, threatening to bring future 
misfortune not just on mourners, but on those in their remote vicinity. The mourner 
was responsible for the emotions he or she displayed for his or dead relative in the 
weeks after death. A person’s excessive grief, because it was a danger to the group, 
was immoral.  
     It is perhaps fitting then that Ache mourners were commonly considered “stingy.” 
As I have already noted, the Ache word tã’ã pertained to the holding on to 
something that is typically circulated. Though the term has strong ethical valences, it 
is not easily to predict what those valences are outside of a given context, as it might 
suggest either a moral fault in the way a person possesses something that should be 
circulated, like food, or suggest ethical praise of someone who has cared for their kin 
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and kept them close around them. Both these meanings are at play in Ache 
mourning. 
     In its broadest characterization, funerary scolding intended to adjust the position 
of mourners in relation to the dead. Kura, as I described it in the previous chapter, is 
an interrogation of a person’s character. It is, in other words, to question if an act 
reflects something of the person’s character. The sort of kura that took place between 
a speaker (an affine) and an addressee (a mourner with kin ties to the dead) was 
similar in some respects to its quotidian forms. It involved the same grammatical 
form that I discussed in the previous chapter. As a form of criticism directed at 
mourners, funerary kura suggested that the grief expressed by the mourner had 
ceased to become an acceptable reason for the mourner’s actions. The mourner who 
cried for her dead husband (for example) has simply become—or might become—a 
“crier.” Yet there are also essential differences between the everyday forms and the 
ritual form of kura. There was no risk to the scolding of mourners; funerary scolding 
had no risk of backfiring for the scolder. The danger of excessive mourning was 
taken for granted so that one could not be scolded for improperly scolding a 
mourner.  
     Funerary kura was often extremely harsh in its delivery, even more so than in its 
“everyday” forms. One mourner, anguished by the death of her husband, was 
scolded by her distant affines this way:  
Gope dje tãndy. Kuerabu ywydjiwa 
nuẽga chi eru. Pẽnde chã buchã 
kuratywerãmi manobu chẽngaeme. 
Duwe dja prawotydjirõ rekopa, 
chẽngaeme. 
You are stingy with [your dead 
husband]. If you can heal your dead 
lover, then you should take him out 
of the ground! Don’t cry when your 
ugly-faced lover dies. You’ll get 
another lover. Don’t cry. 
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     Though they were not the recipients of scolding per se, the dead were evaluated 
as well, and these assessments carried over into the evaluations of mourners. 
Scolders might tell mourners that a particular dead relative wasn’t worth mourning, 
that the dead had failed in his basic obligations to his kin, so that there was no real 
relation to mourn in the first place. Take these two examples: 
1. Dje chẽngaete-djipa katy ywy 
pechabu. Katy membo chupyrã katype 
nakõ kua bue mellãmbyrã wepe katy 
ywy pechebu chẽngaetewe! 
 
 
2. Chẽngaete-djipa? Djapo mẽndymi. 
Djapo mẽndymi chẽngapa. 
 
Are you the one who cries when 
your daughter-in-law is buried? She 
was bitten by a snake because she 
didn’t share the food from her 
basket! 
 
Are you one who cries so much? He 
didn’t share. He didn’t share with 
you, [yet] you cry all the time. 
 
Such aggressive speech might seem shocking to those accustomed to American 
funerals, in which the dead are customarily lauded, and discussions of their 
shortcomings saved for more private times and places. But if the purpose of Ache 
funerals was not to memorialize the dead but to forget them, then the objective of 
these statements may be better understood. The point is not to invoke some context 
that would make such scolding appear “normal” to the mourners. Funerary 
scolding—cutting and personal in its delivery—was intended to be shocking for the 
mourners who hear it. And yet, when I asked one of my informants why a mourning 
woman had been scolded in terms that I considered particularly harsh, the answer I 
received explaining this practice was this: “They scold [the mourners] to make them 
happy (uryma) again.”  
     If the intentions of the scolders were simply compassionate, as Laidlaw (2014) 
claims for the Wari’, why wouldn’t everyday forms of compassion do? As it happens, 
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compassionate scolding was hardly the only means to divest living mourners from 
their grief. Grieving, particularly if it as deemed excessive or prolonged, could be 
met with male rage and physical violence as well. “If you child dies, don’t think 
about it. Those who cry a lot will be hit. Those who don’t cry will soon have another” 
(Djapegi in Hill and Hurtado 1999: 95). The aggressive methods might not make 
mourners happy, but they would assist them—even force them—to return to the 
living relations that would. Therein lies the potential for the mourner return to 
“happiness.” Why should attempts to put an end to mourning take the form of 
scolding normally found in everyday ethical evaluation? I suspect it has something 
to do with the reflexive stance-taking the latter provides. If, as Webb Keane has 
written, “One does not develop morality all by oneself,” neither does one get over 
one’s grief all by oneself (Keane 2010: 74). Through scolding, the mourner is not 
merely distracted from her mourning. She comes to view herself through the 
evaluations and reactions of living others. Scolding, in other words, is the condition 
for the mourner’s capacity to take a distance on herself (Keane 2015). Mourning so 












Ownership and Bodily Integrity in the Settlement Process 
 
     In the past chapters, I have described how ownership relations are created, 
maintained, and evaluated. While it might appear from these chapters that 
ownership was confined to the intimate relations of sharing and caring between 
relatives, ownership was hardly just a matter of local group’s internal relationships. 
Ownership existed outside society, or perhaps more accurately, ownership was able 
to bring the foreign into the immediacy of feeding and care. In this and the next 
chapters, I extend these aspects about ownership to the context of settlement and 
Christian conversion. Ownership was central to how the Ache understood their 
relations with Paraguayan administrators and North American missionaries, yet as I 
show, in these entanglements, ownership took on new meanings and formed the 
basis for new relationships. 
     As I have already outlined in the introduction, Ache history has been related to 
the outside for centuries, and for much if not all of this time, the Ache spoke of their 
relations with non-indigenous Paraguayans and enemy Ache in the idiom of 
ownership and male consanguinity.70 All Ache subgroups extended to whites the 
																																																								
70 The eagerness of newly settled Ache to take on the unfamiliar practices of their Paraguayan 
captors has presented a problem for past ethnographers working with the Ache. In his work on 
the settlement period, Mark Münzel (1978; 1982) noted that “Ache acculturation” was related to 
other cases of becoming-other, such as the potential metamorphosis of the dead into jaguars and 
predatory specters. Indeed, in Amerindian cosmologies, metamorphosis is often the consequence 
of relating to predatory others, who capture people to live as members of their own group, and 
those who were eaten by spectral jaguars were thought to be transformed into jaguars themselves. 
Münzel argues that because the Ache initially addressed the Paraguayans as djamo (a term 
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formal vocative for father and father’s brother (ãpã), and several Ache subgroups 
used the generational term for grandfather (djamo) to refer to whites. These terms 
were used both as categorical terms and terms to describe specific relations. As 
categorical terms (e.g. the “whites”), ãpã and djamo were not possessed. When they 
referred to actual relationships of “familiarization” between specific Ache and 
Paraguayans, these terms were possessed. Thus, after establishing relations with 
certain whites (ãpã) during the settlement period, Ache men would commonly refer 
to a Paraguayan ally as “my father” (cho ãpã) and would refer to themselves as “their 
son” (idja ray).71  
     As Carlos Fausto (2012) has observed, relations between father and son or owner 
and pet are frequently employed by Amerindians to describe relations of control and 
protection with powerful others (whites, indigenous enemies, etc.) in a process of 
adoptive filiation. One of Fausto’s principle examples of this phenomenon is the 
equation made by numerous Amerindian groups between war captives and 
adoptive children, likening the assimilation of captives to their captors as the 
creation of consanguineal ties (see also Santos-Granero 2012). In such situations, the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
meaning both “grandfather” and “jaguar”), that the logic of acculturation must correspond to 
jaguar metamorphoses of the Ache dead: “[A]s, according to Ache belief, the victim of the jaguar 
or janwe returns as a jaguar or janwe to capture more humans, so must the Ache captured by the 
whites transform into a white to search for his brothers still free in the forest.” Thus, according to his 
argument, an Ache was transformed into a predatory specter when he was abducted by the 
whites: “In their own opinion, the already captured Ache is not an Ache (or rather human, as this 
is what their tribal denomination means) but a ferocious shadow, a non-human, whose desire 
and reason-for-being is to hunt those that really live, the forest Ache” (Münzel 1978: 235, 
emphasis added). There is no evidence, however, that the Ache extension of male consanguineal 
kinterms to Paraguayans (discussed in the present chapter) and the statements regarding “no 
more Ache” (discussed in the introduction) involves this fanciful interpretation. 
71 The use of male kin terms such as djamo and ãpã to designate non-indigenous people is 
common throughout lowland South America and seems to have been a well-established practice 
for other Tupi-Guarani-speaking groups. For example, the sixteenth-century Tupinamba called 
the arriving Portuguese tamoi (grandfathers) (Thevet 1955/1573; see Metraux 1928: 7-22; 1948: 
131), and the Parakanã called them “fathers” in the twentieth century (Fausto 2012).  
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relationship between a father and son is analogous to that of captor and captive or 
pet owner and pet or animal master and animal.  
     I have argued elsewhere (Thompson 2019), in the Ache language, there are 
important semantic differences in the way the terms ãpã and djamo applied to non-
Ache when compared to how they applied to Ache kin. First, the generational 
salience of ãpã and djamo as Ache kin terms did not transfer to whites; in the latter 
case, the use of one or the other was completely unrelated to the age or generation of 
the person in question. Second, these terms had gendered values that differed from 
their ordinary use as kin terms. Ache women were not daughters (radjy) to a 
Paraguayan ‘father,’ and Paraguayan women were not categorically referred to as 
‘mothers’ (ei). It is nevertheless the case that there is a clear relationship between the 
uses applied to senior male Ache consanguines and uses applied to distant enemies, 
a relationship that Ache themselves have made explicit. Ache fathers were said to be 
the “owners” of their children, in a way “like” (nonga) to how Paraguayans and 
enemy Ache “owned” their Ache sons.  
     Similar analogies were made to other forms of mastery relations. In 1897, the 
French naturalist Charles LaHitte visited one captive Ache living on an estancia 
along the southeastern frontier. LaHitte described the captive man, in response to his 
poor treatment by his Paraguayan overseers, repeating, Che rupia, che rupia [“I am a 
pet, I am a pet”] (Tenn Kate and LaHitte 1897: 15). In his estimation, Paraguayans 
“owned” him as Ache pet owners “owned” their orphaned pets. The man’s 
observation was not merely a local “metaphor” for his condition. In fact, Ache 
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notions of ownership would prove pivotal to their understandings of their 
subordinate relations to outsiders for the rest of the 20th century. 
 
5.1 New Owners 
     The construction of new roads in the early 1950s brought waves of new settlers 
from the country’s central region to the forests of the eastern border region. 
Unaccompanied by formal state institutions, the settlers’ move east was often a 
haphazard affair, and fears of “hostile Indians” encouraged pitiless abuses of the 
rural indigenous population, in particular, those Ache who remained in the forest. In 
some cases, settlers formed mutual protection groups to protect those “rights to life 
and property” promised by the government’s settlement agency, which were 
typically spontaneously organized by estancia foremen or local policemen to issue 
reprisals against the Ache’s (real or imagined) raids of livestock, corn, and manioc or 
to drive Ache bands out of the area entirely. Spontaneously organized groups of 
settlers tracked Ache bands to kill as many Ache as they could. The children they 
captured were given—or sold—to Paraguayan families. In other cases, more 
organized groups of settlers saw profits in the direct capture of Ache. By the 1940s, 
crews of forest trackers called montaraces in the small frontier towns of San Juan 
Nepomuceno and Tavaí began raiding Ache camps for the particular purpose of 
capturing Ache to sell as slaves in local markets. The area’s trade was largely 
managed by one man, Pichin López, who was well known by both Paraguayans and 
Ache for his cruelty and violence. 
     Kybwyragi, a young man nearing the age of initiation and the son of one of the 
leaders of his band, was captured in 1954 by a group of Paraguayans, who as 
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Kybwyragi notes, included several Ache trackers, and his eventual re-capture by 
López himself.  He described his capture this way: 
Nondebu nonde pychyburõ djamo ure 
endape. Djamo go rupirõ Achewe urepe 
ikõma beru rekowe. Mirõ gorõ djamoete 
ache reko nongaete. Goburõ ukewepe 
pychypami. Urerõ reko. Chuwi wywy. 
Goburõ ure achĩ, “Tu! Tu! Djamo 





Goburõ ure pychy gobu tapype rama. 
Gobu kabwyri myryrõma o. Krỹmballã.  
 
 
Go duwebu mawẽmbu ikõ duwe djamo, 
ure puka gowe ure pychybu djamope 
ure puka, “Pichigi.” Cho Pichigi dja ray, 
dja raywe. Gobu pychypyre ure bapo 
kokue tãrã. Djamo Pichigi go cho reko. 
 
The whites [“grandfathers”] 
captured us at our camp. There 
were Ache there who arrived with 
the whites [“grandfathers”]. Then 
they captured all those who were 
sleeping. We were sleeping. There 
were rifles everywhere. And then 
we screamed: “Tu! Tu! The whites 
[“grandfathers”] are all around us!” 
All of the women ran away.  
 
Then they captured us, and we were 
taken to a house. We later fled into 
the forest. We were afraid.  
 
Then later, another “grandfather” 
came [to where we were in the 
forest], and he captured us again. 
We called that one “Pichigi” [Pichin 
López]. I am Pichigi’s son, his 
former son. After we were captured, 
we worked a lot in the fields. 
“Grandfather” Pichigi owned me.  
 
Kybwyragi in Meliá, Miraglia, and 




Kybwaragi’s experience of capture was not unlike that of many other Ache. It was 
fairly common for forest bands in the mid-20th century to have had several Ache 
among them who had lived with Paraguayans for a part of their lives. The slavery of 
Ache along the farms and ranches of the eastern frontier was too irregular to create 
an economy of scale, in part because farms in eastern Paraguay lacked effective 
means to confine their captives for very long, and because the dense forest was 
never very far away, but this very fact allowed for a degree of movement between 
	 120 
these worlds. Ache captured were able to escape and return to their bands in the 
forest, and when they did, those that had lived with Paraguayans returned not as 
they had left. Their changes became icons of their bodies and the new knowledge 
they had acquired—emblems of their extraordinary experiences while away. I was 
told of one Ache man, who after working for a time on a Paraguayan logging crew, 
no longer shouted like an Ache, trading the protracted, “Yeeeeey!” that the Ache used 
to call out to one another in the forest for the shorter shout used by rural 
Paraguayans. In many cases, it appears that former Ache captives eagerly retained 
signs of their time with Paraguayans despite the often callous and inhumane 
treatment they had experienced among them. Some of those who returned 
subsequently adopted their Spanish given names (e.g. Karina), and others had 
adjusted their traditional names: instead of the Ache animal terms that had provided 
basis for their name, they chose the Spanish or Guarani loans of the same animal (e.g. 
Vakatorogi, from the Spanish vaca and toro [cow and bull, respectively] or Koategi, 
for the Guarani and Spanish word coati).  
     The presence of these Ache who had knowledge of the whites would prove 
essential to the relatively peaceful settlement of Ache bands. As colonial migration 
to the eastern border region intensified and violent encounters with Paraguayan 
settlers became more common, many Ache bands found that the life as they had 
lived it in the forest had become unbearable. The decisions they made against this 
impossible backdrop drew from the past experiences of the whites that some 
resident Ache had knowledge acquired through previous experiences of captivity, 
and the fears that decades of attacks had instilled in them. In some cases, those who 
	 121 
had formerly lived with Paraguayans refused the possibility of returning to the 
world of the whites, and they retreated deeper into the more inaccessible parts of the 
forest; in other cases, the individual connections that some had made through 
capture would become instrumental to the settlement process.  
     For the subgroup living between the Tebicuary River and the Caazapá Cordillera, 
this connection began with an Ache man named Pikygi. Pikygi had been captured 
by Pichin López sometime between 1950 and 1953 and was given (or sold) to a 
friend of López’s named Manuel de Jesus Pereira. Pikygi worked for Pereira for 
several months, but he eventually left Pereira’s ranch to rejoin his band in the forest. 
The band had suffered terrible losses during Pikygi’s absence. A single raid by 
López’s men in 1953 resulted in the capture of 40 Ache (Clastres 1998), and further 
attacks by Paraguayan colonists had resulted in at least four deaths. Pikygi’s 
decision to return to Pereira was a painful choice made against a background of 
external threat and ever-increasing confinement. In August of 1959, he convinced the 
leader of the band—his brother Dywukugi—to go with him to Pereira’s ranch. 20 
persons from the band followed.72 Shortly after their arrival, they were fed and 
clothed. Pikygi visited the remaining 12 members of his band in the forest to 
convince them to join their kin on Pereira’s ranch.73  
																																																								
72 This group was composed of 10 men, 6 women, and 4 children. 
73 One of these remaining Ache describes Pikygi’s visit to him in the forest: “Pikygi came to my 
camp, and he said, “Father Pereira—not Pichigi [Pichin López]—but another one—Father Pereira, 
he is coming; let us go to Father Pereira’s home. Father Pereira won’t kill us.” We arrived after 
the new moon; we arrived at his house. We told Father Pereira: “Pichigi liked to kill.” We told 
him everything. “When they took our children, we fled back into the forest!” That’s how we said 
it. Then Father Pereira said, “I will not give anyone away, I will not give away your sons.” And 
then he said: “I do not kill, I will not kill you.” That’s what he said. And we stayed there. My 
mother was still in the forest, then I went and I brought her; I returned. I did not run away” 
(Kybwyragi in Meliá, Miraglia, and Münzel 1973: 95-6, my translation from the Ache). 
	 122 
     Pereira’s ranch was located along a stream called Arroyo Moroti, around 10 km 
southeast of the town of San Juan de Nepomuceno at a property called Torín. In the 
days following the arrival of the Ache, Pereira provided beef and clothes for the 
band of 32 Ache and wired the government’s Department of Indigenous Affairs 
(DAI) in Asuncion for assistance. León Cadogan, an anthropologist who visited 
Pereira’s ranch as a representative of the DAI, lent effusive praise to Pereira in a 
letter he wrote to the DAI’s director describing the situation. 
I know positively that Pereira received tempting offers for his Guayaki, and 
without extra risk, he could have vastly bettered his economic situation by 
selling most of them. Nevertheless, he chose to welcome them, feed them, 
clothe them, and bring the fact to the notice of the proper authorities [i.e. 
DAI]. He ran into debt in order to defray traveling expenses to Villarrica and 
buy meat, etc. The nobility of this rough country fellow contrasts remarkably 
with the apathy with which the organizations responsible for caring for our 
aborigines received the [settlement of the Ache], an outstanding event in the 
annals of Paraguayan indigenism and South American ethnology…  
(Cadogan, October 20th, 1959, in Chase-Sardi 1972: 197). 
 
The DAI responded by appointing Pereira as an official agent of the department who 
was to assume its local responsibilities. His ranch was declared a reservation and the 
Ache camp christened “Campamento Beato Roque González de Santa Cruz.” Mostly 
consequentially, the DAI gave Pereira a personal monthly salary, and regular 
infusions of food and medicine were provided by an Asunción-based NGO.  
     Residence in the “Campamento Beato Roque González de Santa Cruz” was quite 
different from the one their “Ache fathers” had managed in the forest (described in 
chapter 2). The roughly few dwellings that made up the “Campamento Beato Roque 
González de Santa Cruz” were built in a rough circle in a small forest clearing. The 
low frame shelters were more permanent than the bivouacs that the Ache had 
periodically constructed in the forest when they faced in climate weather. They had 
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gabled roofs (unlike the flat or single-sloped roofs of the forest bivouacs) and most 
had walls of wooden stakes. The DAI had also built a few ramadas in the first weeks 
after the Ache had arrived, open post and beam shelters with gable roofs, which 
provided a place for people to cook and eat together during the day. But in its layout, 
the settlement was essentially that of a traditional Ache hunting camp. The shelters 
the Ache had built were essentially small enclosed hearths, housing a couple and 
their children, each with its own fire. 
     My informants gave special attention to Pereira’s house when they spoke of the 
time they had lived on the colony. It was a large house by the standards of rural 
Paraguay, with two rooms in the front and a separate kitchen in the back. 
Surrounding it was a two-meter high palisade. Between five and ten Ache lived in 
his house at any given time. Thought the house stood nearly 300 meters away from 
the cluster of Ache shelters, the colony, as a residence, was identified with Pereira. 
He had been the ultimate cause of their residence.  
     The well of Pereira’s power lay in his ability to provide steel tools, metal pots, and 
clothe to the Ache, things that had been only been attainable by capture in 
dangerous raids. Pereira, as the primary link between the Ache and the resources 
provided by the government, was able to leverage the scarcity of these goods to gain 
considerable influence over the new arrivals. The Ache provided Pereira with a 
fairly large labor force for the area, and Pereira organized the labor in and outside 
the reservation: he taught Ache to grow maize and manioc and regularly lent out 
Ache to work as laborers for Paraguayans in neighboring towns. He also received 
contracts from the Paraguayan government to clear forest and build roads in the 
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area. The Ache living with Pereira saw little return for their work. Many of the 
products from the fields and forest were sold in San Juan de Nepomuceno and other 
nearby towns, and the Ache were never paid for the work that Pereira had 
contracted. 
     Starting in the early 1960s, Pereira encouraged the newly settled Ache on his 
ranch to find more Ache bands and to settle them. At first, settled Ache brought 
their kin from allied bands still living in the forest, and later once these allied bands 
were settled, they began contacting enemy bands to bring to the reservation to live 
with them. As more Ache bands were settled on the property, a hierarchy developed 
among the Ache living on the reservation. Here too this hierarchy was described in 
the idiom of “ownership” and male consanguinity (see chapter 2).  
 
Gope ore ache matawã ore eruare San 
Juanpe. Cho-rõ ray tãrã matã nondje.  
 
 
Cho-rõ baecheche ache djaraty. Cho-djirõ 
ãpã Pereira prawoty. Gobu cho ache 
djara etama cho. Cho matãmbawe ache 
manollã wywy.  
 
“Djerõ dje ray eru ywy rupi eru kua’a 
ray’y.” Gobu cho ury gatuma cho. “Dje-
dji cho uryma,” ãpã Pereira chope. 
We brought Ache out of the forest, 
at San Juan [de Nepumuceno]. I 
brought out lots of “sons” long ago.  
 
I was an “owner” to many Ache; 
Pereira loved me. Then I “owned” 
many Ache. The Ache I captured all 
lived.  
 
[Pereira said to me], “Your ‘sons,’ 
you really know how to bring your 
‘sons’ [out of the forest].” That made 
me happy. “I’m happy with you,” 
Pereira said to me.  
 
Kadjagi in Sammons (1978: 124-125). 
 
 
5.2 New Bodies 
     The relation of ownership between earlier and later arrivals was reciprocal in that 
newly settled Ache considered themselves the “sons” of those Ache who captured 
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them. Early arrivals considered themselves “fathers” to the enemy Ache they 
settled—their “sons.” And as new arrivals became captors of forest Ache, they 
would have “sons” in turn.74 In other words, those Ache closest to Pereira became 
owners to those least acculturated, and in many cases, persons owned some people 
and were owned by others.  
     One Ache man brought to the reservation by enemy Ache recalled his relation to 
the already settled Ache this way: 
 
Ache uagirõ ore ãpãete. Ore ãpãete ore 
pychy ore pychyare.  
The Ache-eaters [the 
anthropophagous Ypety subgroup 
already living on the reservation] 
were our “real fathers.” They were 
our captors.  
 
Ãpã Budjagirõ ore ymare. Idja tapype 




Ore ekõllã ore ãpã djãwe.  
 
 
Ãpã Budjarõ ore ãpã Budjagi tapyperõ 
ore ekõandy. 
 
Pereira grew us. He “owned” 
many of us in his house; he 
“owned” many that were like his 
sons in his house.  
 
We didn’t live with our [Ache] 
fathers anymore.  
 
Father Budjagi, we lived in our 
father Budjagi’s house  
 




The habits that early arrivals had acquired from Pereira became corporeal icons that 
distinguished them from later arrivals, as well as the means by which they gained 
influence over them. In the first days after having emerged from the forest, he 
																																																								
74 These relations of “father” and “son” were not transposable: if a man was a “son” to his captor, 
who was a “son” to his own captor, the latter did not become a “grandfather” to the man 
captured by his “son.” 
     Though all Ache subgroups called Paraguayans “fathers,” I cannot yet explain why some 
Ache subgroups called Paraguayans “grandfathers” as well. 
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fashioned the hair of the Ache men in the style of Paraguayans. Pereira, evidently 
repelled by the long crests of hair (called byka) that Ache men wore after the 
initiation, gave the men closely cropped hair, side-parted with tapered back and 
sides (see photos below).  Their bodies had changed by living with Pereira, not just 
in outward appearance, but in the new knowledge they acquired. One Ache, who 
had worked on a logging crew, described the new arrivals to me in these terms: 
 
Krỹmballã gogi ache. Krỹmballẽtegi. 
Gobu cho djawu reko, “Krỹmballãeme. 




Kuallãetegi bapo. Kuallã acharã. Karã 










Cho bio reko go bapo. 
Those Ache were terrified [of the 
whites]. They were really terrified. I 
told them, “Don’t be afraid. You 
won’t be hungry. Don’t run back to 
the forest.” 
 
They knew nothing of work. They 
didn’t know how to till with a hoe. 
They didn’t know how to weed. 
They didn’t know how to cut with a 
machete. They didn’t know how to 
seed a field. 
 
Tilling, clearing land for manioc, 
there weren’t these things in the 
forest. 
 
I taught them how to work. 
 
Krachogi, interview (9/20/2011) 
 
Pereira’s increasing hierarchy drew the attention of many visitors to the colony. 
León Cadogan, who had initially praised Pereira, had abruptly changed his 
estimation after further visits, and in 1960, he officially recommended Pereira’s 
dismissal. “This suggestion was not accepted,” Cadogan remembered, “and as he 
found himself free of all control and discipline, it is logical that he began to feel very 
powerful, becoming the absolute ruler and master of the unhappy Aches…” 
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(Cadogan 1960 cit. Munzel 1973: 21). Cadogan was not the only one to remark upon 
Pereira’s authoritarian style of management. Clastres described Pereira as effectively 
a “tribal chieftain” of the settled Ache, who in contrast to Ache owners, “exercised 
his authority through coercion” (Clastres 1998: 80, 106). One visitor to the colony 
noted, “Pereira lives as the ‘father’ of the group and is called ‘papa’ by the children” 
(Gajdusek 1963: 17).  
     The practice of calling whites by terms of male consanguinity had long predated 
their settlement with Pereira. Still, even if the Ache saw Pereira in terms common to 
Ache ownership, he had introduced forms of coercion that were alien to that relation. 
Pereira had ushered in a different relational configuration. All Ache living on the 
reservation with Pereira considered themselves “sons” to the Pereira, whom they 
called “Father Budjagi,” and he was owned by no one. Yet he was an “owner” all the 
same. Despite his regular graft and sometimes violent temperament, Pereira’s gifts 
of food had concentrated the group, uniting them in co-residence. Through his gifts 
of food, he had become the “owner” of an amalgamation of previously unallied and 
unrelated bands (see Costa 2017: 169-172).  And when, after nine years, the DAI 
relocated the colony 75 kilometers north to San Joaquin, so that Pereira might settle 
Ache bands there living around the headwaters of the Jejui River, his “sons” went 
with him.  
     But Pereira, as I was told, had “owned the Ache badly.” He had embezzled most 
of the resources provided to him by the DAI, and under his charge, waves of 
sickness would decimate the Ache who lived on his property. By July 1963, 
complications from measles (pneumonia and dysentery) had killed sixteen 
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persons—mostly the aged and the new arrivals (Clastres 1974). The situation did not 
improve, and another 53 Ache would die in the next five years. Between 1963 and 
1968, sixty-nine individuals—approximately half of the inhabitants on Pereira’s 
property—would die from preventable respiratory infections (Hill and Hurtado 







Figure 5.1. Manuel de Jesus Pereira, 1960. Photo taken by Branislava Susnik and used with 




Figure 5.2. Pereira cutting an Ache man’s hair, 1960. Photo taken by Branislava Susnik and used 










God the Owner, God the Healer 
 
     Pereira’s ownership proved to be short-lived. When it was discovered that 
Pereira’s embezzlement of funds and medicine had significantly aggravated the 
colony’s health crisis, he was removed from his post and was briefly jailed for his 
crimes in 1972. To replace Pereira, the government’s Department of Indigenous 
Affairs (DAI) chose the New Tribes Mission (NTM) to manage the Cerro Moroti 
reservation. The DAI sought to integrate Christian missions into the everyday 
operation of the reservation, thereby avoiding the sort of unwanted attention that 
Pereira’s scandal had caused while hastening the Ache’s assimilation. They believed 
the missionaries would stem the catastrophic waves of epidemics that Pereira had 
failed to contain: Of the 215 persons (in four Ache bands) that had been settled in 
Cerro Moroti since 1968, roughly half had succumbed to measles, fever, and 
secondary pneumonia (Hill & Hurtado 1996). Yet the DAI’s willingness to turn over 
management of the Cerro Moroti community was a reflection not so much of a 
coherent set of practical reforms than it was the acknowledgement that the NTM 
was one of the few groups able and willing to take the job.  
 
6.1 Trails and Trials 
     Their missionaries had in fact been in Paraguay since 1946 and had been trying to 
contact the Ache to establish a reservation of their own. They began expeditions to 
contact and settle the Ache bands in the forests north of the Acaray River in 1950. 
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Two-man teams of missionaries set off from the small frontier town of Itakyry, 
located at the edge of the dense forests of northeast Paraguay. For weeks at a time, 
they hiked northward into the foothills of the mountainous curves of the cordillera, 
along the cross-crossing network of trails that stretched through the forests where 
the Ache camped. Yet each time, they found only long-abandoned camps and the 
traces of their past movement. 
     When the missionaries realized that their goals would not be so easily achieved, 
they rented houses in Itakyry to establish a more enduring presence in the area. 
Itakyry had been created in the final years of the 19th century by the yerba mate 
conglomerate, Industrial Paraguaya S.A., and for most of its existence, it had 
operated as a company town. But by the time the missionaries had arrived, the 
Industrial Paraguaya’s tight control of rural Paraguay had crumbled. The company 
store, which doled out exorbitantly priced goods in exchange for company script, 
had shuttered its doors, giving way to a number of clapboard shops, and the 
company’s former lands had been parceled into agricultural colonies. Gone were the 
shifting group of hardened wage laborers that had populated the town only years 
before, replaced by a new class of farmers and shopkeepers. But the missionaries, as 
they recalled, were not well received by their new neighbors. Wary local Catholics 
snubbed their evangelical message, and the missionaries’ pigs and chickens were 
stolen with some regularity. Worse still, their move to Itakyry brought them no 
closer to encountering Ache bands. Their interactions with actual Ache were 
confined to the two young Ache girls that Itakyry shopkeepers had purchased from 
an Indian hunter who had captured them in the forests outside Laurel. (By 1969, five 
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Ache children in Itakyry were living with Paraguayan families as domestic slaves.) 
Between their attempts to meet “wild Ache,” NTM missionaries made regular trips 
on horseback to the Ava Guarani villages in the area, whose brushes with 
Christianity had begun centuries earlier with the Franciscans and Jesuits. Correcting 
the mistakes of the Catholic missionaries was to them only a small consolation. The 
NTM would stay in Itakyry from 1953 until 1971 without contacting a single Ache 
band.75  
     The NTM missionaries’ direct involvement with the Ache would only come about 
through the government’s tragic mismanagement of the Cerro Moroti reservation. In 
response to the public revelations about Pereira’s abuses, the NTM pleaded with the 
DAI to grant them some involvement in the reservation’s management. After 
preparatory visits in May and June of 1972 with physicians and two Peace Corps 
volunteers, the NTM built a clinic in early July. Once it was completed, they 
promptly requested a mission be built, which the DAI approved on July 22nd, and 
Jim Stoltz and his family moved to Cerro Moroti in August 3rd. The timing finally 
appeared fortuitous for the missionaries. When it was discovered that the Pereira’s 
embezzlement of funds and medicine was at the root of the colony’s health crisis, he 
was removed from his post and arrested. The NTM, who had settled in Cerro Moroti 
only weeks before, immediately assumed full control over the reservation.  
																																																								
75 The anthropologists Pierre Clastres and Lucien Sebag were aware of the NTM’s efforts during 
their fieldwork in Arroyo Moroti. Publically, they dismissed the NTM’s efforts to contact the 
Northern Ache as a token of the “the vastness of evangelical failure.” Yet privately, they 
expressed their worries about the NTM’s attempts to contact the Northern Ache. One North 
American doctor noted after a meeting with the French anthropologist, Lucien Sebag, “Sebag is 
further depressed by the idea of fundamentalist Protestants in with his ‘gentle’ Guayaki, but he 
does not need contact with the northern group and no one has yet made it for him and Pierre. 
The missionaries, not the French anthropologists, have the time and means, unfortunately” 
(Gajdusek 1963: 33). 
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     The DAI generally considered the missionaries to be allies in their efforts to 
concentrate and “civilize” the Ache and other “uncontacted” groups. But the DAI’s 
eagerness to turn to foreign Protestants to manage Cerro Moroti is not immediately 
obvious. The relationship between the DAI and the Catholic Church had 
deteriorated in the previous decade after the Church had vocally criticized the 
Stroessner regime’s repression of suspected dissidents, so the state was more 
susceptible to work with foreign Protestant missionaries. The DAI seemed satisfied 
with the work of the Protestants and with the NTM in particular: In 1971, the 
director of the DAI praised the “close bonds” with the NTM and concluded that 
their cooperation had “improved and facilitated the DAI’s work to acculturate our 
indigenous people” (cit. Bejarano 1977: 44).  
     For its part, the NTM had accepted this charge because they had been 
commanded by God to evangelize the world. The purpose of the New Tribes’ 
mission had to be evangelical. This was their moral imperative. Les Pederson, the 
Director of New Tribes Mission in Paraguay at the time, had this to say,  
Why do people leave the shores of our country to bury themselves in some 
lonesome jungle spot? What motivates some Christian people to do this; or, 
we might ask, why foreign missions? Is it because of sympathy for the 
underprivileged, undernourished unfortunates we see pictures of, that die 
from diseases of all kinds? If this is the motive for going, then the motive is 
wrong, unless the whole idea is simply humanitarian. Of course, we 
sympathize with them in their plight. The little fellows with their tummies 
protruding are heartrending to all of us. Their lack of medicine to cure their 
ills is a concern of ours. In our missionary work we deal as much as we can 
with these needs. Hunger is a very real thing among many of these peoples. 
Does it stir us to do something about it? Yes, of course, we do what we can. 
However, none of these things are the real reasons for going to the mission 
field; they just aren’t adequate enough when the going gets tough for us. 
Then what is the real motive for missionary work? I believe the only really 
valid reason to get involved in foreign missions is found in the Bible. In Mark 
16:15 Jesus says, ‘Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every 
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creature.’ This constitutes the only valid reason for missionary work. We have 
been commanded to go (Pederson 1969: cite page).  
 
God’s call to missionary work held a fundamental cosmological importance for New 
Tribes missionaries. Dispensationalists place believers’ obligation to evangelize the 
world as one distinct period on a sequence of historical stages. For dispensationalists, 
Biblical history is to be understood as a series of discrete periods of time called 
“dispensations,” each one marked by God’s fulfillment of a different set of promises 
for humanity. The Latin dispensatio, used to translate the Greek term oikonomia, from 
which the English “economy” is derived, referred to the “administration of the 
house (oikos).” This administrative connotation of the oikonomia was retained in its 
theological reformulation as “dispensation” to characterize the relation between God 
and the created world. As the creator, God’s “property” was all of his creation, and 
as the head of his creation, God ordered his creation according to an ultimate 
purpose. His commandments and promises were revealed to his people for that end: 
the salvation of humanity. 
     There were various ways that this goal had been accomplished in Biblical history. 
The current dispensation—the Ecclesial dispensation—is marked by God’s offering 
of salvation to all who sincerely accept the Word. The missionary project defines the 
period of time in which they found themselves, one that began with the resurrection 
of Christ and would end with the fulfillment of the events described in the book of 
Revelation, when Christ would return to earth in bodily form and a new 
dispensation would begin with the establishment of his millennial kingdom.   
Naturally, in the face of such a momentous historical unfolding, dispensationalists 
eagerly sought signs that might indicate when these events would occur. For many 
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evangelicals, including the founding members of the NTM, the appropriate textual 
signs of the Second Coming were to be found in Matthew 24 and Mark 13, 
collectively referred to as the “Olivet discourses.” There, Jesus describes to his 
disciples the period of tribulation that would come to pass at the culmination of the 
dispensation. When the disciples ask him, “What will be the sign of your coming 
and of the end of the age?” Jesus points to a succession of common and ambiguous 
events—wars, famines, pestilence, earthquakes, persecutions against Christians, 
etc.—that everyone on earth would endure. Jesus concludes this prophecy with what 
some dispensationalists took to be a fundamentally different sign than the others: 
“this gospel of the kingdom will be preached in all the world as a witness to all the 
nations, and then the end will come” (Matt 24:14). Surely theirs were apocalyptic 
days.76  
     Yet the dispensational premillennialism of the missionaries did not lead to empty 
cynicism or fatalism, as one might expect for a doctrine promising the world’s 
imminent destruction. The founders of the NTM found in this passage (and others 
like it, such as the “Great Commission”) a call to action.77 In this dispensation, unlike 
previous ones, the missionaries’ acts of expanding the Word—through the 
translation and dissemination of scripture—could actually bring a new dispensation 
into being. The founders of the NTM did not merely believe that the world’s 
																																																								
76 As Susan Harding has eloquently described it, “What is consistent is the implicit dispensational 
instruction to ‘read history backward,’ to interpret the significance of present events as ‘signs’ 
that tribulational prophecies are always already coming true, that future events are unfolding 
now” (Harding 1994: 31-2). 
77 In the Great Commission, when Jesus orders his followers to “go and make disciples of all 
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and 
teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you.” Here too, the commandment is 
accompanied by seemingly apocalyptic effects: “And surely I am with you always, to the very 
end of the age” (Matt 28: 17-20). 
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Christians had a duty to spread God’s Word before Jesus’ earthly return. They in fact 
believed that by presenting the Word to all the peoples of the world, they would 
actually enact the Jesus’ Second Coming. To make the translation and witness of the 
Word to all nations a precondition for the Second Coming is to put the community 
of believers at the center of historical becoming.  
     Their task of Christian missionaries—“to complete the body of Christ”—did not 
require the conversion of the entire world; it was rather to “preach among every 
nation.” This idea had been underlined by the Apostle Paul, whose itinerate 
preaching had long been a model for Christian missionaries: “It has always been my 
ambition to preach the gospel where Christ was not known, so that I would not be 
building on someone else’s foundation. Rather, as it is written: ‘Those who were not 
told about him will see, and those who have not heard will understand’” (Romans 
15: 20-1). This imperative to preach among every nation gave priority to those 
“nations” where the Word was wholly absent over those already exposed to 
Christianity whose beliefs needed further correction. The millions of heterodox 
Catholics who haphazardly mixed Christian and pagan beliefs could never be a 
missionary’s priority for they had already heard the Word. The missionaries’ 
priority was instead to reach those unreached peoples—“the new tribes”—who had 
no such encounter.   
     The “new tribes” were not just groups of potential converts; it was a place. It was 
located not only beyond Christendom, but beyond any place where Christianity was 
even known, in the most isolated areas of the world. God’s commandment to preach 
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among every nation directed the missionaries to those entirely cut off from 
communication with the Christian Word.  
     Bringing the Word to peoples distant and remote held challenges quite different 
from evangelical efforts at home. In theory at least, God’s Word was univocal. The 
Word was the agent that did the converting. The performative force of the Word 
exceeded any particular animator or medium it might flow through, such that its 
meaning could be broadcast without misrepresentation through printed text, radio, 
television, and human bodies. Yet the infrastructures, institutions, and cultural 
norms that brought Christ to Americans were not those that would bring Christ to 
the new tribes. Such practical forms of communication as printed books and radio 
were impractical tools for spreading the Word to remote peoples. The New Tribes 
Mission’s founder, Paul Fleming, recognized this very point:  
If God wants to reach some individual here in the States, He has all kinds of 
ways to get through to him—services on TV, churches, Bibles in dime stores, 
and so on. But if he wanted to reach down and save a tribesman in the 
middle of the jungle, He could not do it. Some man has to go and tell him. God has 
no other way to reach him! (Fleming cit. Johnston 1985: 275, emphasis added). 
 
While the missionaries often talked of themselves as mere intermediaries of the 
Word, they recognized the human effort needed to conduct the requisite 
metalinguistic tasks of translation, instruction, and persuasion. As Fleming 
recognized, the spread of the divine message to “the new tribes” necessarily relied 
on face-to-face encounters between missionaries and remote peoples. There could be 
no substitute for the missionaries’ physically traveling to exotic lands and learning 
their language to bestow that divine message on them. God needed the NTM. 
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     Believers’ principal duty to God is to continually expand the Word. This is the 
common purpose of all believing Christians; they are entirely taken over by this 
common task, entirely identified with it, even if other “Christians” do not fully grasp 
the importance of their role in the unfolding of God’s historical project. As Susan 
Harding has described it, “dispensational discourse produces a point of view from 
which history is narrated. It constitutes those on behalf of whom history is directed 
(“we”) and those whom history happens (“they”) (1994: 20). In contrast to the wars 
and natural disasters, to which believers would stand as mostly passive participants, 
this prophecy spoke to Evangelical Christians as dynamic accessories to the events 
of the future. As one NTM missionary put it, “One of these days, the last soul that is 
needed to complete the body of Christ, the Church, will be saved. That last soul will 
very possibly be some tribesman out in the jungle somewhere” (Johnston 1985: 283). 
The various roles of other “nations” could take in Christian theology—as a foil for 
believers, as a missionary object, or an instrument for God’s mysterious 
interventions—were subsumed under the idea that they might provide the essential 
fodder for a dispensational revolution. The missionaries were to go out and find that 
tribesman. 
     The correspondence of the missionaries’ goals with divine purpose was an 
immense source of pride for them. They held a sense of an eminent and inevitable 
triumph in spite of great odds and difficulties, a sense of being involved in Christ’s 
ever-amplifying conquest of the world and the assurance of the submission of the 
Godless to the Word. But this pride involved more than simply their association with 
God. As missionaries, they were a technological appendage of God’s will and voice, 
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and divine agency became enmeshed in theirs. Even if it is God’s Word that is 
actually doing the converting (a point NTM missionaries often emphasized), the 
missionaries were the tools of that Word, and conversion would be impossible 
without the missionaries’ physical presence in the encounter with the unconverted.  
     The missionary project was as much a conquest of time and it was of space. Their 
mandate gave them the feeling of being part of a dramatic story that stretched from 
the first day of creation to the last judgment. Missionary work would bring “the 
distant future” of prophecy into the near, foreseeable future of person experience. 
The circulation of God’s word to far-flung locales would bring millennial time closer. 
The timeline was imminent: the NTM set out “to reach the last tribe with the Gospel 
in our generation” (Johnston 1985: 32, emphasis added). 
     God’s commandment to preach the gospel was a binding duty for all Christians 
in a way that the “good works” of humanitarian efforts were not. How could 
missionaries, in the name of morality, chose humanitarian goals over divinely 
commanded ones when God was himself the source of all morality?78 
     No doubt grounding their task in God’s commandment preserved its objectivity 
and clarity of purpose. Yet the tasks they faced in their first months in Cerro Moroti 
prompted questions of what was and what was not covered under dictates of the 
Great Commission, and some NTM missionaries doubted that their evangelical and 
																																																								
78 Pederson feared that taking on humanitarian tasks beyond the mission’s stated goal of church 
planting might actually serve to undermine it: “Initially the objective is simple. Preaching the 
Gospel is the one vital thing, everything else secondary. Before long schools and hospitals emerge 
as helps to the main objective. In time, institutions take over and become the main thrust. 
Sometimes the simple preaching of the Gospel becomes secondary. We certainly don’t want to 
fall victim to this subtle trick of our enemy [i.e Satan]. Yet, to do missionary work among tribal 
people without involvement in their economic problems becomes unrealistic. We have to become 
identified in their culture in more than just phraseology. […] Our prayer is that this involvement 
will be kept in its proper perspective. Our main objective, of course, is to see local churches 
established in every tribe” (Peterson 1969: 5). 
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humanitarian work could be so easily separable as the stark formalism of their 
mandate would suggest. Jim Stolz argued that medical work might open doors for 
their missionary work: “All these sicknesses are new to them, and they don’t realize 
the dangers involved. Treating them has been a real means of gaining their 
confidence as well as giving us constant contact with the people” (Stolz 1973: 19-20). 
Another missionary, Ruth Sammons, argued that without careful attention to the 
health and economic problems of the colony, achieving their evangelical goals might 
prove impossible:  
Must we get involved in all these other areas: economics, medical, etc.? How 
we wish this aspect of the work could be handled by professionals in those 
fields and we be free to spend more time in language and culture—so 
pertinent to getting the Gospel to these people. What if we just didn’t get 
involved in those areas? After all, we came to preach, not to worry about the 
people’s physical or material needs. But—if we don’t help them in these areas, 
there’ll be no need to think we can give them the Gospel. Many would die 
first—for lack of food and medical care, having been a nomadic people, now 
with no place left to roam and having to be taught how to care for themselves 
and fit into a society they hadn’t previously known. Many don’t fear death, 
believing they’ll go to the sun anyway and be safe and happy there. Dare we 
not care whether they live or die before having an opportunity to hear the 
Gospel? (Sammons 1976: 5). 
 
Medical intervention was not merely compatible with the evangelical imperative, 
Sammons argued; it was absolutely necessary. First, as Sammons implies, death 
foreclosed the possibility of a person’s conversion. It marked the end of evangelical 
opportunity; it was the point at which the not-yet-saved became the unredeemable.79 
																																																								
79 Sammons was hardly alone in her judgment. The idea that death marked the temporal nexus 
between salvation and damnation had been a popular trope in NTM media since the 
organization’s creation, and for good reason: Paul Fleming, the founder of the NTM, had 
highlighted just these concerns decades before in his highly mythologized account of the NTM’s 
founding. It was in witnessing one Senoi burial in the Malaysian highlands that Fleming was able 
to grasp the enormity of damnation—and the need for a global missionary movement. “This man 
they were burying never had a chance to accept or reject Jesus Christ. The full realization of it 
startled me… this same thing was happening to multiplied millions the world over. Men were 
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The Ache had to be reached before they died. With so many Ache dying of illness, 
there was a real danger for the missionaries that there would be no one left alive to 
redeem.  
     But the Ache, as Sammons states, could not see the seriousness that this danger 
posed. This was because the Ache had no fear of death itself. Death was not the 
ineluctable end of individual human life—it was above all a life lived elsewhere. The 
Ache would become krei when they died and eventually reunite with their kin to 
trek across a celestial forest. Lacking a notion of death’s utter finality in such a vision, 
there seemed little at stake in God offer of salvation and eternal life.  
     Communicating a notion of salvation required the missionaries to align Ache 
notions of death and dying with their own. They had to install in their potential 
converts what Michael Lambek has called a different “kind of ending,” one of 
several possible ways a thing finds completion and closure (2019: 254). They had to 
establish finis as the “default setting” for human existence, as the price of sin. Death, 
then, became the pivot between the properly religious and the humanitarian goals of 
the missionaries as well as the point of equivocation between a notion of death 
where finality had to be ritually achieved and one where death’s finality was given. 
These issues turned on the reality of krei, the spirit that separated from the body at 
death and lived on as ancestors in the sky. 
 
6.2 The Healing Dead 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
born into these jungles. They lived their whole lives through and died without one chance to 
know Jesus and His saving power. Shocking was the realization—a Christless grave before my 
very eyes” (Brown Gold: March 1944: 8). 
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     The krei was an image, an ancestral shade, a shadow-cloud—the visible form of 
the dematerialized owe. Unlike the adjawe, which is closely associated with material 
body of the deceased, the krei lacked the material connections to the dead body it has 
left behind. It may be best glossed by the somewhat antiquated term “shade,” 
because it simultaneously captures the idea of a person’s ghost and that person’s 
visible trace (a shadow).  
	
Ywadjirõ kreipe nande manowe owerã. 
Kreirõ owe. Nande manowe. Gobu 
ywadji oma. Nande djamo gope opama 




Ywydjiwa pechepyre emi oma ywadji. 
Gorõ ore na, “krei.”  
 
The krei goes to the sky when we 
die. The krei goes. We die and then 
we go to the sky. All of our 
grandfathers and grandmothers 
went there. They all went there, 
where the krei are.  
 
What was buried in the earth goes 
to the sky. That’s what we call krei.  
 
Baipurangi in Sammons 1978 [1975]: 
40, my translation from the Ache 
 
 
The krei goes to the sky, to the land of the ancestors. As the krei make their way, they 
are said to follow the path of the sun, cutting trails across the forest-in-the-sky so 
their kin can later find them when it came their turn to die. Their destination, the 
dwelling place of the dead, appeared as an immense forest with groves of 
remarkable trees and unfamiliar animals. Bands of dead ancestors moved through 
this forested expanse, as they did when they were living, and relations among the 
dead appeared as they did before those persons had died. Individual krei co-resided 
with their kin, and ownership relations appeared as they had when living.  
 
Dja brekowe ra’a krei ywadji. Go rekoma The krei [of the speaker’s 
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Djarypurãngi rama emi ywadji kreipe 
krei ape rupi. Gobu emi rekoma krei dja 
brekowe. Dja radjype djawupa krei 
ywadji rawã. Emi dja radjy emi ywadji 
rapama. 
grandfather] takes his former wife to 
the sky. That one [the krei] owns his 
wife again in the sky. 
 
Grandfather takes grandmother to 
other krei in the sky, along the path 
to the other krei. Then the krei owns 
his wife again. Krei talks to his 
daughters in order to take them to 
the sky. He takes all his daughters to 
the sky as well.  
 
Baipurangi in Sammons 1978 [1975]: 
40, my translation from the Ache 
 
The krei’s connections to the living were not entirely benevolent. There is a fear that 
krei who do not reside with “owned kin” in the afterlife might grow impatient 
waiting for their kin to join them and turn back to bring those he owned during his 
life.80  
 
Dja apãpe emi owerã. Gobu djawu 
djypywagi maĩ djawu duwe mano 
putabu. “Krõrõeme. De djoãwe rupi cho 
owerã krei apepe.”  
 
 
Dja ãpã mano putabu na’ã tay purã, 
“Chẽngaeme. Apã djoãwe rupi cho 
owerã krei apepe. Dje djoãwe rupi cho 
owerã apã llo,” na’ã. Go nonga na’ã tay 
purã. “Krei apepe cho djoãrã de nõnde 
kua,” na’ã. Go nonga na’ã tay purã 
djamope. Djamope na’ã, “Bueme.” Go 
nonga na’ã, “Ywadji krei rawerã 
buepaka.” 
 
He will also go to his father. One of 
the dead ancestors talks when 
another is about to die. “Don’t shout. 
I will go on path to the krei along 
where you’ve gone.”  
 
When his father is about to die, the 
son says, “Don’t cry. I’m going to go 
along where father has gone on the 
path to the krei. I’m going to go along 
where you’ve gone, father.” That’s 
what the son says. “On the path to 
the krei, I will follow where you went 
before.” That’s what he says, “Don’t 
cause it.” That’s what they say, “The 
krei in the sky will take me; Don’t 
cause it”  
 
																																																								
80 Interestingly, of all the cases, I did not encounter any cases where siblings killed other siblings 
to co-reside. It was almost exclusively ownership relations. 
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Baipurangi in Sammons 1978 [1975]: 
36, my translation from the Ache  
 
 
     The celestial ekõandy of the krei remained opaque to the living. For the most part, 
theirs was a “life” lived elsewhere. But they did occasionally appear among the 
living. The krei are, in theory, visible, even though informants attributed to them a 
tendency for them to withdraw (kãndjã) just as one caught a glimpse of them. They 
could be seen in the play of light reflected on waxy palm leaves when animated by 
the passing wind, the shimmering effect of the sun on rippling water, or other 
chromatic effects considered peculiar or “strange” (purã) to the viewer.81 The 
presence of krei was also perceivable through a cool breeze or a sudden chill felt in 
the body. Though the earthly presence of the krei was limited to these few generic 
signs, they were not anonymous. And in this regard, Ache krei differ from what has 
been reported for other groups in the South American lowlands (cf. Viveiros de 
Castro 1992; Taylor 1993). Krei retained something of the presence of historical 
individuals. They were often named familiars—that is, the krei were identified as the 
krei of someone in particular—and they retained personalistic relations with those 
they owned during their lives. This had implications both for how the living related 
to krei and for how they expected the krei to relate to them. 
     There were a number of occasions in which krei might appear to the living below 
them. The krei could take revenge on its living enemies through violent storms called 
																																																								
81 Other strange light formations signaling the presence of krei spirits include: “strange morning 
light” (koẽpurã), “strange moonlight” (krendypurã), and “strange rainclouds” (bakypurã). 
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pichua that could topple the trees of whole stretches of forest.82 Vengeful against 
enemies, the ancestors’ krei could take on an altruistic role to its living allies.83 It was 
said to advise relatives through dreams, leading them to safety when they were lost 
or in danger. The living were subjects for the krei, not only because the krei might 
intervene in the lives particular people (their sons, daughters, spouses, etc.) but also 
because they were attentive to the events that take place among their living kin. The 
krei appeared as a synthesis between past biography and news extraordinary 
																																																								
82 Ann Christine Taylor has written, “Amazonian groups transform their dead quite 
systematically into paradigms of sociological foreignness, and it is their relation to this alterity, 
rather than the fate of the dead as such, that really engages their interest” (Taylor 199: 654, 
emphasis in the original). The Ache were no exception. Just as the adjawe appeared as enemies, 
Ache krei took the appearance of Guarani shamans. They were in effect shamanized, uncanny 
beings able to capture the capacities of their avian familiars through powers inaccessible to the 
living. This fact is all the more striking because, in stark contrast to their Guarani neighbors, the 
Ache did not have living shamans.  
     Interestingly, in this case, historical linguistic data accompanies this phenomenon. According 
to the Ache, pichua is enacted by certain “messenger birds” that unleash acts of meteorological 
vengeance. When the soul of the deceased rises to the sky, one of a number of these “messenger 
birds” will descend, bringing its particular form of turbulent weather with it. Thus, should an 
Ache encounter a particularly turbulent storm in the months after a band member’s death, she 
knows exactly which bird the deceased employed to produce it: The pichua that blows down trees 
is enacted by kyminõ and kruma birds; rain without lightning is caused by the birds hoka, uru, and 
pirabua kako; heavy rain is caused by the gacho bird; the bird kryta causes hail; and the kwipiru bird 
brings the cold. At least some of these effects appear to be iconic of the animals that cause them: 
For example, the pirabua kako, known in English as the Swallow-tailed Kite (Elanoides forticatus), 
has a bifurcated tail that resembles a fish’s and is commonly associated with water and with fish 
in Ache myth (even though it is not an aquatic bird and does not feed on fish.) Naturally, it is one 
of the birds that bring heavy rainfall. Pichua is related to the concept of tupichua in cosmology of 
neighboring Guarani groups as a regular semantic shift. In his Tesoro de la Lengua Guarani (1876), 
the seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary Antonio Ruiz de Montoya defined tupichua as a “spirit 
familiar,” a non-human auxiliary employed by the Guarani shaman to prey on his human 
enemies (Montoya 1876 [1639]: 404). Montoya’s definition suggests the common practice of 
familiarization by Tupi-Guarani shamans, whereby a shaman offers gifts of tobacco and honey to 
certain animals or spirits so that he may control their predatory impulses (Fausto 1999). Once 
adopted by the shaman, the tupichua become his children, and they obey the shaman as one 
would obey a father. Should the need arise, one of these tractable auxiliaries could then be 
charged by the Guarani shaman to take vengeance against his human enemies. Thus, among the 
seventeenth century Guarani, tupichua designates not the meteorological effects produced by 
spirit auxiliaries (as in Ache) but the avian auxiliaries themselves. 
83 Though the form of vengeance was different for each, deceased ancestors could take revenge 
on the living whether they were “good” krei or “bad” andjawe. The Ache say that in the forest, it 
was common for individuals to tell their rivals that their krei would return to exact revenge on 
them after their deaths. 
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qualities, and it was that synthesis that allowed individual krei to cure their specific 
kin.  
     Often, for this to happen, the krei had to be summoned or “called out” (puka). The 
word puka means to “call out” to a physically absent addressee. The sick appealed to 
the krei of deceased relatives—the spirits of those kin who had “owned” the sick 
person during their lives and could be counted on to care for them in death. The krei, 
who lived elsewhere in a distant celestial forest, had to be summoned here to the 
place of the sick person. 
 
Kreirõ kuerare emi ãpã. Puchĩ bwiey 
buchãwe ãpã. Manorãwe.  
 
 
Ore chẽnga ãpã mano putabu. Gobu krei 
kuerama.  
 
Krei-rõ ore ãpã. Krei-rõ krey-djiwã. 




Gope-rõ dja memby mano putabu eigi 
puka. Djamope-rõ puka djamo 
ekõllãmbu. Djarypurãngi ekõllãmbu 





Dja eigiperõ puka eigi. Cho pya durubu 
puka eigi. 
 
Krei healed my father. Father had 
really bad diarrhea. He was going to 
die (but didn’t).  
 
We cried when father was going to 
die. Then a krei healed him.  
 
Krei are our fathers (ancestors). The 
krei come from the sun. The ones 
there we call krei. Those are our 
fathers.  
 
When her child “wants” to die [i.e. 
is about to die], she calls out to 
them. She calls out to the 
grandfathers when they are about to 
die. She really calls out to the 
grandmothers when they are about 
to die.  
 
Mother calls out to her mother [i.e. 
her mother’s krei]. When my liver 
swelled, mother called out [to her 
mother].  
 




As a healing agent, the krei cured the sick and injured through direct contact with the 
sick person’s body, by forcing the painful object (achygi) out of its host. The victim 
appeared as the passive object of something that is both a sickness and a spirit, 
which had lodged in the victim’s body. The wind—the krei’s breath—was imbued 
with agentive force that takes the source of pain away by cooling the afflicted body. 
The agentive capacity of the painful object became the object of the krei’s own 
agentive power. Central to this idea is the instrumental use of smell. Generally 
speaking, just as fetid odors produced harmful disease, pleasant odors drove them 
away. A number of substances used as remedies for sickness (beeswax, vulture 
feathers, and the barks of certain trees) possess a strong and characteristic odor, and 
it was through the odor that they achieve their effect on the patient. When burned, 
padje bark is crisp with a green floral undertone and was described to me as “good-
pungent” (teiwy gatu). The soft-bitter smell of burned vulture feathers and the sweet 
smell of beeswax were also described as “good-pungent.” But the perfumed smoke 
that was pleasant smelling to humans was suffocating to the foreign spirit that had 
invaded the body. When certain substances were burned beside the patient’s body 
and blown over it, or when certain barks are massaged into the victim’s skin, the 
resulting smell “made the pathogenic spirit’s eye’s water,” forcing it out of the body. 
Third, the painful object might be forced out through massaging the affected areas. 
Anyone could do this, but the massage of pregnant women was preferred, as her 
hands were considered particularly cold. The pregnant mothers were not the 
authors of coolness, which came from the unborn child and ultimately derived from 
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the krei, but her massage was capable of harnessing these signs, even if only for 
fleeting moments. 
 
6.3 The Epidemics 
     There is scant information available about how Ache understood the epidemics 
that resulted from their contact with whites. If Pierre Clastres’ descriptions of the 
sickness he witnessed in 1963 are representative, the first outbreaks of disease on the 
colony were attributed to djuwy/baiwã, fevers originating from the spectral adjawe or 
from the vengeful spirits of game animals (Clastres 1998 [1972]: 247).84 What is clear 
is that by the epidemic of 1968, the whites were recognized as the cause of the 
escalating deaths there. The specific pathogenic powers of the Paraguayans derived 
from their clinging bodily odors (ãpã eche teiwy buchã), and through contact with 
them, one became susceptible to their malignant agency. 
 
Wendu djuellã go nonga eche teiwy. 




Ãpã pire teiwy buchãrõ nande eche 
tuwapare. 
 
[The Ache] didn’t like the smell of the 
sweat on [the whites’] bodies. Their 
bodies were like something else. The 
whites’ bodies were strong-smelling. 
 
The smell of sweat on the whites’ skin 
made our bodies weak. 
 
Bywãngi, interview, 10/20/2016 
 
The strong connection between smell and illness is widespread in lowland South 
America (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Crocker 1985; Albert 1988), and was basic to Ache 
notions of disease that strong-smelling substances could penetrate the bodies in its 
																																																								
84 A deadly outbreak of measles broke out just after Pierre Clastres, Hélène Clastres, and Lucien 
Sebag had left the colony, so Clastres’ descriptions may not apply to the epidemic in 1963. 
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vicinity. For example, to smell the blood of game animals risked incorporating that 
animal’s subjectivity into the body and being sickened by it. The Ache word teiwy 
referred specifically to the pungent smells of sweat, animal musk, and certain kinds 
of smoke. The term was often specified with the qualifier gatu (e.g. “good-pungent”) 
or buchã (e.g. “bad-pungent”), and these qualifiers signaled different effects on the 
body: things that smelled “bad-pungent” caused illness, while things that smelled 
“good-pungent” drove illness away. As best I could tell, these qualifiers did not 
make categorical distinctions in kinds of smell. Thus, “bad-pungent” smells were “bad” 
because they emanated from dangerous objects and not merely because they smelled 
bad.  
     What appears different in ascribing illness to whites (as opposed to the dead or to 
vengeful game animals) is the kind of relations it evokes and colors. As Carlos 
Fausto has written, “In the Amazon, odor is more than a quality perceptible by 
smell; it is the vehicle of other’s agency. The smell of the blood of the victim 
permeates the killer at a distance, as that of the parturient contaminates her husband. 
The smell carries the qualities of the other; it penetrates and transforms the body of 
the person who receives it” (Fausto 2016: 174).  
 
6.4 Good Bodies 
     In the turmoil of the epidemics that had claimed so many of their relations, the 
Ache at Cerro Moroti wanted “good bodies.” Given the strong association between 
the missionaries and the health services of the community, it was natural that they 
turn to the missionaries. They had built the first clinic in 1972, acted as nurses 
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treating the innumerable sick left by the epidemics, and had begun training of Ache 
medical orderlies to staff it (cf. Vilaça 1997: 93). The missionaries were responsible 
for health services for the community, and their presence in the early period of 
contact had been vital to the physical survival of the Ache. 
    One young convert told this to a NTM missionary one night after helping her with 
language work: 
Kowebu ore eche gatu ndaipori mano.  
 
 
Nonde Budjagi Wytatachegi ĩmbu ache 





Kowebu pende Jesu Krito rekoã-rõ 
ĩkõmbu ore mano bechema. Proãty dja 
manollã. Kowebu ore uaty almacen* 




Eche buchã ore pawe wywy. Prãndja 




Kowebu ore Jesu Krito djawu wẽndawe 
ore prãndja bechema. 
Now that we have good bodies, there 
is no death.  
 
Before when Budjagi [Manuel de 
Jesus Pereira] and Wytatachegi 
[Nelido Rios, Pereira’s sometimes 
assistant] were here, many Ache 
died.  
 
Now that you who belong to Jesus 
Christ came, we don’t die anymore. 
Because of the medicine, we don’t 
die. Now we know how to eat food 
from the store; we ate there a lot, and 
our bodies became good.  
 
[Before] all our brothers had bad 
bodies. All of them were angry there 
[in the forest.] All of us were angry. 
All of us.  
 
Now we have heard Jesus Christ’s 
word; we are no longer angry. 
 
Garagi, NTM field recordings (1978) 
 
 
Yet the changes that the speaker attributed to the missionaries’ arrival—the change 
in diet, the change from bad to good bodies, the change from angry to contented 
dispositions—were not attributed to a subjective reorientation. The Ache’s response 
to the social rupture brought about by their sickness was not to focus on spiritual 
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matters, such as sin and grace, but to produce positive transformations in their 
bodies that this would enable them to escape the bodily afflictions they faced during 
their settlement. The attention, in other words, was directed not to their souls but to 
their bodies, and their initial interest in the message of the missionaries concerned 
how it might affect their physical state of being (Vilaça 2016; Grotti 2009).  
     They were the result of “calling out to God,” and much in the same way as 
debilitated Ache had called out to the krei to cure them, “calling out” to God 
initiated direct corporeal contact. The act of calling “causes him to come into the 
inside of their bodies” (djãwãmpe ikẽwã). It did not refer to a change in subjectivity (as 
in “to let God enter your heart”). In this case, the “inside” (djãwãmpe) of the body 
designates the inside of something hollow, like a cave or the hollow of a tree. God 
would touch the soul of the sick person, thereby curing them of all illness.  
Ore ĩ eche achybu ore pukapa Jesu 
Kritope ãpã ywa-djiwãgipe. Ore na, “Ore 








Go ore na ore pawe kiuape pende ikẽwã 
pende ãpã nande ãpã wachu puka eko ĩ. 
Goga nãnde kuwẽndy ĩ. Prãndjãpe 
mẽllãndy kuwẽllã ĩ. Wei nande dja ipo 
mĩmbyre gatu nande kwera gatu 
pukapyty. Go emi nande gwei nande 
krei emi poko emi nande djãndji. Nande 
praruwã. Nande krei nande ãpã 
wachupe puka-rõ krei chidja buchã dja 
djãwãmpe. 
 
When our bodies are in pain, we call 
to Jesus Christ, to our celestial 
father. We say, “Make our bodies 
good while we sleep. All our 
brothers, heal our bad bodies.”  
 
And we tell our brothers, “When 
you sleep, call to God, and he will 
come.”  
 
That one always heals us. He 
doesn’t care for those who are angry 
and don’t give to others. With his 
great shimmering hand, he heals us 
when he is called. And he touches 
our krei for us when we are weak. 
Our krei calls out to the great father, 








It is clear from their documents that NTM missionaries were ambivalent about the 
messages they had received from enthusiastic converts. They understood that the 
Ache’s desire to receive “good bodies” was a matter of the immediate now, and 
because health was far more precarious at that time, they could understand that its 
pursuit might be felt to be much more urgent than the pursuit of ultimate salvation. 
But if the fruits of salvation—“good bodies” (eche gatu)—were achievable in the 
here-and-now, salvation as a future goal for believers could only appear redundant. 
The very thing that so attracted the Ache to this God—the desire to have “good 
bodies” (eche gatu)—seemed to eclipse the rest of the missionaries’ message. 
     They felt a similar ambivalence toward the past efficacy of “calling out” to krei 
ancestors. On the one hand, the idea of “calling out” to a celestial healer had 
provided a fruitful parallel to explain God’s beneficent influence and the power of 
prayer to elicit it. Yet the krei’s capacity to heal seemed entangled with that of God’s, 
and the missionaries made various attempts to separate the capacities of the krei and 
this new God. One popular conceit involved treating Ache understandings of their 
krei ancestors as a misunderstanding of God’s involvement in their lives. Not only 
was God healing them now through the antibiotics and vaccinations the missionaries 
had given them. God had been the “real” agent all along, curing them of illness and 
venomous snakebites even before the missionaries had arrived. It had been God—
not the krei—who had answered the call, a God they had not known but one that the 
missionaries had since disclosed to them. But if God was merely the “right” agent 
behind a tangle of causes, nothing would seem to change, and there would be little 
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need to assent to a different set of moral prescriptions than the ones they had 
already known. 
     Rather than a simple substitution between terms, the figure of God had to replace 
the krei. The missionaries attempted to instill the sense that the efficacy of the 
missionaries’ medicine and Christ’s healing power resulted from the latter’s 
difference with the krei ancestors. And without the clear understanding of their 
difference, there could be no salvation. Individuals had to choose whether they accept 
God’s offer of salvation. God required that one perform a particular kind of 
relationship before he healed them. The Ache would have to realize themselves as 
persons capable of creating a relationship with God, in order to recover from illness, 
in order for them to receive a “good body.” The bodies of non-Christians might be 
subject to sickness and other accidents, but Christian bodies would be protected.85  
     Despite the missionaries’ aggressive attempts to separate the qualities of the krei 
from those of Jesus, and to devalue the former, the signs that evinced supernatural 
healing were largely shared between them. As the “real” author of their good 
fortune in the forest, God simply inherited many of the qualities formerly assigned 
to the spirits of dead relatives.  
     The missionaries knew that simply translating terms between Christian and Ache 
frameworks would not lead to the leaving behind of a sinful past—the sine qua non 
																																																								
85 This appears similar to the comments of Ache language assistant to the NTM missionary Ruth 
Sammons. While God would protect Christians from revenge by their ancestors, he would 
punish his enemies. As he explained to Sammons, “If a [jaguar] goes to eat one of God’s sons, 
He’ll say ‘Don’t eat my son; eat one of the Devil’s sons’” (Sammons 1979: 8). 
     Early Ache converts were not alone in treating God as an avenger. The Jesuit missionary 
Anchieta recounts the words of one Tupinambá shaman for whom a violent storm was God’s 
vengeance against a dog that had bitten him: “I knew God and his Son. Having been bitten by a 
dog, I ordered the Son of God to bring me medicine. He came immediately, and being angry at 
the dog, he sent this great wind which destroyed the forest and avenged me for the injury I 
received” (Anchieta 1812 [1560]: 135). 
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of what they considered conversion to be. To communicate their message, the NTM 
missionaries could not merely present God as the “real” defender against the 
quotidian worries of sickness and predation by malevolent spirits. God could not be 
a krei by another name, just another a superlative ancestor, because the krei could not 
be categorically distinguished from humanity. After all, the krei might cure sick 
Ache, but ultimately, a krei had once been a living Ache. And those Ache that had 
been cured by krei might in turn, after their death, become krei that healed. It was 
essential that the soul (the thing that was to be saved) first be estranged from God 
(the savior.) The conflation of God’s powers with the powers of the krei troubled the 
missionaries, for without their strict separation, the concept of salvation remained 
incoherent. Humanity, in other words, would first have to be seen as a problem 
before this new God could be seen as their solution.86 
 
6.5 The New Owner 
     The missionary linguist Ruth Sammons expressed in frustration, “We came here 
to give these people the Gospel, and we can’t even communicate. Now we find we 
not only have to learn their language, we can’t communicate the Gospel 
comprehensively to the Indian without knowledge of his culture…” (Sammons 1976: 
5). To compensate for their initial unfamiliarity with the Ache language and the 
understandings of its speakers, the NTM sought to make parallels with what they 
knew of the Guarani language. This was a natural strategy. As source language, 
																																																								
86 According to NTM missionary, Ken Johnson, “The unbelieving tribesman, like the 
[unbelieving] American, does not always recognize that is he not happy as he is. But the 
discerning one [that is, the missionary] knows he has a void in his heart which pleasures or riches 
cannot fill” (Johnson 1985: 274). It is thus part and parcel of this missionary strategy to encourage 
the unbelieving tribesman to see how unhappy he really is (see Sahlins 1996).  
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Guarani was genetically related to the Ache language and shared much of its lexicon. 
Moreover, several of the missionaries in Cerro Moroti were fluent speakers of 
Guarani with years of experience proselytizing in the Ava Guarani communities 
around Itakyry. In the absence of exegetical materials in Ache, Guarani provided a 
rough metalinguistic map that might allow commensuration between the language 
of the missionaries and Ache, and to was hoped, facilitate the movement of meaning 
between them. The movement of Christianity into the Ache language began with 
Guarani. 
     The most important of these sources was a version of John William Lindsay’s 
(1913) Guarani translation of The New Testament.87 Though Lindsay’s New 
Testament, missionary linguists selected Guarani terms as temporary placeholders, 
to be later replaced with the appropriate Ache terms when the missionaries had a 
fuller understanding of the language. The most consequential of the terms the NTM 
took from Lindsay’s translation was the Guarani term for God, Nandejara (“our 
owner.”)88  
     “What meaning would a relationship of subjection to God have,” Valerio Valeri 
once asked, “if God were not explicitly conceived of as a lord and master who 
requires, like all lords and masters, precisely subjection and fidelity?” (1994: 35). The 
notion of Ache ownership, as I have described it in previous chapters, would appear 
																																																								
87 Lindsay translated The New Testament from Greek in 1913, making it the first published New 
Testament in a South American indigenous language. 
88 Wittingly or not, by adopting Nandejara (“our owner”), the missionaries had inherited a term 
that Franciscan and Jesuit missionaries had been using for nearly four centuries. It appears in the 
Franciscan Luis de Bolaños’ Catecismo from 1607, and was subsequent adopted by Jesuit 
missionaries like Montoya (1639) and Yapuguay (1727). The Guarani word aña, which referred to 
the deadly specter of the recently dead and the NTM used for “Satan” and “demon,” originates 
from this time as well. Later, it was directly replaced with the Ache term adjawe. 
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to be an unsuitable term to communicate the hierarchy that God demanded. It was 
defeasible, dependent on the caprices of co-residence. Furthermore, its moral focus 
was directed to the “owner” and not the obedience of the “owned.” And yet, 
missionaries of the New Tribes attempted to explain God’s superabundance by 
analogy to the notion of ownership. 
     Even if it was the New Tribes missionaries who first introduced to the Ache the 
notion that God was an “owner,” the Ache quickly extended it along local lines. God 
the Father was not a patriarchal authority and domination; God was ãpã, a father 
and owner. And as an “owner” of his people, God was depicted in NTM educational 
literature as a bandleader. The “future-followers” (rupiwarã) of God and Satan were 
depicted as those who followed those ahead of them on a trail.89 Even when the 
principal Ache language assistant later recommended that the term for God be 
changed from the Guarani Nandejara to an Ache term, he was careful to preserve the 
notion of ownership captured in the original. One missionary described the 
language assistant’s reasoning in the following terms: “Fausto says the fact that God 
created these beings [i.e. humans] [is the reason] He is called their ‘father’ or ‘patron.’ 
																																																								
89 In their training manuals for new missionaries, missionary linguists described the opposition 
between God and the Devil through the image of a fractious division of a band by rival headmen, 
where the allegiances of band members had been put to the test: 
 
Añarõ nande djaradji byllã. Prãndjãngirõ 
duwety ma djo. Aña buepyre duwety. 
Prãndjãngi rapama dja djãwewaty. Prãndjãngi 
djãwewaty adjawepama o. Gorõ byllã nande 
djaradji. 
The Devil is an enemy of our “owner” [i.e. 
God]. The angry one went to another place 
[away from God’s camp.] The Devil went 
to another place. The angry one took his 
companions. The angry one’s companions 
all became adjawe. They are also enemies of 
our “owner.”  
 
El idioma Ache 1978: 133 
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Same is true of Aches working for their patron. It is spoken of with terms denoting 
‘father/son’ relationship” (El idioma Ache 1978: 133). 
 
6.6 Abandonment of taboos 
     The anxieties of partial identification between the missionaries’ understanding of 
Christianity and their understanding of Ache cosmology were ultimately 
destructive. Even while translating Christianity through its terms, NTM missionaries 
circulated the idea that Ache cosmology was an assortment of lies communicated to 
the Ache by an invisible but ever-present Christian Devil. In an article in the NTM 
newsletter Brown Gold, peculiarly addressed in English to an imaginary Ache reader, 
one missionary explained: 
You can decide if you want to be born into God’s family, walk on God’s path, 
and to go to His Campgrounds; or you may continue listening to the one who 
lies and then go to the Big Fire. He’s the one who told you that God’s 
beautiful rainbow was a venomous snake who hides in the woods to get you. 
He is the one who told you that those animals out there, the fierce tigers and 
such, are your wicked ancestors out for revenge. The choice is yours. And 
tears would come to your eyes as you realize that your beloved parents and 
grandparents had already gone to the Big Fire because they did not have a 
chance to make that choice. Why did the missionaries not come sooner? Why 
couldn’t they come in time to tell the rest of your family? (Heckert 1985: 7).  
 
Living Ache were not future-krei. Neither was God. The ancestors had in fact been 
damned for not knowing God. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the 
disagreements among the Ache over the efficacy of alimentary taboos (see Vilaça 
2016: 134). God, as the “owner of all things,” had made the animals for humans, and 
unlike the Ache owners of the past, he did not withhold gifts of certain animals on 
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the basis of what the missionaries considered the “superstitious” effects of eating 
them.90  
     One young Ache would voice her approval of the taboo’s abandonment in the 
following terms: 
Gorõ bue u kallãndy kadji ekõmbu. 
Membo o ẽngatu go mellã krumipe. 




Kowebu go membo memba 
krumipe. Krumiperõ membo o 




Go o ẽngatu uatyrõ waiwi purã mellã 
krumipe. Pia wachurõ me’e krumipe. 
Krumi ymaeche mai’ĩ reko djarypurãngi 
membo u rekobu. Gobu djarypurãngi 
prãndjã buchã krumipe membo ubu. O 
pykae ubu djẽguru buchã waiwi purã. 






Kowebu Jesu Krito apepe 
mudjãmbu go nonga bechema.  
 
 
Gorõ bue u kallãndy ekõmbu 
djarypurãngi. Prãndjã buchã. Karẽ 




Go kuallã Jesupe ãpã wachu emi. Jesurõ 
The [grandmothers] prohibited meat 
when we lived in the forest. 
Delicious snake meat, that wasn’t 
given to the children. They ate it all 
with their husbands.  
 
Now they give snake meat to 
their children. Delicious snake 
meat [they give] to the 
children, [they give] delicious 
snake meat.  
 
The old women ate the delicious 
meat and did not give any to the 
children. They gave big snake eggs to 
the children. The older children 
watched the grandparents eating 
snake meat. The grandmothers were 
very angry with the children if they 
ate snake meat. They muttered 
[complained] if they ate a little snake 
meat. The old women were angry for 
no reason.  
 
Now that we follow the path 
of Jesus Christ, they are not 
like that.  
 
The grandmothers prohibited meat 
when they lived [in the forest]. They 
were very angry. If the children ate a 
coati that had bitten someone, they 
were angry.  
 
They knew neither Jesus nor God. 
																																																								
90 Similarly, Vilaça writes that because God made the Wari’ the masters of animals, food taboos 
were no longer consequential (Vilaça 2016: 134). 	
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bue wywy djapopawe kowe ywype 
nande upawã idja djapopawe emi. 
	
Jesus made all things on this land so 
we could eat them.  
 
Baepurãngi in Sammons (1987: 169)	
 
 
     The devaluation of past knowledge strained relations between older and younger 
Ache. Many young Ache drew a political conclusion from the missionary’s idea that 
God had created all animals for humans use: the old had been deceiving younger 
generations: the fearful consequences of breaching alimentary taboos were in fact 
illusory. They had laid bare the older generation’s deeper interests in directing the 
distribution of food. That seniors had been so careful to remind others that one class 
of persons should be given a specific kind of meat or another class of persons should 
be given no meat at all could only be a mystification. They had invoked the taboos of 
the past to inhibit more expansive giving. Taboos, in other words, were an excuse to 
deny a gift, where, according to younger converts, a gift should have been given. 
And for those who had been deprived of food on the basis of such rules, their 
abandonment was a source of freedom. 
    Because Ache food taboos applied only to a person during a particular ritual state 
(e.g. initiation) or age grade, and not, as an absolute prohibition for an entire ethnos 
(Douglas 1999), foods prohibited to a certain class of persons at one time (pre-
initiates, for example) would have been regularly consumed at other times. (In 
contrast to the taboos found in Leviticus, for example, Ache food prohibitions did 
not involve any disgust or contempt for the prohibited foods.) Their prohibition was 
thus experienced as necessary deprivation. This allowed for the particular dynamic 
of their abandonment: the Ache would be free to eat the things they had always 
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wanted to eat (Keane 2007). In this view, taboo was the absence of what the rule 





91 It might be tempting to explain such challenges to traditional principles of Ache authority as 
the simple voicing of missionary critiques. Missionaries, after all, often emphasized that the 
acceptance of Christianity was an act of freedom from false fears (see Keane 2007; Viveiros de 
Castro 2012). While this certainly played a role, it is also important to point out that there were 
existing motivations for this interpretation in Ache tradition. In Ache myth, seniors regularly 
appeared as caricatures—as exceedingly greedy, deceitful, or gullible—in stories about the 
virtues and vices of surround food sharing. In one popular myth, an old man called Pichuetegi, 
“the real palm larvae eater,” invents false prohibitions to avoid sharing his delicious palm larvae 
with two young brothers. The two hungry youths surreptitiously try the palm larvae and 
discover the old man’s deception before tricking the old man out his food. Though few clear cut 
and enduring stereotypes could be found in real life, the very nature of the seniors’ exclusive 
knowledge and the authority contained the possibility of its misuse (a dynamic not unlike that of 




Figure 6.1. The sinful body. For NTM missionaries, the body was made by God, in advance of 
any inputs by humans. It was also made in his image, so it could only be complete and adequate 
to itself. As a result, the practice of scarring the body during initiation showed irreverence for the 
Creator’s design. For the Ache, however, the body did not exist in a final form. The body was 
dangerously incomplete without the stripes cut into its skin and the particular foods given to and 
withheld from it. By attending to its surfaces and insides, a body was “made Ache.” An 
unmodified body showed no signs of relation to other humans, and being unaffected by kin, put 




     Ache food restrictions were not immediately abandoned by everyone, and of 
course not everyone treated the abandonment of food prohibitions in such terms. 
Many considered the abandonment not as freedom but as a loss, an absence (of a set 
of instructions for achieving a “good body,” way of life, etc.) For Kuategi, the aged 
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traditionalist, the achievements of the younger generation would never compare 
with the youthful exploits of his parents’ generation. Before, there had been giants 
on earth. Men of Kuategi’s generation had seen their fathers as strong hunters, 
bountiful givers, and fearless warriors.92 But today’s youth was too idling, cowardly, 
and intemperate to match these feats. Of their many shortcomings, the adolescents’ 
flouting of alimentary taboos was, in Kuategi’s estimation, the most consequential.  
 
Kowebu dare wei kakullã. Upama. 
Kuallã. Dja ete kuwẽllã. Allã aicho u 
emollã ueme. Go nongallã. 
Now the female initiates don’t avoid 
meat. They eat everything. They 
don’t know. They don’t take care of 
their bodies. They don’t put the 
aicho93 over their hair; they eat 
unsweet things that they shouldn’t. 
It’s not like it was anymore.  
 
Kuategi interview, 5/11/16 
 
 
As Lambek (1992: 249) has written, “a taboo clearly differentiates between those who 
practice it and those who need not.” The following of these rules differentiated them 
from others who do not eat the way they do. In so doing, they might provide an 
important diacritic between, for example, those who eat kosher or halal and those 
who do not, or those of a certain age grade who have rights to eat certain foods and 
those age grades that do not have such rights. But something very different is at play 
here. For Kuategi, however, the essential diacritic was between the way Ache used 
to eat—the way they were supposed to eat—and the way they ate today.  
     But Kuategi’s frustration wasn’t shared by many others, who placed no moral 
value on the taboos at all. Kuategi’s half-sister, Pikygi, for example was starkly 
																																																								
92 And it was usually men, in my experience, who made these sorts of claims about the past. 
93 The aicho is a woven palm basket that the female initiate wears to prevent her from looking at 
others and from other looking at her. Wearing it also gives her long beautiful hair. 
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utilitarian in her assessment for why the taboos had been abandoned. Untroubled by 
the changes in Ache diet, she explained to me that the diseases that resulted from 
breaking taboos no longer existed. Adolescent girls no longer became light-headed 
and feverish if they ate predatory birds during their menstruation. Male initiates no 
longer got sick if they ate black howler meat. Without the sanctions that resulted 
from breaching the taboos, Pikygi concluded, following them was simply longer 
necessary. Kuategi’s and Pikygi’s responses to the collective abandonment of 
alimentary taboo stress different aspects of what taboo is and does, whether taboo is 
a causal claim or a moral expression (and in this respect, it is not surprising that they 
resemble anthropological explanations with Pikygi playing Frazer to Kuategi’s 
Radcliffe-Brown).  
      
6.7 Autonomy without Relations 
     It was not simply the kinds of foods the Ache ate that would come under criticism 
by the missionaries but how they gave that food. “Whether one likes it or not, he 
becomes involved in a program of economic development for such people,” wrote 
one missionary in the months after their arrival at Cerro Moroti. “It is either that or 
let them become beggars” (Cole 1973: 18). 
     Some NTM missionaries had misgivings about their involvement with the 
community’s economic development, and a healthy suspicion of developmentalism 
had been one of the guiding ideas of their organization since its founding. As 
Courtney Handman has recently written, “Mid-century American evangelical 
missiology was framed as a response to the nineteenth century model of mainline 
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missions figured as welfare states. As opposed to the perceived excess of the older 
model of colonial institution building, postwar American missionization did not 
want to be colonialist. Local people would be offered a choice in religious affiliation, 
and in thus avoiding the coercion of state forms, they would also remain 
authentically themselves” (Handman 2015: 68, emphasis added).94 As one such 
missionary fellowship to emerge from mid-century U.S., the NTM set out to win 
exotic converts from remote areas of the globe through a strategy of “church 
planting.” The essential goal of the NTM’s strategy was to establish indigenous 
churches that would eventually flourish without the direct support of Western 
missionaries, and when indigenous leaders had taken on the Great Commission just 
as enthusiastically as the missionaries themselves had adopted it, they might grow 
their own future missionary movements.95  
     If these indigenous churches were to endure beyond the stay of the missionaries, 
they would have to be populated with self-sufficient converts. To encourage this, 
NTM missionaries drew up a deliberately capitalist plan for the community of Cerro 
Moroti to sustain itself. In addition to the subsistence crops grown in the community, 
they added several cash crops, particularly cotton and tobacco, that could be 
exchanged this with neighboring Paraguayan towns. The missionaries would also 
help the Ache negotiate contracts for wage labor with neighboring farmers to ensure 
																																																								
94 Missionary groups of the size and influence of NTM obviously worked with governments to 
secure their presence in the countries where they worked, and in some cases formed alliances 
with even the most repressive Latin American regimes, with which they shared a fervent anti-
communism. In following Handman’s account of mission history, I wish to point out that NTM 
missionaries did not consider their political relationships to limit the freedom needed for 
believers to undergo a sincere conversion.  
95 NTM missionaries expressed concern about the “viability” of indigenous churches against the 
threats of deconversion and financial collapse. The links between spiritual and financial 
constancy should be explored in detail in future work. 
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they were not cheated out of their wages.96 The community’s fields would be 
divided among the families, and the missionaries’ farm equipment was made 
available for the Ache to use—with the stipulation that the Ache had to rent them, so 
that their self-discipline would not succumb to the self-pity that charity so often 
encouraged.97 Finally, the missionaries built a general store where the Ache could 
spend their wages on meat, flour, rice, and clothes, while keeping profits within the 
community.  
     These arrangements were admittedly paternalistic, but without them, the 
missionaries reasoned, the Ache would never become independent. The Ache would 
have to be taught how to be free. It was here that NTM missionaries felt the need to 
supplement their developmentalist aspirations for the community with a critique of 
Ache gift-giving practices—particularly food sharing. Ache gift-giving proved to be 
especially puzzling for the missionaries: On the one hand, it was considered to be 
frustratingly non-capitalist—the missionaries regularly complained that obligations 
of Ache to their kin corrupted the kind of impersonal exchange needed for the 
proper functioning of Cerro Moroti’s general store.98  
																																																								
96 The colony’s previous administrator, Manuel de Jesus Pereira, received government contracts 
to build roads, for which he used the Ache to work without pay. Much of the work available to 
the Ache outside of Cerro Moroti was clearing the forest for nearby farms. 
97 On the antagonism between the “tough love” of ascetic Protestantism and the caritas of 
Catholicism and Lutheranism, see Weber (1948). 
98 The enthusiasm with which the NTM implemented capitalist practices in Cerro Moroti drew 
the ire of anthropologists in Paraguay and elsewhere. Miguel Chase-Sardi wrote that the NTM 
“confuse the essential principles of Christianity with the particular values of Western culture, and 
teach the latter is if it was the former” (Chase-Sardi 1972: 207). As is probably clear from my 
framing of the issue, I have strong doubts about the easy separation between the “religious” and 
“cultural,” particularly in the case I describe here. Chase-Sardi overlooks precisely what many 
missionaries “learn the hard way”: the porousness of Western notions of “religion” and the 
implications that purportedly “non-religious” phenomena have for self-consciously religious 
claims—things I take to be the more interesting problems typical of the mission encounter.  
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     “The Aches always have their hands out; whatever gift was given once just 
becomes standard procedure, and they want their share now!,” the missionary 
Claudia Heckert declared in exasperation.99 Gifts were not just solicited so much as 
they were demanded (see Peterson [1993] on demand sharing).  
     Neither did the gift-givers’ motives seem entirely innocent to the missionaries. 
The apparent selflessness and generosity of Ache giving disguised more interested 
reasons. She explained: 
It’s not that they don’t share with each other. They give, but not out of a spirit 
of generosity. It is an embarrassing social stigma to be selfish, so they give to 
improve their reputations. One of the finest things you can say about a 
person is, ‘He really gives a lot.’ But they have stipulations to that giving. 
One must share with a close relative or risk the wrath of the village (which is 
the primary reason we cannot run a store.) But if times are lean and the 
relative is ‘shirttail by marriage,’ there is no obligation. If one is not related at 
all, they take no responsibility whatsoever even if the person is starving. I 
have seen them gathered around a pot of food, stuffing themselves happily 
while a hungry child sits nearby without a thing to eat. Since the child is not 
related to them, they don’t have to share (Heckert 1989: 5).100 
 
Marcel Mauss famously argued that it was no coincidence the distinction between 
purely interested exchange and free gifts had been most fully elaborated in the West 
(Mauss 1966: 46; 1973: 229; cf. Gregory 1980).101 The notion of a free gift can act as an 
effective foil for purely interested exchange precisely because both ideas assume a 
particular idea of the person (with its indispensable concept of freedom), one 
indigenous to Western Christianity and the otherwise diverse strands of political 
																																																								
99 For Heckert, the quintessential icon of the compulsory nature of Ache gift exchange was the 
absence of a term for “thank you” in the Ache lexicon. On the use of “thanks” in gift exchange, 
see Pitt-Rivers (1992). 
100 These observations roughly correspond to the findings of evolutionary anthropologists that 
Ache households give preference to kin who are more likely to reciprocate, rather than those who 
are most needy (Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, & Hurtado, 2001).  
101 There is some precedent in emphasizing the religious basis of this connection. The connection 
between gift and grace is implicit in Mauss and explicit in Parry (1986), Pitt-Rivers (1992), Barclay 
(2015), among others. 
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philosophy that descend from it. In this view, the individual person stands as the 
cause of events, which may be distinguished on the basis of motives and interests. 
As Jonathan Parry succinctly put it, “Those who make free and unconstrained 
contracts in the market also make free and unconstrained gifts outside it.” Both the 
free gift and the commodity are both normatively governed by the expressions of the 
giver’s free and unconstrained intentions. “But these gifts are defined as what 
market relations are not—altruistic, moral, and loaded with emotion” (Parry 1986: 
466).102  
     As Heckert and other NTM missionaries saw it, Ache gift exchange confused 
these two poles, because, they supposed, the Ache were too burdened by kin 








102 For Mauss, it was the lack of distinction between persons and things (because the thing 
contains the person) that the gift creates an enduring bond between persons. Persons and things, 
interest and disinterest have since been pulled apart, leaving gifts opposed to exchange, persons 








Being Seen is Believing 
 
 
     The Ache say that their knowledge (kua) of and from God comes through his 
speech (djawu). They first came to know God’s word as it was transmitted through 
the reported speech of the missionaries, and more gradually, through the short 
Biblical passages translated in Ache by NTM and native language informants. The 
word New Tribes missionaries used for “believe” was wenduty, “to habitually listen 
to.”103 Ache Christians referred to themselves with the nominalized form, wenduare, 
“the listeners [of God’s talk].” And churches were called ãpã wachu djawu kiutygi, 
“the place where God’s word is told.”  
     This unmistakable focus on the aural foundation for their knowledge of 
Christianity fits uneasily with Ache metalinguistic claims about reported speech, 
however. In most contexts, the Ache grant knowledge gained through speech a low 
epistemological value, and they are always careful to distinguish knowledge 
obtained by one’s own senses and knowledge obtained through the experience of 
others—a practice commonly reported for many other Amerindian groups (Basso 
1988; Gow 1991; Urban 1996; Viveiros de Castro 2002; see Robbins 2001; Schieffelin 
2007; Bloch 2008 for similar cases outside of South America). Viveiros de Castro has 
argued that these evidential practices are inimical to Christian notions of “belief”; 
																																																								
103 Cho wenduty ãpãwachupe. “I habitually listen to God,” “I believe in God.” Strange that the NTM 
should use such a Pascalian assumption here. 
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knowledge gained from the testimonies of others “has no similarity to a revealed 
truth [or] the notion of dogma.” The careful citation of each individual source of 
information carries with it an individualizing force that “prevents the solidification 
of any orthodoxy” (Viveiros de Castro 2002: 40-1).  
     In this chapter, I describe how rival epistemic attitudes toward experience and 
reported speech held by Ache converts and New Tribes missionaries were first 
combined and entextualized in Ache conversion narratives. Jointly produced in 
ongoing interactions between Ache and missionaries, these narratives became 
central to the way Ache converts related the past to the present and unreliable to 
reliable knowledge. God’s word, rooted in the unchallenged capacity to see 
everything, has somehow become powerful enough to undermine existing 
evidential strategies. Specifically, conversion narratives became an important means 
to reframe the relation between visual experience and reported speech.  
 
 
7.1 Conversion Narratives in the NTM mission 
 
     When the NTM arrived in Cerro Moroti in September of 1972, they knew little of 
the Ache language, and for the first years, most of their communication with the 
Ache was in Paraguayan Guarani, the lingua franca of the country’s rural east. The 
missionaries worked with a small team of Ache language assistants to translate 
Christian lessons and short Bible passages, which Ache language assistants passed 
on to the rest of the community at meetings held three or four times a week.104  
																																																								
104 The Ache language assistants’ lessons were the reported speech of the missionary’s reported 
speech of Scripture. But new sources of evidence emerged. These lessons would sometimes be 
visualized with figures on a flannel board (see Sammons’ NTM teaching materials). This visual 
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     On March 3, 1978, nearly five years after their arrival, the missionaries reported 
their first pivotal effects of this strategy when Fausto Bywãngi, their principal 
language assistant, converted. According to the NTM missionary Ruth Sammons, 
“Fausto was so enthusiastic about teaching his own people. He needed little 
encouragement to tell others of the truth he had come to believe. He was so thrilled 
and excited to share this great news and began having nightly meetings with his 
own people” (Sammons 1979: 8-9). As a result of these meetings, there arose a 
passionate interest in evangelical Christianity among the Ache of the Cerro Morotĩ. 
Conversions moved rapidly through Ache kin networks, and within a month of 
Fausto’s conversion, whole extended families had converted. As one missionary 
wrote, “These are a very group-oriented people; they prefer to do things together, 
and within three weeks [of Fausto’s conversion] we had about seventy professions of 
faith! That was a very high percentage of the adult population at that time.” The 
missionaries’ excitement at the Ache’s sudden conversion was measured, however: 
“We weren’t sure how many were genuine and how many were just following the 
crowd” (Goddard 1990: 12).  
     The missionaries’ doubts ran deeper than whether the Ache’s exuberant mass 
conversion reflected the hard-won, individual transformations they had imagined 
for the Ache when they arrived. They also bemoaned their own linguistic knowledge 
of Ache and the problems that this limitation created in communicating the 
evangelic message: “When the first fellow accepted the Lord, the language analysis 
was just being completed, we had not been in the tribe very long, nor was our team 
																																																																																																																																																																					
evidence was not direct, however, as it referred to events that no living person had actually 
experienced. On the combination of visual and aural to present message, see Schieffelin 1995; 
Severi 2014; Hanks 1999; Besnier 1995. 
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established yet. So they sort of caught us ‘flat-footed,’ you might say, in that we were 
in the beginning stages of language study [and] there was no Scripture in their 
language” (Goddard 1990: 12). Unable to cull the disingenuous from the heartfelt, 
and unsure of the accuracy of their existing translations, NTM missionaries initiated 
a series of individual meetings with new converts in the missionary’s homes. When 
an individual came forward with a claim of having undergone a conversion, the 
missionaries would judge his or her knowledge of Christianity through the telling of 
a conversion narrative: 
We asked that anyone who professed to know Christ discuss it with us 
privately. We made it clear that coming to us has nothing whatsoever to do 
with their salvation, but we as missionaries need to know who are our 
brothers and sisters in Christ. We also need to know how to help them in 
their understanding of the truths of salvation. We can only know these things 
if they tell us. 
     The response has been good, with over fifty of them coming individually. 
It has been a thrill to listen to these people, most of whom are able to give a 
clear testimony of where their faith is placed. […] It has been a blessing to 
hear these Ache brothers and sisters expressing their belief in God, explaining 
how Christ was sinless and therefore able to die to save us who were 
hopelessly lost in our sins (Goddard 1990: 14). 
 
Urging Ache Christians to give conversion narratives was therefore a way for the 
missionaries to rein in a message that had been mediated in large part through their 
Ache language assistants. It was no longer enough simply for the Ache to listen 
patiently to “God’s talk” as related by the missionaries and their Ache language 
assistants. The Ache were enjoined to talk about it, to externalize God’s talk as proof 
that they had internalized it in the form of a “clear testimony” (to use Goddard’s 
words.)  
 
7.2 Hearing and Speaking: Evidence and Authority in the Mission Encounter 
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     The mandate that Ache converts talk about what the missionaries had told them 
suggests the Urapmin’s sardonic characterization of Christianity, as related by Joel 
Robbins: “In Christianity, talk follows talk and charters talk that produces more talk” 
(2001: 904). Yet it is also true that the participant roles of (saved) speaker and 
(unsaved) listener give some order within the torrent of “Christian talk” 
surrounding the mission encounter: Knowledge of Christianity begins as a verbal 
message from missionary to the unconverted. It is repeated in testimonies that prove 
one’s faith. And it is further reproduced if and when the once unsaved listener 
becomes the missionizing believer. It is this order that makes Christian “conversion 
talk” both “an argument about the transformation of self that lost souls must undergo, 
and a method of bringing about that change in those who listen to it” (Harding 1987: 
167, emphasis in the original). 
     In some cases, these roles are materialized in the textual objects themselves, such 
as this Ache hymn, written by the missionaries to inculcate an ethics of listening and 
telling:  
 
Wendu ãpã wachupe 
Idja djawu wendu gatu 
 
Wendu ãpã wachupe 
Idja djawu cho mudjãndy 
Idja ray mewe 
Cho pepy mano 
Cho prãndjeare 
Cho ywa-dji djo 
 
Wendu ãpã wachupe 
Idja djawu wendu gatu 
 
Kiu’u picha kbaepe 
Ãpã wachu djawu gatu 
Listen to the great father, 
To his speech, listen well. 
 
Listen to the great father, 
His speech I always follow. 
He gave his son, 
I am exchanged for death. 
I am remorseful. 
I will go to the sky. 
 
Listen to the great father, 
To his speech, listen well. 
 
Tell your fellow men, 




Kiu’u picha kbaepe 
Idja djawu go mudjãwã 
 
Cho kuallã wyte 
Ãpã wachu ray 
            Idja pepy mano 
            Gobu wẽmabu 
 
Kiu’u picha kbaepe, 




Tell your fellow men, 
His speech, so that he may 
follow it. 
I don’t yet know 
Great Father’s son, 
His exchange for death, 
Or when he was healed.105  
 
Tell your fellow men, 
Of the great father’s good 
speech.  
 
(NTM 1985: 82, my translation 
from the Ache) 
 
	
Ache converts would have to do more than propagate a message like the hymn 
above. They would have to demonstrate they had undergone the experiential inner 
change that distinguishes authentic conversion, and at best, the willingness to adopt 
the discourse of the missionaries could only be a sign of that change. Practically 
speaking, however, this meant that “sincere conversion” was to be determined 
through a specific genre of religious speech: the conversion narrative. Though they 
had converted as a group, Ache converts would have to speak individually about 
what hearing “God’s talk” had done to them. And unlike in everyday discourse, the 
speaker could expect no validation from listeners. Only the individual convert had 
the authority to narrate; despite its public performance, testifying remained—like 
Meyer Fortes (1967) said of eating—something you must do yourself.  
 
7.3 Conversion Narratives as Evidence 
																																																								
105 In this song, NTM missionaries use the term wẽ’ẽ, “to expel” to refer to Christ’s resurrection. 
Though the Ache term often refers to the practice of healing someone by expelling the sickness or 
intruding object, it does not capture the intended sense of death and resurrection.    
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     What sort of evidence is a testimony? The qualities of one’s acts (good works, 
speech, etc.) index a change in the actor’s inner state. In its most basic sense, the 
conversion narrative is a presentation of a changed self, an account of the speaker’s 
transformation in time. Minimally, this presentation involves the speaker’s 
plumbing of autobiographical details to illustrate a “sinful past” from the standpoint 
of a “saved present.” In many forms of Protestantism, the narrative’s center of 
gravity lies in the explanation of the speaker’s change, in describing the middle term that 
facilitates the switch from one state of knowledge to the other. An array of 
autobiographical events is brought together under a single cause not simply out of 
narrative contrivance, but out of an understanding that the world is structured 
around a divine purpose. Over time, speaker perceives a causal unity working 
through what previously seemed like unrelated events—acting “behind the scenes,” 
so to speak, as a final cause. Speakers describe how they came to know the real, 
hidden sources of influence behind a seemingly diverse autobiographical elements—
the proverbial “scales falling from one’s eyes”—and how he or she was changed by 
that knowledge. That knowledge replaces the speaker’s sense of emptiness, 
meaninglessness, isolation, and sinfulness with feelings of love, community, and 
newfound purpose.  
 
7.4 Knowledge “Before”: Modality, Epistemic Authority, Seniors, and Ethics of Ka 
 
     As a result, existing metalinguistic assumptions have significant bearing on what 
all this talk is about. But here the assumptions implied in the display of Christian 
conviction came into tension with other ethics of talk, namely what they could say 
about the things they had experienced and the things they had not. Ache Christians 
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faced a dilemma: How should the Ache speak confidently about a God they had not 
seen, related to them by strangers who had also not seen this God?106   
     The Ache word kua (“knowledge”) applies to sensory perception generally as well 
as cognition, implying that the persons concerned must comprehend that and what 
they are experiencing. Though the Ache language does not have the kind of system 
of grammaticalized evidential marking common to many South American 
indigenous languages, there is a continual normative emphasis in discourse to 
specify the source of one’s information. Basic to this idea is that a person can speak 
about his experience in a way that he cannot of another’s. As is common for many 
groups in lowland South America, the Ache emphasize contrast between 
information obtained through the sense of sight (mechã) and information obtained 
through reported speech, which is based on the named or unnamed experience of 
others. I often heard from several of my informants, “When we see something, we 
really know it.” Direct visual experience avoids some of the more treacherous 
intentions of others, the potentially dangerous intentionality that might color a 
report.  
     Obviously, people had to rely on things they were not able “to see” for 
themselves or experience in a direct, firsthand manner. For the most part, this 
involved things we are told about or informed of. Ache notions of the authority of 
sight frequently appealed to the age and habitual experience of the person in 
																																																								
106 For much of Western philosophy, epistemology begins with the possibility of our senses 
deceiving us. But broadly speaking, Amerindians seem to place more emphasis on the tension 
between the evident and concealed aspects of the people and events they encounter. In other 
words, it is not one’s senses that deceive, but the people and events themselves that are deceptive.  
     Moreover, knowledge was composed of events, not abstract truths against which the listener 
could oppose his own reason.  
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question. Vision was still important here. Persons with recognized acquaintance 
with particular tasks were often referred to as mechãndygi, “those who have 
habitually seen it.” The mechãndygi was therefore considered an authority, to use 
Benveniste’s words, “insofar as he ‘knows,’ but in the first instance because he has 
seen” (Benveniste 1973: 440, emphasis in the original). 
     Those considered mechãndygi were invariable seniors, and I never encountered a 
case where a woman was called a mechãndygi. In a mundane sense, the old had a 
greater store of knowledge and experience to draw upon. But some seniors had a 
form of knowing, a techniques of special understanding, that younger people did 
not. Some seniors were able to “see penetratingly” (chãmpycho) past the external 
appearances of things—for example, to “see” whether a jaguar is indeed a jaguar or 
if it might be vengeful relative wearing a jaguar’s clothes, or even to “see” the sex of 
an unborn child by the taste of the food cooked by its mother. This special kind of 
“seeing” was clearly something different from plain sight, in that it was available 
only to a few persons, and that it could even include other sensory modalities such 
as taste, as the above example indicates.107 Nevertheless, chãmpycho constituted “real 
knowledge” and it relied on drawing conclusions from engaging with specific signs. 
As I was told, “The senior men see penetratingly, and they really know. It is the 
senior men who know.” 
     These confident assertions about the knowledge of seniors were never attributed 
to information based on the reported speech of any other age grade. Whatever was 
not directly experienced must be explicitly noted. If not directly experienced, 
																																																								
107 It was often accompanied by inferential markers, mirõ (doubt) and rõnde (future possibility). 
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speakers assiduously qualified their accounts of events by saying mechãllã, “I didn’t 
see it,” to avoid making strong claims for which they have an insufficient degree of 
access.108 Any given narrator was expected to recount the sources that separated the 
narrated event from how he came to know about it, referencing the origins of the 
narrative and its history of circulation. Should an account correspond to the 
experiences of others, it would be met with approval. Listeners might quietly repeat 
significant words or phrases from the speaker’s preceding utterance to show their 
affirmation, or offer a generous endorsement, “Go nonga!” “It was like that!”109 
     One man, after describing to me a jaguar attack that took place in his 
grandparent’s generation, concluded his account with the following metalinguistic 
disclaimer: 
Byamari go wywy bya duwe.  
 
 
Ure mechallã wywy.  
 
Cho eirõ mechãmbare wywy. Cho 
djamomari Peĩmbuwachugimari.  
 
Ure irõndy ache tãrã ure mechallã.  
 
 
Cho ãpãrõ mechãmbare wywy.  
 
Ure mechãmbu ure kua gaturawe. 
Krebua ure ikõ pou ure.  
The ancestors, all of those people, 
were different [from us].  
 
We never saw them.  
 
My mother saw all of them. My late 
grandfather Peĩmbuwachugi did too.  
 
Our people [we, the living] never 
saw it.  
 
But my father saw it all.  
 
If we see something, we really know 
it. But we have only lived in recent 
																																																								
108 Interestingly, many mythic events are also described as directly witnessed by their grandfather’s 
generation (and not as hearsay, as is reported for many Amerindian groups.) 
109 This brings up the question of cases where the account does not correspond to the experience 
of others. Privately, one might scorn someone else’s ideas as lies. But the mutual deference that 
Ache egalitarianism required made public argument traumatic, exposing the speaker to ridicule 
and risked a quarrel. Thus, although everyone heard other people say things that conflicted with 
his or her own knowledge, there was no acceptable way to challenge what had been said. They 
rarely contradicted each other face to face. Publically at least—that is, in the face of one’s affines, 













These provisos were not mere rhetorical flourishes. A person who makes an 
informative statement may be obliged to recount the precise circumstances in which 
he or she came by it. A person is expected to say whether there is any cause for 
uncertainty or imprecision about the information. Determining whether the 
information is derived from the speaker’s firsthand or secondhand experience is part 
of this process. A person’s diligence in doing all of this also is considered important 
evidence of their moral character. Failing to note the source of one’s information 
invited the distressing allegation that one was “talking senselessly.” The Ache refer 
to this idea of “senseless talk” with an epistemic modal adverb, ka.110 Unlike the 
English “lie,” the Ache ka applies to utterances or actions based on deliberate 
deception, as well as those based on erroneous premises. Though at a purely 
denotational level, ka does not distinguish between intended and unintended 
falsehood, this by itself should not be taken to mean the Ache were or are indifferent 
to intentions. In addition to evaluating talk, mothers frequently apply ka to a host of 
verbs when scolding their children—directly their child’s attention to behavior that 
should have been intentional.111  
																																																								
110 The corresponding term in Guarani is rei. Interestingly, the Kalapalo term “auginda” refers not 
only to mistaken or incorrect speech, but also to formal speech (found in affine speech, political 
speech, etc.), and the concealment of certain inappropriate feelings (shame, jealousy, anger) in the 
presence of one’s affines (Basso 1988: 233; see Franchetto (2007) on augu.) 
111 Phrased somewhat more precisely, ka is applied to verbs to describe an attempted but 
unachieved objective (something “done in vain”) as well as an action performed without a clear 
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     To provide false information, knowingly or not, was an infringement on another’s 
autonomy, for it meant that those who acted on that information were not in control 
of their actions (Williams 2002). The speaker, rather than acting as a transparent 
conduit of the original source, imposed his will on his interlocutor by providing him 
or her with unfounded reasons for further actions.112 
     One Ache man, for example, explained his past hostility to Paraguayans on the 
basis of the false descriptions he received of them by his senior kin—some of whom 
had actually lived previously with Paraguayans for years as captives. He recalled his 
astonishment when he saw a Paraguayan for the first time:  
Ache inawe nonga bupi wachu pyta 
nonga. Ãpã kbegatu. Cho wechã gatuma 
gobu cho maĩma go. 
 
 
The Ache had told us the 
Paraguayans had noses like a bat’s 
nose. But the Paraguayan was 
beautiful. I saw him really well, 
and I looked at him. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
reason or cause in the first place (something “done senselessly”). Ka can be used to describe 
tricking another, often by coordinated group effort. Children and young men play out these 
scenes constantly among themselves, and older women seem to have been a favored target of 
these jokes: Orerõ ka bewãndy kadji ãpã maĩ inandy. Ka paroty ore kadji achĩmba wãiwĩ purã achĩmba. 
Gobu wãiwĩ purã ka tata pachopyre pire wi wachupa djono gobu ka achĩmbyre. Gobu ka achĩmbyre 
djudjama. Ka paroty ka-dji. “We liked to ‘deceive for nothing’ in the forest, father always said. We 
startled the old women for no reason (ka paroty) in the forest and made them scream. Then an old 
woman was burned by the fire she mistakenly thought had been smothered when she was 
screaming for nothing. Then having screamed for nothing, we laughed. In the forest, we liked to 
startle them for nothing.”  
     While persons are not directly responsible for the behavior of another, they frequently scold 
and give commands: Parents are upbraided when their children misbehave. Adults give orders to 
children. My observations of mothers’ interaction with their children suggested that patterns of 
behavior may be instilled early by attempts to secure children’s compliance. A woman wishes to 
silence her unruly child by telling him: Buekã ka mani-dijpa? “Why do you make noise for no 
reason?”  
112 The corresponding term in Guarani is rei. Interestingly, the Kalapalo term “auginda” refers not 
only to mistaken or incorrect speech, but also to formal speech (found in affine speech, political 
speech, etc.), and the concealment of certain inappropriate feelings (shame, jealousy, anger) 
(Basso 1988: 233; Franchetto 2007). 
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For this man, the firsthand descriptions given to him by his senior kin had proven so 
contrary to his own visual experience that he questioned the basis of their epistemic 
authority:  
Cho ãpã ka. Ore djamo-rõ ka ina bupi 
wachu pyta nonga. Ka ina ãpã fware 
wywy ekombabu. Djamo Awagi maĩ ka 
inamba. Emi djarypurã Piradjugi maĩ chã 
buchã fwarami bupi wachu pyta nonga 
wywy ãpã. Ka inamba djarypurãngi 
ekõwe ãpã fware wywy. Go ware cho 
kowe cho djawu djeyma. 
My father spoke falsely. Our 
grandfathers spoke falsely when 
they said the Paraguayans had 
noses like a large bat. The fathers 
that had lived with Paraguayans 
spoke falsely. Grandfather Awagi 
spoke completely falsely. The late 
Piradjugi talked about their ugly 
faces when she said all the 
Paraguayans had noses like a 
large bat. The grandmothers who 
lived with the Paraguayans spoke 
falsely.  
 
Chachugi in Hauck, Roessler, and 
Thompson (2019) 
 
The focus of the speaker’s evaluation of his senior kin lies in the inaccuracy of their 
report, in confidently reporting what must have been otherwise. And if the 
description of Paraguayans was unfounded, the speaker concluded, so was his 
previous hatred of them.  
     Ka would assume systematic importance in the context of Ache conversion to 
Christianity and took on new epistemological valences in Ache conversion 
narratives. The term ka was widely employed by new converts to dismiss all 
knowledge that seemingly conflicted with a God that neither they nor the 
missionaries had ever seen. Above all, it came to distinguish all those ideas and 
actions in conflict with Christianity, defining the past in general and the knowledge 




7.5 Time and Narrative: Conversion Narrative, Conversion Verse  
 
     The reliance on conversion narratives to gauge the sincerity of Ache conversion 
opened up new problems for the NTM missionaries. Yet conversion narratives had 
little in common with existing indigenous speech genres, and missionaries had to 
teach to the Ache and request from them forms of speech that ideally, were 
supposed to be monologic and given willingly and spontaneously (Keane 2007).  
Missionaries coached Ache in the telling of conversion narratives by asking them 
what they enjoyed about their newly settled lives at the reservation at Cerro Moroti, 
and what they feared or disliked about the past.  
     Here is one example, recorded by one of the NTM missionaries, of a missionary’s 
attempt to elicit a conversion narrative from a young convert: 
Torãngi: mba’eicha djawuta 
 




Sammons: urygatuba pikopa kowebu              
go nonga kiu 
 
Torãngi: cho kowebu cho urygatuma. 
Che kowebu urygatu. Che krỹmbagatu 
kowebu kowebu ãpã wachu djawu 
wenduare. Che krỹmbagatuma. 
	
How will I say it? 
 
Call out to me. Call out to me. 
 
I am content. 
 
Are you content now? Tell me like 
that. 
 
Now I have become content.  Now I 
am content. I have become 
composed now.  Now I am a listener 
of God’s speech. I have become 
composed. 
 
NTM Field Recordings (1978) 
	
 
Ache conversion narratives, as they appeared in the autumn of 1978, dealt directly 
with the effects of acquiring new knowledge from God’s word. Near unvaryingly, 
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narratives began with an opening phrase describing how the speaker was affected 
by hearing or otherwise incorporating God’s word, an effect typically described in 
terms of the speaker’s emotional constitution.  
     In this particular interaction, one NTM missionary asks the Ache speaker to 
provide an account of herself as a converted Christian. When the Ache speaker 
replies, somewhat innocuously, that she is “content,” the missionary directs the 
speaker to the reasons why she is content now—and not “previously content” or 
“habitually content” as some enduring character trait.  
     Ache conversion narratives took on their temporal dimension as a backward 
glance from this temporal ground. The structure of each of the eight recordings of 
conversion narratives from 1978 that I have transcribed and translated follows this 
same alternating sequence between the time when they heard God’s speech and a 
positional past (a time “before” [nonde] they had heard this speech) defined by 
senseless knowledge and fear. 
Jesu Kritorõ kua’a gatu idja rayrãdji. 
Chorõ wichakrãmbu membo chullã 
wyche emi. 
 
Kowebu ore ury gatuma Jesu Kritope 
apepe mudjãmbu. Cho ãpã emi.  
 
 
Cho eigi membo chullã wywy. Warõ 
gatu Jesu Krito dja rayrãdjiwã go o.  
 
 
Kowebu ore mudjã dja ape rupi. Ore 
mudjã ore kuwẽandygi Jesu Krito rupi 
kowebu. 
 
Orerõ kua’allãwe nonde ãpã wachupe. 
 
Jesus Christ knew those who would 
become his sons. When I was small, 
snakes hadn’t bitten me yet.  
 
Now we (exclusive) are content 
when we follow the path of Jesus 
Christ. My father too.  
 
Snakes never bit my mother. Jesus 
Christ cared for her because she was 
to be his future “son.”  
 
Now we follow his path. We follow 
after the one who cared for us, Jesus 
Christ, now. 
 




Kowebu ore kuaama Jesu Krito manowe 
wyra wachapyredji. 
 
Gorõ ore wãrõandy nonde kadji ore 
ekõmbu. Ore kuallã Jesupe ãpã wachupe 
emi. 
 
Gorõ ore ka-dji ekõmbu membo chuwe 
djamogi wywy membo chuwe 
wedjapyre kuwẽandy. 
 
Adjawe kuwẽndy kura ore ka nache’e. 
Jesurõ go kuwẽandy. 
 
 
Djypybu waiwipurã chuepurãngi ka na’a 
adjawerõ go kuwẽandy. Idja ãpã 




Kuallã go Jesupe. Ka djawu waiwi purã. 
Go nonga na’a idja eirõ go kuwẽandy. Ka 





Djarypurãngi-rõ prãndjãngi buchã kadji. 
Go-rõ ka kua’a krei. 
 
 
Koweburõ kua’a reko Jesu Krito manowe 
wyra wachapyredji. Go mema orepe idja 
krei djarypurãngi emi. 
 
 
Orerõ kuallã dedji ãpã wachu. 
 
 
Nondewa djarypurãngirõ ka na’a kreirõ 
nande kuwẽandy. Kuallã gogi. Ka djawu 




Now we know that Jesus Christ died 
on a wooden cross.  
 
He cared for us before when we 
lived in the forest. But we didn’t 
know Jesus; we didn’t know God. 
 
When we were in the forest, God 
healed all the grandfathers bitten by 
snakes when they were left behind.  
 
We [exclusive] thought the spirits of 
the ancestors healed us, but we 
spoke falsely. Jesus healed them.  
 
Long ago, the old women and old 
men wrongly said that the spirits of 
the ancestors healed them, that their 
dead fathers healed them. That’s 
what they all said.  
 
They didn’t know Jesus. The old 
women spoke falsely. That’s what 
they said, that the spirits of their 
mothers healed them. The 
grandmothers spoke falsely. The 
grandmothers didn’t know God.  
 
The grandmothers were angry in the 
forest. They “knew senselessly” the 
spirits of the ancestors.  
 
Now we know Jesus died on a 
wooden cross. He gave his spirit to 
us, to the grandmothers as well.  
 
 
We hadn’t learned of God from you 
[the NTM missionaries].  
 
Before the grandmothers said falsely 
that spirits of the ancestors healed us. 
They didn’t know that one [God]. 
The grandmothers spoke falsely. The 
grandmothers really spoke falsely. 
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NTM Field Recordings (1978)	
 
Three points deserve particular attention here: First, the speaker makes the more 
general claim that the knowledge of the Ache (whether young or old) does not have 
the same status as God’s knowledge. What is distinctive about God’s knowledge is 
that it bridges the speaker’s past, present, and future, as it includes awareness of 
things that the Ache did not know in the forest and knowledge of things that will 
eventually come to pass. God knew “those who would become his sons,” and 
protected them in the past so they would assume that role of “future listeners of his 
speech” (see time and predestination).  
     Second, as the speaker explains, it was not their dead relatives who had protected 
them from sickness and accidents in the forest but a God that they had not yet 
known. The speaker places responsibility for this misunderstanding on senior Ache, 
for it was their reports of ancestral spirits—their ka kua, or “senseless knowledge”—
that had swayed the minds of his generation.  
     But here we face a problem alluded to in the opening of the chapter: On what 
grounds did younger Ache consider their elder’s past statements about ancestral 
spirits to be “senseless talk?” After all, God’s infinite knowledge was not something 
that could be empirically verified, like seeing the face of a Paraguayan. In fact, this 
infinite knowledge had only been told to them by missionaries who had not 
themselves seen God. How did Ache Christians establish the undisputed existence 
of an entity (and the unwavering truth of that entity’s knowledge) that was outside 
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of experience and visually removed from the world? This brings us to the third point. 
The visual capacities of God were attached to the idea of omnipotence. 
Nande mechãllã apã wachu djawu. 
Nande mechãllã nande djãwe tõ rekoaty 
djawu nande reko. Mechãllã. Nande 
mechãllã apã wachu. 
 
Ãpã wachu-rõ idja ray etallã 
kowepe ywype bue akua 
pychowe manoma nande 
prãndjãwe rapawã. 
 
Go rupi kowebu nande watama ra. 
Nande kuama ãpã wachu rupi ra. 
 
 
Go idja ray etallã mewe wyra 
wachapypredji manowã. 
 





Gorõ emi edjowerã kowe ywype. 
 
 
Nande urygatu reko ãpã wachu 
chupape.  
 
Ãpã wachu chupaperõ bue rywo 
gatu wyra o rywo gatu tãrã go. 
Goperõ ury gatu emi gope. Ãpã 
wachu chuparõ kybae gatu. Go 
rywo gatu reko idja chupa ruchã 
gatu. 
 
Nande mechãllã ãpã wachu chupa. 
 
 
Apã wachu nandepe mechãmba 
 
Nande mechãllã nande apã 
wachu echedji 
We don’t see God’s speech. We don’t 
see us have his speech as it goes 
straight into our heads. We don’t see it. 
We don’t see God. 
 
God’s only son here on earth 
was stabbed with a sharp point; 
he died to take away all our 
anger.  
 
We [inclusive] are walking 
along behind him now. We 
[inclusive] know to follow God.  
 
He gave his only son to die on 
pieces of crossed wood.  
 
Now he is at his father’s camp 
again.  
 
We [inclusive] haven’t seen it.  
 
He will come back again to this 
land.  
 
We [inclusive] will be content 
when God has us at his camp.  
 
In God’s camp, things are cool; 
there is cool shade under the 
trees there. There is happiness 
there. God’s camp is wonderful. 
It is cool; his camp is 
refreshingly cool.  
 
We [inclusive] have not seen God’s 
camp. 
 
God sees all of us.  
 




Go nande mechãmba nandedji 
ywadji 
 
Nande kadji nande chãwãmbu 




Mechãmba apã wachu nandepe 
 
Kadji nande urychi ikõ nande. 
 
 




Apã wachu mechã kreydji. “A la pinta* 
cho radjy! Bue buchã djapo.”  
 
 
Nande bue buchã djapobu krãndo 
buãwerã apã wachudji. 
	
 
He sees all of us from the sky.  
 
 
In the forest, we [inclusive] did 
lots of bad things in the 
darkness. We thought we were 
not seen. 
 
God sees all of us.  
 
[Living] in the forest, we really 
enjoyed living in sin.  
 
God sees all of us.  
 
We don’t see God.  
 
God sees us from the sun, “Gosh, my 
daughter! You did something 
ugly/wrong.”  
 
When we do something ugly/wrong, 
we pray to God. 
 




7.6 The Superstition of Missionary Christianity 
 
     From the beginning of the narrative, the speaker clearly states her evidential 
relation to the Christian message.  Jesus’ death and resurrection is clearly described 
as something lying outside of direct (visual) experience. No Ache had witnessed the 
events recounted in story; neither had the missionaries directly experienced it. Yet 
interestingly, the speaker’s lack of visual experience does not seem to imply any sort 
of skepticism about the Biblical events of sacrifice and resurrection—demonstrating 
a dramatic departure from the previously described evidential strategies. This is 
evident through two related asymmetries pointed out by the speaker: First, there is 
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the idea that Ache can’t see God, but God can see the Ache. The speaker’s lack of 
visual confirmation of the central events of Christian doctrine, rather than indexing 
her reservations about its truth-value, is instead used to separate fallible human 
knowledge from the global survey of God’s aerial point of view. God was able to see 
the Ache do “bad” things that the Ache can’t see among each other. The use of the 
adverb ka marks a departure from previous evidential standards, one based not on 
the experience of individuals but on a reality imagined through the sense of being 
seen (see Vilaça 2016: 222). 
     The Ache owners of the past had been evaluated on the basis of their care, 
whether they had “owned well” their dependents. For them, Ownership was a 
gradual process made concrete by gifts of food. God was a different sort of owner. 
God was an owner independently of any gift, of any actual relationship with an 
Ache. All creating, God’s ownership was a priori. How could God be evaluated? All 






     I devoted the early months of my fieldwork to collecting kinship terms and 
genealogies, a task that I believed my limited Ache could handle and one that would 
give me a sense of the shape of relations in the community and some idea of their 
past. In asking for the names of kin, I mostly received evaluations of kin and the 
networks of relations of which they were a part. Starting at the first line of my charts, 
I asked one of my informants, Krachogi, the name of his father. He responded, 
Cho ãpã mẽgatu. Mẽte karẽ kyra ray 
djurupe pypy. Waichy wywy emi. 
Gaiparallã dja djary. Mẽgatu buchu 
wywy. Mẽgatu pichu. Tatu. Goperõ 
mẽgatuetegi. Mẽ ury. Go llellãma mẽbu. 
 
Father “gave well.” He gave coati fat 
to his son, putting the food into his 
mouth. To all his godsons too. Neither 
were the grandmothers skinny; he 
gave them beetle larvae and armadillo. 
He was one who really gave well. He 
was happy to give. My father was 
always hungry because he was giving 
to others.  
 
Krachogi, interview (07/20/2009) 
 
 
Throughout the course of my fieldwork, my questions regarding relations were 
inevitably met with evaluations. Krachogi began his answer by mentioning his 
father’s generosity to his sons. Then, as further testament to the scope of his 
generosity, he gives to persons at successively wider social distance from these close 
relatives. Through his gifts of game to pregnant women, he had become a name-
giver to many children, whom he continued to nourish and protect throughout their 
early years. He created new relations with his gifts of game, and he honored the 
obligations of care that those relations entailed. He even gave to grandmothers, who 
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were often neglected and received poor shares when meat was distributed. 
Krachogi’s depiction of his father does not end with the latter’s generosity. An Ache 
hunter aimed not only to produce in abundance; he should also consume in 
moderation. As Krachogi describes, perhaps with some embellishment, his father’s 
eagerness to give left him in constant hunger. The value of consuming little did not 
derive merely from the fact that it allowed for a greater amount of food to share. 
This self-restraint was a value in itself, a sign of control over one’s appetite. His 
hunger did not result in jealousy, untrammeled desire and social strife, as commonly 
happened when the group was short of food. His hunger was a victory over these 
things. Krachogi’s father “gave well” (mẽgatu). The term gatu (well, good) not only 
implies that the act of giving is subject to evaluation; it draws attention to the act of 
giving by evaluating it.  
     Over the course of the preceding chapters, I have attempted to construct a portrait 
of relationality amid social change. In the first part of the dissertation, I examined 
Ache ownership in the context of everyday life among kin, showing that choices in 
residence (who one “follows”) were normatively limited to those who “owned” 
them. It was they who had grown them in the past, and it was hoped, they would 
provide for them in the future. Ownership brings up the question of evaluation and 
moral criticism, and this too has political undertones. In chapter 3, I described that a 
specific verbal genre of scolding that happens within ownership relations. Yet, as I 
showed, the risks involved in scolding show how tenuous the ownership relation 
can be. Relations of ownership between individuals were subject to change.  
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     Yet the idea of ownership itself remained quite durable over a period of 
tumultuous social change. Ownership traversed the boundaries between close kin 
and distant enemies, articulating external and internal relations (Fausto 2012; Costa 
2017). Whether conceiving themselves as the “sons” or “pets” of Paraguayans or the 
“sons” or “followers” of God, ownership provided an elastic idiom to understand 
the asymmetries they experienced. Of course, the idea of ownership would also 
undergo important changes during the settlement period (1959-1978), particularly 
through the influences of evangelical Christianity. In some respects, these new forms 
of ownership were destructive of existing forms and evaluative standards of 
ownerships. This had less to do with the relations Ache cultivated with the 
missionaries. The missionaries’ fears that giving gifts would make the Ache 
dependent made them poor candidates for owners. God’s ownership of humans was 
not only based on care but on his omnipotent authority as well. God’s ownership 
turned the evaluative attention from the actions of the owner to the actions of the 
owned. As an essential aspect of ownership, evaluation had its own history. 
     That history continues in the way Ache still talk about lost kin. Of course 
Krachogi’s estimation of his father’s worth as an owner was prompted by my 
interest. It does not reflect the quotidian discourse the colors daily events for the 
Ache today. However, it happens often enough that past relations are recalled, not 
as a source of desperate longing of the kind Djakugi struggled with in the 
introduction, but as a way to remind oneself of the pleasures of the past, the 
generosity of lost kin, and that people lived well in the most unforgiving of historical 
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circumstances. Even if the past is orphaned, it might still be taken up again, 











A Note on Orthography and Transcription 
 
     Ache (pronounced ah-CHAY) is one of more than forty languages in the Tupi-
Guarani family, the largest indigenous language family in South America as well as 
the most widely spread geographically. It is further grouped among indigenous 
Guaranian languages, alongside Ava Guarani, Mbya Guarani, Paĩ-Kaiowa, Xeta, and 
Tapiete/Chiriguano (Rodrigues 1985; Michael et al. 2015). There is considerable 
regional variation in the Ache language with two existent dialects—Northern Ache 
(spoken by the subgroup around the Jujui watershed) and Ñacunday Ache (spoken 
by the subgroup from the headwaters of the Ñacunday River to the Monday River) 
and two extinct dialects—Ypety Ache (from the subgroup between the Tebicuary 
River and the Caazapá Cordillera) and Southern Ache (from the subgroup around 
the middle course of the Jakui River). The Ypety and Jakui dialects have been 
described by Branislava Susnik (1961; 1962) and Friedrich C. Mayntzhusen (1920; 
1948), respectively. Eva Maria Roessler (2019) has extensively studied the Northern 
and Ñacunday varieties. 
     Anthropologists León Cadogan, Branislava Susnik, and the linguist Ruth 
Sammons of the New Tribes Mission each developed competing orthographies of 
the Ache language during their research.113 In this dissertation, I use a modified 
version of Cadogan’s orthography that Ache teachers selected in a meeting on 
																																																								
113 Susnik (1974), for example, erroneously posits the existence of long vowels, and Sammons 
ignored the existence of non-nasalized voiceless stops (Roessler, personal communication).  
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orthography in the Chupa Pou community in January of 2009 (see Roessler 2009), 
and for the purposes of clarity and parsimony, I have adjusted the Ache passages I 






114 Several internally consistent orthographies were developed by the linguist Eva Maria Roessler 
as part of a language documentation project in which Roessler, Jan David Hauck, and I 
participated. Ache representatives chose the particular variant I use here because it highlights the 
differences between Ache and Guarani. 
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Table 8.1 Consonants 
 
 Bilabial Alveopalatal Alveolar Palatal Velar Glottal 
Voiceless 
Stop  p  t/nt  k ‘ 
Voiced 
Stop b/mb  d/nd  g/ng  
Voiceless 
Fricative 
f       
Voiced 
Fricative w      
Voiceless 
Affricate  ch     
Voiced 
Affricate 
 dj     
Flap   r    
Nasal m  n    
Semi-
vowel    ll   
  
 
As is common for the Tupi-Guarani linguistic family, the Ache language has six oral 
(a, e, i, o, u, y) and six nasal vowels (ã, ẽ, ĩ, õ, ũ, ỹ). Nasal vowels may modify some 
consonants that follow them, a phenomenon that linguists call “nasal harmony.” 
Thus, the sound [b] is pronounced <b> when it follows an oral syllable, but becomes 
[mb] when it follows a nasal vowel. The same is true for <d> and <t> and <g>, 
which is pronounced [nd] and [nt] and [ng] when it appears next to a nasal vowel. 
Word final nasal vowels typically affect the initial consonant of the next word. 
Because nasality in Ache only affects segments in immediate proximity to the nasal 
vowel segment, it is weaker than most other languages in the Tupi-Guarani family, 
where nasality spreads in both directions until it encounters a stressed oral syllable. 




Table 8.2 Vowels 
 
 Front Central Back 
Close  i, ĩ y, ỹ u, ũ 
Mid e, ẽ  o, õ 
Open  a, ã  
 
 
Two immediate problems arise when writing Ache. The first involves how to 
transcribe differences among the three existing Ache dialects. I have included textual 
material from these dialects in the dissertation but have not standardized these 
variants, so pronounced dialectical differences such as [t/ch], [w/bw], [ky/∅] are 
retained throughout. The second involves multi-lingual transcription. Ache, as it is 
currently spoken, borrows liberally from the Paraguayan Guarani spoken in the 
country’s rural areas, and owing to different sociolinguistic situation of each 
language community, different dialects of Ache borrow from Guarani and Spanish 
at different frequencies. When transcribing borrowings from Guarani or Spanish in 
cases where the orthographic representation of the same sound differs between the 
two languages, I have chosen the Ache grapheme. Thus, the Spanish term Kristo 
becomes Krito. Ache words are italicized.  
     All translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own. I have tried in my 
translations to stay as close to Ache as possible to address the source-oriented 
concerns I take up at various points in this dissertation. I use brackets in translated 
text to give the reader a sense for what is implied but not directly encoded in a 
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Glossary of Ache Terms 
 
I have left some Ache terms untranslated in the text, both because of their 
importance and the difficulty of finding accurate equivalents in English. Though the 
English translations of the terms below are not exact, and the reader will gain a 
better sense of their meaning through a consideration of their context as described in 
the main text of the dissertation, I think it might be helpful for readers to have some 




























The terrestrial specter of a deceased human or 
animal 
 
A class of diseases caused by the terrestrial 
souls of adjawe 
 
From ekõ, “to live or exist,” ekõandy refers to 
the areas frequently visited by an Ache band 
 
An adverb that describes false, senseless, or 
careless actions 
 
The celestial soul of a dead person; a shadow 
or reflection 
 
To scold; a jaguar’s growl 
 
To give or give something up to another 
 
The celestial soul, literally “what is separated 
from the body at death” 
 














Account of September 1973 Contact by NTM 
 
     On August 30th of 1973 on the outskirts of the town of Laurel, a Paraguayan 
farmer named Hilarion Vera saw a small band of seven Ache cross a forest road a 
short distance from his house.115 At the sight of the band, he pointed the barrel of his 
rifle upward and fired twice into the air. At the sound of the rifle blasts, “They 
stopped in their tracks, threw away their bows and arrows, and held up their hands” 
(Aqui, 9/21/73). After subduing the group, Vera took the Ache back to his house and 
fed them.  
     What happened next is unclear. Vera took an infant from one of the Ache, and 
when he sold it to a neighbor, three of the Ache fled back into the forest. One Ache 
couple, Krypurãngi and Eiragi, and their young son stayed at Vera’s house. Vera 
took the three Ache to the mayor of Laurel, who, unsure of what to do with them 
himself, then turned them over to the police in the city of Puerto Presidente 
Stroessner.  
     The Ache couple was released to the NTM on September 13th. Krypurãngi and 
Eiragi wanted to be reunited with the other members of their band, so the 
missionaries (Jim and Steve Stolz, Paul Heckert, and Felipe Mendoza) set off with 
																																																								
115 As Vera recalled in a newspaper interview, “We stopped the tractor, but then we pushed 
forward another 50 meters and saw another completely naked man run past us in the same place. 
[…] I shot into the air with my rifle. When the Ache saw us they began to run. I stopped the 
tractor and shot again into the air. Then they stopped in their tracks, threw away their bows and 
arrows, and held up their hands” (Aqui, 9/21/73). 
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two Ache from the reservation (Julio [Betapagi?] and Deli) to look for them in the 
dense forests around Arroyo Guazú.  
     By noon the next day, they had located the Ache camp. The missionaries stayed 
behind a short distance outside the camp’s perimeter, while Krypurãngi and Julio 
stripped off their clothes and entered the camp, so that the others could look at their 
bodies. Seated in the camp were eight women with their children and two old men; 
the men of the band were away hunting. The women and girls greeted the two Ache 
visitors with the “welcome of tears.” They cried and massaged the bodies of the 
visitors from head to toe in a ritualized greeting.  
     “After about half an hour, [Krypurãngi and Julio] came and told us we could go 
in if we took off our clothes and left our guns. We obeyed and followed them. The 
men sat trembling and staring. Deli, Julio, Krypurãngi began rubbing their backs 
and told us to do the same.” An old woman (Brikugi’s mother) greeted the 
missionaries with ritual wailing. She cut bitter oranges and with the juice, rubbed 
their bodies to make them “sweet-smelling.”  
     Several young women were sent to tell the hunters about the whites who had 
arrived in their camp. When they heard of the visitors, the hunters were alarmed 
and unsure about the whites’ motives, and they did not yet know that Krypurãngi 
and Eiragi had led the whites to them. As one Ache hunter, Brikugi, would later 
remember the event, “The women called out to us, ‘The whites have come to take us!’ 
There were a number of men (ache) with me. The men were very frightened. They 
said, ‘[The whites] might kill us!’ Then I went to where the frightened Ache were [in 
the camp.] When we walked out of the forest, I was going to shoot Jim [Stolz] with 
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an arrow. I thought about it. I went to where the children were. I took the other men 
with me. Then when the women called out [to us], we moved noisily along the path 
that had been cut in order to scare them.”   
     The hunter’s aggressive entrance had its intended effect on the missionaries. 
“They came charging up the path like a bunch of wild pigs,” one missionary recalled. 
“I thought they might be going to kill us, but they lined up with bows and arrows in 
hand and just stared” (Heckert 1974). Jim Stolz, who had nearly been shot by Brikugi, 
had this to say: “The band of hunters surrounded us and threatened us with their 
arrows, while forcefully hitting the ground with their bows, leaving a strong and 
unforgettable impression on us. But soon thereafter, the old woman talked to them 
and managed to convince them that we had arrived as friends with the intention of 
helping them” (Stolz 1973).  
     After the tensions had subsided between the hunters and missionaries, the 
hunters shared with them roasted game—a coati, agouti, armadillo, and several 
Amazona parrots—with a cake made from palm fiber. The Ache wanted to see if the 
whites ate the same things as they did. “We asked [the missionaries], ‘Will you eat 
parrots?’ Felipe [Mendoza], because he was Paraguayan, knew how to eat animals. 
He roasted the parrots on sticks. We roasted them and gave them to everyone 
(Brikugi in Sammons 1987: 21-22).  
     After they had eaten, the missionaries spoke with the beleaguered band through 
one of the Ache from the mission who understood by Ache and Guarani. Jim Stolz 
described the next few hours in the camp: “We spent that afternoon and evening 
there with them, during which time the young Guayaki that accompanied us told 
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them what life was like in the Colony, that we wished to help them—which we 
could do in the Colony—so that those who wanted could go with us, upon which all 
of them did” (Stolz 1973). In the early morning of the 16th, the group carried the sick 
Ache several kilometers from the camp through thick canebreaks to the road where 
the missionaries’ had left their truck.  
     While the newly contacted Ache were “content” with what the missionaries had 
told them, they were still mistrustful of the “strange” Ache the missionaries had 
brought with them from the reservation, some of whom had been their traditional 
enemies. The situation, as one newly contacted Ache man would recall, was tense, 
and at one point, nearly broke into violence. When the group flushed a covey of 
curassows, one of the (enemy) reservation Ache raised his shotgun to shoot one. 
Brikugi told one of the reservation Ache: “Don’t shoot your gun. We will shoot you 
with arrows if you do.” His threat had its intended effect on them. As Brikugi 
recalled, “He knew it. If he had shot the gun, I would have killed him with arrows 
by the road. I would have probably killed the man (ache), I would have shot him 
with arrows” (Brikugi in Sammons 1987: 22).  
     At the road, the Ache women climbed into the flatbed of the missionaries’ Dodge 
Power Wagon and rode several hours to the colony. It would be the next day before 
the missionaries could return for the men. The men would later recall their 
uneasiness as they waited for the truck to return. They wondered if the whites 
would take the women away, never to be seen again, just as the Paraguayan had 
taken the child four weeks earlier. Brikugi would later say: “We didn’t know the 
Ache’s place here [Cerro Moroti]. They might have been taking us somewhere else” 
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(interview 10/13/17). But by midnight on the 17th these concerns were allayed as 
they were reunited with the women. The group, which numbered 46 people, spent 
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